Daily Report

Latin America

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FBIS-LAT-94-165 *25 August 1994*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

OAS Charges Dominican Election Schedule Violates Pact *[Madrid EFE]* 1
Honduras' Reina Remarks at Central American Summit *[Tegucigalpa TV]* 1
Regional Governments To Promote Joint Broadcasts *[Managua Radio]* 2

CARIBBEAN

Cuba

Castro Views U.S. Ties, Emigration Crisis *[Havana Radio, TV]* 3
Robaina Discusses Relations With Ecuador's Paredes *[PRENSA LATINA]* 19
Meets With Chilean Businessmen *[Havana Radio]* 20
Robaina: 'We Are Willing To Sit Down and Talk' With U.S. *[Madrid EFE]* 20
Robaina: Cuba 'Not Begging' To Negotiate *[Havana Radio]* 20
UN Envoy's Remarks *[Havana Radio]* 20
Further on UN Envoy's Remarks *[PRENSA LATINA]* 21
Jamming Station 'Worked Efficiently' Against U.S. Broadcasts *[Havana Radio]* 21
GRANMA Commentaries: U.S. Not Seeking Solutions *[PRENSA LATINA]* 21
GRANMA: 'War' Among Guantanamo Refugees 'Could Explode' *[Havana Radio]* 22
U.S. Reactions To Influx of Cubans Reported *[Havana Radio]* 23
Radio Cites U.S. Groups on Immigration Issue *[Havana Radio]* 23
Russia Supports Cuba-U.S. Talks *[PRENSA LATINA]* 24
Raul Castro 18 Aug Granma Plenum Address *[Havana Radio]* 24
UJC First Secretary Appointed CDR National Coordinator *[PRENSA LATINA]* 26

Inter-Caribbean Affairs

Cuba Asks Caricom Not To Accept Refugees *[Kingston Radio]* 27

Haiti

Deputies Debate Jonassaint Government Prime Minister *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 27
Sansaricq Senate Discusses 'Normalizing' Electoral Council *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 28
Flights Chartered by Journalists Prohibited *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 28
Further on Prohibition *[AFP]* 28
Aristide: Haitian Refugees 'Treated Inhumanely' *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 28
Jonassaint Minister Discusses Fuel Situation, Refugees *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 29
Inflation Replaces Invasion as Primary Worry *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 29
Neo-Duvalierist RDR Favors Negotiations *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 30
Social Christian Party Leader Urges Compromise *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 30

MEXICO

Commerce Secretary Foresees Growth in Exports *[EL FINANCIERO 22 Aug]* 31
Exporters To Present Trade Program to Zedillo *[LA JORNADA 23 Aug]* 31
Police Arrest Several for Drug Trafficking *[Madrid EFE]* 32
Steady, If Incomplete, Democratization Seen *[NEXOS Aug]* 33
Krauze Urges Genuine Democratization *[PROCESO 8 Aug]* 34
Castaneda Cites Vote Reporting Dilemmas *[PROCESO 8 Aug]* 34
Democratic Advance Criteria Cited *[NEXOS Aug]* 36

CENTRAL AMERICA

Costa Rica

Naranjo: Limited Number of Cubans Could Be Accepted *[AFP]* 39

El Salvador

Government Denies Considering Accepting Cubans *[NOTIMEX]* 39

Guatemala

Government Not To Accept Cuban Refugees *[ACAN]* 39

Honduras

Possibility of Receiving Cubans 'Not Ruled Out' *[Tegucigalpa Radio]* 39
Source: Government To Admit 'Selective' Group of Cubans *[ACAN]* 40

Panama

Perez Balladares: Cuban Refugees To Be Handled Same Way as Haitians *[Panama City TV]* 40
No Formal Request Made to Panama To Take Cuban Refugees *[Panama City TV]* 40
President-Elect Pledges To Punish Corrupt Officials *[LA PRENSA 22 Aug]* 41
Legislative Assembly Approves Ban on Constitutional Army *[ACAN]* 41
Further on Act Eliminating Army *[Panama City TV]* 42
Extradition Request Denied for Former Guatemalan President *[Panama City TV]* 42

SOUTH AMERICA

Argentina

Di Tella on Falklands, AMIA Case; Menem Not To Visit UK *[NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS]* 43
Defense Minister Discusses Security, Falklands *[NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS]* 43
Defense Minister on Military Salary Increase *[CLARIN 16 Aug]* 44
Buenos Aires Province Governor on Reelection *[NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS]* 44

Bolivia

Defense Minister Denies Unrest With Armed Forces *[HOY 12 Aug]* 45
Sanchez Terms Gas Contract With Brazil 'Just' *[Madrid EFE]* 45

Brazil

Vox Populi Poll Shows 40 Percent Prefer Cardoso *[JORNAL DO BRASIL 20 Aug]* 46
Ω Nuclear, Space, S&T Notes *[GAZETA MERCANTIL 5-7 Aug, etc.]* 46

Chile

Foreign Minister Figueroa Interviewed *[LA TERCERA DE LA HORA 14 Aug]* 48
Government To Transfer Land to Indigenous Communities *[EL MERCURIO 15 Aug]* 51
Pinochet Criticizes Those Who 'Attack His Institution' *[Santiago TV]* 52

Ecuador

Ω Poll Reveals Government 'Credibility Crisis' *[HOY 24 Jul]* 52
Ω Demographic Projections for Year 2000 *[EL COMERCIO 11, 18 Jul]* 53

Peru

Perez de Cuellar Campaign Faulted for Leftists *[Madrid EFE]* 53
Board Approves Text of New Electoral Law *[EXPRESO 11 Aug]* 54

Uruguay

Minister Interviewed on Mercosur Outcome *[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO 10 Aug]* 55
'Leftist' Group Calls for 'Revolutionary Justice' *[BUSQUEDA 18 Aug]* 56
Injuries Reported in Basque Extradition Clash *[NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS]* 57

Venezuela

Foreign Minister: Country Unwilling To Receive Cubans *[AFP]* 58

OAS Charges Dominican Election Schedule Violates Pact

PA2508022394 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2106 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Santo Domingo, 24 Aug (EFE)—According to a report issued in Santo Domingo today, Tuesday, the Dominican National Assembly has violated the "Pact for Democracy" signed by the political parties to solve the postelectoral crisis.

The report, issued by the OAS, indicates that the violation occurred when the Assembly scheduled "elections to be held in two years instead of the stipulated 18 months."

The document emphasizes that several legislators, supporters of President Joaquin Balaguer, oppose complying with provisions of the "Pact" signed by Balaguer and Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, former presidential candidate for the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), the main opposition party in the country.

The "Pact For Democracy" was signed by Pena Gomez and Balaguer, with the mediation of the Catholic Church and the OAS, to stop the Dominican Republic's political crisis from worsening as the opposition was calling for strikes to protest reported "colossal fraud."

Christopher Thomas, acting OAS secretary general, explains in the report to the Permanent Council that, in assuming the government on 16 August, Balaguer said that he was willing to change the Constitution but that several of his followers oppose this.

The OAS reiterates its position of backing the Dominican Republic in holding a "feasible and trustworthy electoral process."

But, the report adds, despite "a very delicate situation" and an atmosphere arising "from irregularities in the electoral process, which were witnessed by the OAS (observers), a new presidency has been inaugurated for a reduced two-year period."

It clarifies that the reduction in the presidential term from four to two years resulted from "all the parties' concern about flaws in the electoral process and the need to strengthen the people's trust in their institutions."

Regarding the signing of the "Pact for Democracy," Christopher Thomas' report asserts the OAS "was invited to ease the dialogue and served to bring the contending parties to dialogue. The result could turn out to be not as perfect as we would have wanted."

The acting OAS secretary general mentions in this report the main events in the Dominican electoral process and the regional organization's participation in this process.

Among those events, Thomas refers to the Electoral Tribunal declaration that granted the presidency to Balaguer without taking into account the recommendations of the "Verification Commission" that investigated the opposition's charges of fraud.

The Verification Commission report indicated that between 28,000 and 54,000 Dominicans were not been able to vote although they had documents to do so.

The difference in votes between Balaguer and Pena Gomez was 22,000 votes—less than 1 percent of the total votes.

The regional organization maintains its position that constitutional reforms must be completed and that there be compliance with "Pact for Democracy" to stabilize the political situation in the Dominican Republic.

The report concludes by pointing out that the experiences of the Dominican electoral process will be helpful in future electoral observation missions.

Honduras' Reina Remarks at Central American Summit

PA2508022494 Tegucigalpa Telesistema Hondureno Television Network in Spanish 0100 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Report on statements by Honduran President Carlos Roberto Reina at the 15th Central American Presidential Summit in El Guacimo, Costa Rica, on 22 August by Danilo Rios; from the "This Very Day" newscast—passage within quotation marks recorded]

[Text] [Rios] President Carlos Roberto Reina thinks that the Salvadoran Government is willing to immediately begin the border delimitation between the two countries.

[Reina] "Both states have agreed to start this immediately. This is extraordinary news for Honduras, which has not been highlighted anywhere. It is extraordinary news because if this delimitation is not carried out, the efforts of all these years with the International Court in The Hague will have been wasted."

[Rios] The president said that the Constitution allows dual nationality, for instance for certain Salvadoran settlers who are demand this after they ended up living inside Honduran territory after the border between both countries was defined.

[Reina] "For these cases, the Constitution suggests a dual nationality treaty. This will be sent to the Congress for debate. Then the Honduran people can express their opinion through Congress on the conditions for such a treaty."

[Rios] The president also explained some of the decisions he considered important that were reached at the presidential summit.

[Reina] "We have the case of bulk purchases of medicine. This change represents boundless benefits for Central America. Why should the cost of a certain medicine

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in a Central American country vary so widely from that of the same medicine in some other Central American country?"

[Rios] Trade union negotiations and bulk purchases will also be implemented for fuels to try to lower purchase prices and ensure supplies. On the topic of public security, Reina supports the idea of creating a police academy with Central American instructors, thus improving the quality of police work.

Regional Governments To Promote Joint Broadcasts

PA2208185394 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1200 GMT 19 Aug 94

[From the "Events" newscast]

[Text] Central American governments will promote a radio newscast to further regional integration. All the Central American information and press ministers or secretaries, who are meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, agreed to broadcast an inter-Central American radio program and a periodic television broadcast to give news and discuss topics to further integration.

According to a press release by the Social Communications Directorate, area government officials met in San Jose, Costa Rica, on 16 and 17 August to define communications strategies to support the Peace and Development Conference to be held in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in October. The meeting was attended by Luis Rivas Leiva of Nicaragua, Felipe Lozana of Guatemala, Juan Ramon Duran of Honduras, Hector Herrera of El Salvador, and Flor Rodriguez of Costa Rica.

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Cuba

Castro Views U.S. Ties, Emigration Crisis

PA2508031994 Havana Radio and Television Networks in Spanish 0200 GMT 25 Aug 94

[Interview with Commander in Chief Fidel Castro, president of Cuba, by program host Hector Rodriguez and reporters Rosalia Arnaez, Arleen Rodriguez, Luis Baez, and Susana Lee, in Havana; from the "This Very Day" program—live]

[Text] [Hector Rodriguez] As announced earlier this evening, Commander in Chief Fidel Castro, president of the Republic of Cuba, is here to participate in this program. We welcome him again. Good evening, commander.

[Castro] Good evening.

[Hector Rodriguez] We have here a panel of journalists. From left to right, Susana Lee, Luis Baez, Rosalia Arnaez, Arleen Rodriguez. I want to point out that Cuban television and radio, as well as Radio Havana Cuba, are now in network. I immediately give the floor to Commander in Chief Fidel Castro.

[Castro] Thank you. On this occasion I am compelled to review, as briefly as possible, events that have led to the current situation, meaning what we may call the complex and serious crisis that has been created, given the topics we have discussed. Hence, I think it is appropriate to continue with the same team, because you are well aware of the issue.

[Hector Rodriguez] Exactly.

[Castro] It is possible that I may expand a bit on the initial statement because I have some issues to discuss, and I want to do it coherently, so that it is not interrupted with questions. I will later give you the opportunity to ask all the questions you want, because today we began earlier, at 2200.

[Hector Rodriguez] At 2200.

[Castro] I think that those who watch the soap opera will not complain. Right?

[Hector Rodriguez] No, it is over.

[Castro] We have inconvenienced the fewest number of people possible.

A chronology of the events: hijacking of the 13 de Marzo tugboat. Accident with other tugboats that cause the craft to sink. Thirty- one people were rescued by Border Guard troops. Thirty-two people drown. This happened in the month of July. in mid-July.

[Hector Rodriguez] The 13th.

[Castro] The 13th. The 13 de Marzo on 13 July. Within the campaign unleashed after this event, President Clinton stated on 18 July that the incident is another example of the Cuban regime's brutal nature. It was proven that the authorities had absolutely nothing to do with this accident, which was duly explained.

Tuesday, 26 July. Hijacking of the Baragua passenger boat with 30 people aboard. The hijackers, armed with a pistol and various knives, threaten to kill a passenger, a 17-year-old woman. They throw two passengers overboard—one of them three miles from the coast—and they threaten to throw others overboard. The boat is intercepted 36 miles from the Cuban coast by a U.S. Coast Guard unit that picks up 15 people and turns over the hijackers' weapons. The patrol boat crew follows the boat but take no action in order to avoid accidents. They simply rescue the people thrown overboard.

Wednesday, 3 August. Hijacking of La Coubre passenger boat by a group of people armed with a pistol, a revolver, a hand grenade, and various knives. U.S. Coast Guard units pick up the hijackers and other passengers, more than 100, on the open sea. Later, Border Guard troops help the remaining 76 passengers.

Thursday, 4 August. Hijacking of the Baragua passenger boat—for the second time. Murder of Lieutenant Gabriel Lamoth. The boat ran out of fuel, and since their intimidation plot failed, the hijackers were captured next day. The boat and its passengers were brought back without problems. In this case, what really happened is that they surrendered. They were within our jurisdiction, they ran out of fuel, they got tired, and they asked the authorities to help them.

Friday, 5 August. Vandalistic actions by counterrevolutionary and antisocial individuals in Havana, linked with the hijacking of boats for immigration. This provokes the overwhelming reaction of the revolutionary people in the capital. My first appearance on Cuban television to review events that occurred that day. I said then: If the United States does not adopt quick and efficient measures to stop encouraging illegal departures from the country, we will feel duty-bound to instruct the Border Guard troops to not obstruct any boat from leaving Cuba.

We have defined our position. We do not oppose solutions if there is sincerity, honesty; if they wish to solve things; if they do not want to pull our leg; but we cannot continue to guard the United States' borders. We state this here, in the presence of the people and the world, denouncing events which have occurred and how they have occurred.

Sunday, 7 August. Funeral ceremony to bid farewell to Lieutenant Gabriel Lamoth Caballero. Speech by General Ulises Rosales del Toro: If the United States is willing to discuss with Cuba serious solutions, honest negotiations on this issue, we do not oppose a joint search for solutions. The idea is again repeated.

Monday, 8 August. A U.S. Coast Guard source reports 5,154 Cubans have been rescued in the Florida Straits to date in 1994.

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According to the source itself, the numbers for previous years are: 1983-1989, 630; 1990, 467; 1991, 2,203; 1992, 2,557; 1993, 3,656; and in 1994, 4,731 as of that date, which was 1 August. One can see here that the number of people who are being received illegally in the United States has been increasing year after year. This shows that a massive exodus was already under way, for reasons that I will explain later.

That same day sub-officer Lamoth Caballero was buried in Guantanamo. Also that same day the ferrocement vessel 5034 of the military unit 4349 of the Revolutionary Navy was hijacked at Mariel, and Corvette Captain Roberto Aguilar Reyes was murdered. At the time he was a navy lieutenant. I think that in reality his rank is navy captain. He used to be a navy lieutenant.

There is a mistake here in this information. Even though our Border Guard troops immediately reported the hijacking and the crime to the U.S. Coast Guard, a unit from this naval force intercepted the hijacked vessel and picked up the 26 people on board, including the murderer himself, and took them to Key West. Subsequent statements by U.S. Government spokesmen and officials cast doubt on the veracity of the information regarding the murder of combatant Aguilar Reyes. They even identified the dead man as the hijacker and murderer Leonel Macias Gonzalez.

Tuesday, 9 August. In an editorial, THE WASHINGTON POST asks President Clinton to think about Cuba in a new way and to soften the embargo because the policy pursued up to now punishes innocent people and gives Fidel Castro a card of nationalism that hinders political change. That same day the Coast Guard reports that it has assisted 116 rafters in the past 24 hours, for a total of 539 in the month of August and of 5,270 in the year. So as of that date, 9 August, there were 5,272 [figure as heard] admissions: the mass exodus is under way.

Thursday, 11 August. THE NEW YORK TIMES urges the U.S. Government to soften the economic sanctions on Cuba and to change its immigration policy toward Cuba, and affirms that the United States is trapped in a self-created dilemma. That same day, 11 August, the Coast Guard reports that in the past 48 hours it had assisted 116 Cuban rafters and that the total number of rafters assisted in 1994 had reached 5,435.

That very same day I said on Cuban television: Discussing the matter in earnest and looking at problems in depth entails discussing the embargo and ending both it and the policy of constantly stimulating terrorism. It implies settling the matter surrounding the famous Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, which gives Cuba privileges not granted to anyone else regarding emigration and which legitimizes the illegal emigration of Cuban citizens.

Friday, 12 August. Despite all the things that had been happening, such as kidnappings, crimes, assassinations, throwing people overboard several miles from the coast, and despite the volume of illegal emigrants, White House spokesperson Dee Dee Myers—I pronounce it in Spanish—declares that the United States has not changed and does not intend to change its policy on Cuban illegal immigrants. That same day, Secretary of State Warren Christopher said: We will continue to enforce our present policy on illegal immigration from Cuba. He added that the United States has the plans and the means to prevent another Mariel boat lift. On the same day, State Department spokesman David Jones said the White House does not intend to either modify the preferential status accorded Cuban illegal immigrants or to repatriate them. Anyone leaving Cuba can acquire U.S. citizenship quickly, pleading either political or economic reasons.

May I repeat—all this occurs after all that has been happening. Any type of boat is commandeered and any type of felony is perpetrated to reach the objectives.

On that same day, 12 August, Border Troops were specifically instructed to make operations on illegal departures more flexible.

Sunday, 14 August. Hundreds of people, with the complicity of the captain, boarded the tanker Hussara at the port of Mariel. The situation has already reached a level of impunity. The hijackers were already safe. The degree of stimulus given through all the actions and remarks is large. A ship carrying fuel, a dangerous ship, was seized by hundreds of people, approximately 700. The situation was complex and dangerous, forcing the police to act cautiously to prevent an accident with this ship carrying fuel. It was a dangerous situation. But the police calmly managed to resolve the problem and prevent further consequences. We would have been blamed for anything that happened there.

August 15. The Interior Ministry announced that all those who had boarded the Hussara ship had left voluntarily. No measures were taken against those people, even though an investigation is being conducted into the captain's and several crew members' responsibility for their participation in the action. But I am not familiar with the results of this investigation.

In other words an untenable situation had been created, which threatened transportation on the bay, threatened work, and was a risk to arriving and departing vessels. This was a big vessel—if the stern were placed on home plate, the bow will reach past the scoreboard. The ship is 160 meters long. Nearly every Cuban knows what a ship that big is like. They take over the ship with the help of the captain, and he goes down the ladder and agrees with them. This all happens the same day that several thousand people gather in Mariel for the funeral of Navy lieutenant, now Navy Captain Roberto Aguilar. This is the same day. This gives some idea of how the hijackers were encouraged and how things had been happening for a long time and of the encouragement given to potential hijackers.

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On Friday, 19 August, President Clinton gives a news conference. I have a copy somewhere. On Saturday 20 August, President Clinton issues a press release. I also have it somewhere. Finally, on Sunday, 21 August, White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta says that a naval blockade is a U.S. option. Further along I shall talk about the instructions that were given. I simply mention the border.

I believe that we should now mainly discuss what Clinton said on 19 August, the date of his news conference delivered on his birthday. I notice my birthday is pretty close to that, since it was on 13 August, while Clinton's is on 19 August. I try to avoid taking hasty and careless measures on my birthday. He should have waited and seen how events developed, and then he would have had much more to go on, much more calm, much more serenity to judge things.

Clinton said: Castro's regime has encouraged Cubans to take to the sea. Castro's regime has encouraged Cubans to take to the sea in unsafe craft in order to flee his country's domestic problems. With this action he has jeopardized the lives of thousands of Cubans. He has attempted to export to the United States the economic and political crisis he has created in Cuba, challenging the wave of democracy that today sweeps the area. As you can see, not even his birthday kept him from reading the harsh things he said during his news conference. Further along he said: I issued instructions today that Cuban illegal refugees should not be allowed to enter the United States. Those refugees who are rescued on the high seas will be taken to our naval base in Guantanamo.

Clinton was then asked several questions; I will not repeat them because they are well-known. Some of the questions are interesting, like the one where he is asked: Mr. President, we have maintained an embargo against Cuba for the past 35 years, which has increased economic problems in that country, and I understand this is why the refugees are arriving. What problem is there in taking small measures to negotiate treaties... [pauses] the negotiation... [pauses] What problem is there in taking some small measures regarding negotiation of a possible movement toward democracy with Cuba?

We have held negotiations with many communist nations during the past 35 years, and we continue to hold these. Clinton replies: I support the embargo and I support the law on democracy for Cuba, that is, the Torricelli bill that was approved in 1992. I do not think that in this we should change our policy. A reporter says: Nevertheless, there is North Korea and China; you deal with them all the time. This is a serious question; it is logical, ethical. Clinton responds: I believe that the circumstances are different and that our policy is correct.

Here is a reporter's question: Does this not force you to use multinational pressure to get Castro out in some way—militarily, economically, or another way? He says, he says: The United States has done more than any other country to attempt to end Castro's government.

They call it Castro's government, Castro this and Castro that. They ignore the fact that there is a revolutionary process, that there is a revolution. These are things very different from personalities, individuals, or the name of any leader.

Nevertheless, he says they have done more than any other country to put an end to Castro's government. This is a right that he takes, that he takes for himself as President of the United States. We have done this through the law on democracy for Cuba, the embargo. We have worked hard, many times almost alone with that goal in mind, and we will continue doing so through the reasonable means we may have at our disposal. How very interesting.

Certainly here, for the first time, there is undoubtedly an attempt to discourage, to take some measure to discourage illegal departures. From our point of view, however, he adopts an absurd position that even further complicates the problem and violates international law, Cuba's sovereignty, and even the norms of that agreement—unfair, arbitrary, and outdated—by which they imposed upon us the Guantanamo Naval Base, maintained by force.

That was on the 19th, but this produced certain reactions of various sectors. Clinton was the target of very strong pressure by individuals on the far right, but particularly from the extreme right-wing Cuban fascist mafia in Miami. As we have said on other occasions, they have a great deal of resources, a great deal of money, a great deal of influence; they carry weight in Congress and at different levels. We mentioned this during our last appearance.

As a result, they demand measures, they pressure Clinton, and Clinton caves in to the extreme right's pressure and in general to the mafia. Therefore, he decided to adopt a number of drastic measures with regard to Cuba.

He issued a statement that in part says: During the past two weeks the Cuban Government has carried out actions, the Cuban Government has carried out actions to provoke a massive exodus toward the United States. These actions have placed in jeopardy thousands of Cuban citizens in small vessels and rafts and has a direct impact on our national interests. Yesterday I announced measures to counter Castro's efforts to export his problems by means of an exodus. Today I am announcing additional measures in accordance with the law for democracy in Cuba, the Torricelli law, to limit the Cuban Government's capacity to accumulate foreign exchange, and which will allow us to broaden the flow of information to the Cuban people. Specifically, sending money to Cuba will not be authorized. Family packages will be limited to medicines, food, and strictly humanitarian articles, and the transfer of money for humanitarian reasons will require specific authorization from the Treasury Department. Second, the only Havana-Miami charter flights that will be authorized are those

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that will carry legal immigrants and make flights in accordance with the purpose of the law for democracy in Cuba. Third, the United States will use all means necessary to increase and extend its international broadcasts to Cuba. The United States will continue presenting to the United Nations and other international organizations proof of human rights violations such as the sinking of the 13 de Marzo tugboat.

And there we go again with the sinking of the tugboat. Once again they resort to slander and to the incident that began this entire process.

For the time being we will undertake these efforts with vigor and determination.

So nothing that we have been saying will be taken into account: all that was said in the successive interviews, in the Cuban media, or by the Foreign Ministry; all the opinions that we have been voicing in a constructive manner, seeking solutions, willing to discuss and seek serious solutions for this problem, because we considered it a problem that had already been created.

We say that the blockade is the fundamental thing that encourages this, and the response is more blockade. We say that the subversive broadcasts have been continuously encouraging illegal departures, and the response is more subversive broadcasts. We say that the compulsion toward massive emigration is the fundamental factor, the economic compulsion, and they adopt more coercive measures.

In this case, truly, the U.S. Administration is destroying in one fell swoop the work that has taken years to accomplish, with the purpose of creating an atmosphere of harmony and family reunion between the Cubans in Cuba and those who are abroad: a policy that the U.S. Government has always claimed to defend. They always said that this was a necessary policy, and our country has truly made strenuous efforts in this regard.

First, it established the general principle that Cuban citizens have the right to emigrate. Later came the immigration agreement of 1984, followed by the permission to travel abroad. At the beginning, this permission was granted to women over 55 and men over 60; later, the age was progressively reduced until we established the general principle that all people over 20 have the right to travel to the United States and return here and all Cubans or people with Cuban roots have the right to travel to Cuba from the United States and return—from the United States and anywhere else and return. They might be U.S. citizens, but if they have Cuban roots, they can travel here.

This achievement was not easy. Many people here had to be persuaded to accept this kind of policy. I already explained the risks we had to run; we had to convince the revolutionaries, and we had to convince public opinion before implementing these policies. The party and the government made a great effort to convince people and public opinion.

In April, we held a conference with Cuban emigrants. All of those willing to work constructively were invited. As a result of these discussions, a number of initiatives were agreed upon, including the creation of an office in the Foreign Relations Ministry to attend to the emigrants. We also discussed the possibility of some Cubans who live abroad that want to study in Cuba being able to study in Cuba, as long as they pay their tuition. Twenty years ago we could not have discussed the possibility of studying in Cuba.

We discussed visits to Cuba by those who left the country legally without having to wait five years. These kinds of visits were allowed, but there was a restriction. The emigrants asked us why we had this restriction on those who left the country legally. We suspended that restriction. We proposed reducing the age for leaving the country from 20 to 18 years. They asked why 20 and not 18 when the laws recognize an individual is of legal age. Right. We agreed to reduce the age limit from 20 to 18, although there are interests with 18-year-olds. This was the first time they were allowed to leave.

As for the right to travel abroad, we expanded the permission to stay abroad for personal reasons from six to 11 months. We accepted the possibility of repatriating those emigrants who meet certain requirements, such as not being involved in activities against the country, being over 60, being included in the annual quota for this type of case, being able to determine they will not be a burden on society, and proving they have their own resources or that their relatives are able to support them. These measures were discussed at that meeting, because the Cuban emigrants requested it.

They are favorable measures; some more so, others not as much, but altogether they are of great importance: to grant a number of Cubans permission to reside abroad that will allow them to travel to Cuba without a visa; to suppress all demands regarding staying at hotels, because before, when entry into Cuba had been authorized, part of those who came had to stay at the hotels. They presented this problem forcefully, and this requirement was lifted. They were granted facilities for staying wherever they pleased. All of these measures were agreed upon after April. They had not been announced yet because some details were being worked out. I believe that the official announcement was made recently—yesterday, as a matter of fact.

What a difference in policies we have here: the policy that is being followed by Cuba and that which has been adopted by the United States. There was a notable advance in all that had been seen in the history of the revolution; this can be clearly seen. This is what all these measures represented. Another measure that was recently adopted was the decriminalization and the right to family remittances, something that had not been authorized for almost 35 years: the dollar was decriminalized and family remittances were authorized.

Many times this had been achieved in one way or another, but we legalized it, made it easier. Hundreds of

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thousands of people in this country, in one way or another, benefited from those family remittances to resolve specific problems. They no longer had to be looking for a tourist or paying the trip of a tourist—they had the legal means to do this. There were certain conditions, as is the case in all countries of the world.

One of the measures adopted—obviously with the support of the fascist mafia leaders.... [pauses] Just imagine, the meeting during which these decisions were adopted was attended by the leaders of this mafia, along with the U.S. Government. Mas Canosa among all those people, the Cuban Foundation, people like that discussing and analyzing things. The U.S. policy has reached this extreme. People of this sort determining U.S. policy. As a result of this, I repeat, hundreds of thousands of people who, in one way or another, benefited from those remittances and solved many problems have now been deprived of those remittances.

Tens of thousands of Cubans used to visit the United States each year. They started to reduce—because this is part of an entire strategy, as I will explain later—they started to reduce the visitor's visas, which used to number some 30,000—as I said, tens of thousands. When all of these people returned to Cuba they brought suitcases loaded mainly with medicines. They had the right to bring up to 10 kg of medicines without paying taxes of any kind. Ten kilograms is a considerable amount. There was not one single person who did not return with at least 10 kg of medicines, taking into account the current difficulty with medicines.

They solved the problems of many people, including relatives and friends. Some people could try and change this, as sometimes happens. But an untold number of people benefited from these medicines when they visited their relatives. Now these people have lost all chance of having these medicines. Many sick people got used to certain medicines, and now cannot receive them. But in addition each of those who came from there as visitors brought 10 kg of medicines. This is one of the things we had anticipated. Thus, 30,000 people who traveled there, plus another 30,000 who came back, that makes approximately 60,000 people who brought medicines. Many people must have used these medicines given the policy recently adopted to address the special period's shortage. This was a humane and fair action by the champions of humanism.

But all this, including the result of the revolution's constructive policy on family unification, was wiped out with the stroke of a pen. This measure hurt Cubans on the other side and this side. No efforts were spared to strangle the revolution even more. As I said, all of these measures force illegal, mass departures. They should not blame us for this situation. We have documents to prove who is to blame for the mass departures and how this situation was created, although I warned about it so many times.

I have said once, 10 times, 20 times, all the time, that it was necessary to end the illegal entry of Cubans into the United States. A frame of mind, an idea, a belief, a conviction, had been created in many people that they had the right to travel to the United States illegally, that they needed no permit from SINA [U.S. Interests Section], which it had refused to give them. They were convinced that they could leave by sea in commandeered ships or planes.

At the time, they did not mention the risk to the lives of people aboard boats or ships that had been commandeered. For instance, a leaking 110-year-old tugboat was commandeered for travel. Yet they did not say a single word. The tried to resolve the problem all of a sudden by creating a concentration camp on Guantanamo Naval Base. Without having to take drastic measures of this type or any other type, in the course of time they could have done the opposite of what they did.

They could have predicted what could happen. They did the opposite. We have all the information here. See? It is obvious. The U.S. policy has been mathematically proven.

As I already explained, there was a migration agreement signed in 1984. This agreement was signed with none other than Reagan, who was very anti-Cuban, very hostile toward Cuba. Nevertheless, long talks were held and an agreement was reached. The agreement stated that up to 20,000 people would receive visas every year.

In other words, that was the amount granted. Long talks were held. There was another category, aside from the 20,000 visas—because our negotiators discussed this figure very well with regard to a minimum figure—and the phrase read like that: up to 20,000. That was the intention, the purpose, the sense, the spirit. A smaller group corresponded to those who had been in prison—the counterrevolutionaries and their families. They should legally receive 20,000 people per year, based on this agreement.

The agreement was signed in 1984 and took effect in 1985, and they granted 1,227 visas that year—out of the 20,000 visas.

Year 1986-1987: Suspension of the agreement given the conflict provoked by the U.S. determination to establish the unjustly named Radio Marti. This in itself represented an offense to the people—but it was not a Cuban invention or a Cuban initiative or a Cuban provocation. The provocation was theirs. This resulted in the agreement's suspension in 1986-1987. Nothing happened for two years. The agreement was resumed afterward. The largest number of visas was granted in 1988—they granted 3,472 visas; 1,631 were granted in 1989; 1,098 in 1990; 910 in 1992—see how the number goes down; 964 in 1993—this is Clinton's government, not Bush's government—544 in 1994, to date, up to 22 July, meaning over half of the year. See that. Those were the ones granted for family reunifications.

They should have granted 160,000 visas based on this chapter, but they only granted 11,222—7.01 percent—

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and, in recent years, less than 5 percent of the 20,000 visas. In other words, 160,000 people were unable to travel, and the number of people has grown in recent times. Of course, this was all part of a strategy. They denied the visas but deliberately sponsored... [pauses] The goal was to leave those people disappointed, bitter, displeased, waiting indefinitely for a visa. Nevertheless, they now invent reasons—for example, that there were not enough qualified Cubans to go there. [chuckles] See how they welcome them there, how they are all qualified, and how, although the Cubans who want to migrate have many relatives living in the United States, only 5 percent of the visas has been granted in recent years—and 7 percent overall.

Nevertheless, when it involved counterrevolutionaries, people who had been arrested, who had been in prison, and who had had problems—encouraged by U.S. policy, practically directed by them for 30 years... [pauses] They were given an opportunity precisely based on decisions we adopted and at a given time demanded because those people here were displeased. Those people had been in prison—the United States was essentially responsible for this—so they were given an opportunity. Since they were in a different category from that of relatives, they were given a larger number of visas—3,000 a year. Well, they gave 2,800 visas in one year, 3,015 the next, and so on, until there were no more left in that category.

They gave 11,222 of the 160,000 visas which corresponded to family reunifications, yet they granted 17,210 visas for that category, meaning counterrevolutionary prisoners and relatives. Just imagine, a political distinction between one category of citizen and another. They felt more committed to the former. Thus, out of the 184,000 possible visas they granted 15,000—no, not 15,000; it was 15.45 percent. But for family reunifications, I repeat, they granted 7.01 percent and less than 5 percent in recent years. I emphasize the figure because this is what proves it is all the result of a policy. There was no problem for those who departed illegally.

Nevertheless, here is the migration agreement... [pauses] the communique issued when the agreement was signed in 1984. It said: The United States will resume issuing preferential immigrant visas to Cuban citizens living in Cuba, up to 20,000 a year—just imagine, they did not say only the family. The communique said: The United States will will resume issuing preferential immigrant visas to Cuban citizens living in Cuba, up to 20,000 a year, particularly next of kin of U.S. citizens and Cubans who are permanent residents of the United States. It did not just cover those in the category of people with relatives in the United States.

The agreement also said: The U.S. side stated its willingness to implement, with the Cuban authorities' cooperation, all the necessary measures to guarantee that Cuban citizens residing in Cuba who wish to migrate to the United States, and qualify according to the U.S. laws for immigrant visas, may enter the United States taking the fullest advantage, taking the fullest advantage of the 20,000 immigrant visas a year.

This did not include the category of former counterrevolutionary prisoners and relatives. What happened to the agreement? What happened to the communique? What happened to these intentions?

Moreover, Cuba will accept the return of those Cuban citizens who arrived at the United States in 1980, coming from the port of Mariel, and who have been declared ineligible to legally enter the United States. That was not an easy thing but the state of mind prevailed. That was the counterpart—accept that they could choose who they would consider ineligible to receive in the United States—and a complete list of all the people was prepared. We have faithfully abided by our commitments. Some of the people who came had AIDS. Obviously, we did not like that, but they were accepted. We have not rejected one single case.

None, every time airplanes were sent to pick up these people. Every time they said the word these people were brought, every one of them. Some could not be brought due to legal problems—because a riot occurred at a given time in one of the places where they were kept. Negotiations were held with them, and there were some obstacles, but we created no obstacles so they could be here, meaning the 2,800 we had agreed upon.

Cuba has strictly complied with its commitments, and they complied in the manner I explained before.

Notice this: the fewer visas they granted for legal travel, the more illegal entries occurred. This happened between 1990 and 1994. In 1990, Cuba prevented 1,593 people from traveling illegally; nevertheless, the United States received 467 illegal immigrants who arrived on its coasts. In 1991, 6,596 people who were prevented from traveling illegally, while 1,997 people who traveled illegally were received during this same period. In 1992, 7,073 people were prevented from traveling illegally, while the United States received 2,511 illegal travelers. In 1993, Cuba managed to prevent the illegal departure of 11,564 people, and during the same period there were 4,208 people who arrived illegally in the United States and were received. In 1994, so far up to now, up to a few days ago, 10,975 people were prevented from illegally traveling, but the United States received 4,092 people. The rate was nearly 10,000.

Cuba's efforts prevented the arrival of 37,801 people in four and one-half years, while thanks to the U.S. policy they received 13,275 people during the same four and one-half year period. No exceptions whatsoever were made as to their category, what crimes they may have committed, what ships they hijacked, whether they travelled by ship, or whether they travelled by raft. Many of these went by raft.

Every day for years radio stations encouraged and called on people to steal a boat and depart illegally by whatever

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means that could take them to the United States. Can we really be blamed for this? Can a policy, a strategy be clearly seen here? Fewer and fewer legal visas are being granted, as little as 5 percent of the 20,000. Every day there are more and more illegal entries into the United States.

More people entered the United States illegally in four and one- half years than legally in eight years! There were 11,222 legal entries, compared to 13,275 illegal entries. Well, many more entered—imagine, in 1993 there were 4,208 illegal entries, compared to 964 legal entries. Isn't this encouragement of illegal emigration? There is a clear and proven mathematical relationship between illegal entries and mass departures.

Here one can see how these two mechanisms worked: the tougher Cuba's economic situation became, the fewer people they received legally and the more they received illegally. One can see the strategy here; one can also see the effect this has had. In 1990, 1,593 people tried to leave and were stopped, but 467 did make it. Year after year the number increases in step with harsher economic conditions, in step with the increased effects of the blockade, compelled by the blockade. Studies have been made, and the work of some university people on reasons why these people emigrated has been published. It was for economic reasons. The thesis we advance is that the fundamental factor is really the economic blockade which compelled increasing numbers of departures.

They had all that data. What efforts have they made? What measures have they taken? They could have done something 10 years ago, when that immigration agreement was signed.

That immigration agreement was beginning to weaken. For political and political chicanery reasons, that agreement did not differentiate between the person who was traveling legally and the person who was traveling illegally. That agreement did not differentiate; therefore, what was the use of a legal agreement? Anyone, a person who fell into no category, a person who had committed a crime, could travel and was greeted in the same manner as a person who met all their requirements. They should have adopted stronger measures. That is why Clinton's measures, and the measures adopted by the previous governments—but Clinton's in particular since he has been in government for almost 20 months—should have foreseen the consequences all this would entail. They are also responsible. Because in 1993, they picked up 964—that is the number without legal permits.

Would it not have been better to broaden and fulfill the agreement? If they had acted in good faith, and they had started to take measures, warning first and taking measures later, telling them that they were going to return them, that they are going to take measures, that they will have to go to jail to serve a sentence.

Or, they could have done as other nations do, return them to their country and talk this over with us. They could have said: We are willing to discuss with the nation the issue of those who arrive illegally.

We were not going to do anything to them for leaving illegally; this is not problem. This could have been discussed with the nation. Nevertheless, the demagoguery, political campaigns, the lies: How could they return someone to hell? If there is a naval base, yes. This logically does not resolve the problem of the urge. I will talk about the naval base later. I will talk about the effect that the decision that was made to send them to the naval base has not had.

Now, did we fail to warn about this? Did we fail to foresee this? Did we fail to say? We have lots of evidence about this. Another related diabolical mechanism—we are the ones who guard the U.S. borders—37,000 in four and one-half years. Now, if any incident came up, this was the end of the world. We were blamed for the whole incident, all the campaigns were against us.

There are several examples. For example in July 1993, when the Cojimar incident took place, we reported this to the North Americans. There was a North American involved. Everyone knows what happened in Cojimar. We reported to them that at approximately 2200 on Thursday, 1 July 1993, troops that guard the nation's border captured a speedboat called Midnight, Midnight Express. There are more details. During the capture a crew member was wounded in both legs. He was a U.S. citizen whose name was (?Richard Roberts) [words indistinct] resident of Key West, Florida. He was also a fisherman who received certain amounts of money for each person he took to U.S. territory. During the capture of the Midnight Express vessel, three citizens lost their lives while others were wounded, according to information. In addition, we explained what Cuba's chances for preventing these actions were, the consequences that these have, the serious consequences that arise again due to policies that encourage illegal departures from the country.

Besides, the Government of Cuba reiterates once again the serious consequences that once again arise from the policy that encourages illegal departures from the country, as well as with regard to the profits that unscrupulous individuals who reside in the United States make from people who live in Cuba. These people try to travel to the United States, but they are prevented from doing so legally because of the immigration policy imposed by the U.S. authorities. Cuba's chances for completely preventing these actions are limited, despite its willingness to cooperate and despite the great efforts it makes in this regard.

We need more cooperation from the United States. They responded to the accident that took place there with an insult. They said: We urge the Cuban Government to refrain from using excessive force under circumstances where there are no obvious threats to national security or the Cuban people. What do we understand to be excessive force? What force? Where is the manual?

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Sometimes a fast boat approaches our coast and opens fire. Then they say the U.S. Government rejects the allegations that it is somehow promoting illegal departures from Cuba. Then we had to send another note explaining that the Cuban Government is the first one to regret the loss of lives. As we explained to the U.S. Government in the note we sent on 3 July, we have proven said accidents are possible given the time and circumstances in which the pirate boats coming from the United States violate our territorial waters and even reach our shores, often to perpetrate armed attacks, smuggle human beings, or both.

The 3 July note reads: For pity's sake, it is inadmissible for Cuba to allow measures to be implemented to prevent such types of violations against both U.S. and Cuban laws to imply a loss of Cuban citizens' lives. Cuba's capability to fully prevent the smuggling of people by these boats is limited despite its willingness to cooperate—that is what the diplomatic note states—and the huge efforts it is making in that direction. I will say it again: We need more cooperation from the United States.

We sent a note on 5 July 1993 clearly stating that, convinced that the United States could not be interested in allowing its laws and borders to be violated in such a way, the fact that all those who commit these types of violations are welcome in that country and that most Cubans are not authorized to travel there legally is questionable. Sometimes people who have committed crimes in our country are welcomed there. Their arrivals are widely publicized and they are treated like heroes. We cannot deny that this policy triggers such violations; therefore, it is erroneous to say that our accusations are unfounded.

Cuban authorities have no reason to become U.S. border guards. We did not say this in August: We said it a year and a half ago, more than a year ago, thirteen months ago. I repeat: Cuban authorities have no reason to become U.S. border guards. The U.S. attitude does not equal the enormous sacrifices our personnel are making to prevent said violations, which affect the United States more than they affect Cuba.

We are telling them, if you will, we are explaining to them it is impossible to predict the individual reactions of isolated men whose mission is to guard and protect the coasts from the presence of hostile vessels that operate at night or before dawn. These vessels constitute a true and potential danger to our personnel. It is not easy to guarantee a more rational use of force and weapons under such conditions. There will always be risks to run. The U.S. Government is perfectly aware of this. Now if they really want to solve the problem, it would be necessary for both parties to act honestly and efficiently to prevent such incidents and to reach a consensus on the pertinent measures to be taken to prevent or at least attenuate unpleasant and painful incidents. This is how the Cuban Government is addressing the problem. The United States cannot pretend, under any pretext, that these efforts and the risks inherent in obeying the laws and protecting the two countries' coasts be made and run by Cuba only. This is their diplomatic note.

There were other similar cases. Cuba is making an effort to prevent these incidents from being blamed on Cuba—incidents like resorting to cruel methods and using excessive force.

Then came the incident that took place on a base. They sent us a weird, strange, and incomprehensible note. The note was sent to address several acts of extreme cruelty committed recently by troops on board patrol boats belonging to the Cuban Border Guards against people who were attempting to enter the U.S. naval base by swimming through the northern waters of Guantanamo Bay.

The note lists several alleged incidents: On 19 June at approximately 0800, troops on board Cuban Border Guard patrol boats threw several grenades into the bay's waters to try and stop several individuals from swimming toward the naval base. Several shots were heard. On 20 June at 0730, troops on board patrol boats again threw several grenades into the waters, followed by a burst of machine-gun fire, in an attempt to stop two swimmers. On 26 June at 0500, three patrol boats—this is the most dreadful and most horrifying report—surrounded some swimmers, shot them with automatic rifles, and detonated four grenades in the waters, killing at least three swimmers—they even said three swimmers were killed. Later, the troops used a large harpoon—what an imagination—of the type used to catch large fish to recover three bodies. On 27 June at 0529, Border Guard troops threw grenades on the waters, causing two explosions. Also on 27 June at 0848 GMT, troops on board a patrol boat opened several bursts of automatic rifle fire on one or more swimmers. Later, the patrol boat recovered one body from the waters. This was the fourth body recovered.

The use of lethal force by the Cuban Government against those who are attempting to reach Guantanamo Navy Base is unacceptable. The United States believes the use of hand grenades to stop individuals supposedly unarmed and performing actions that fail to threaten anyone else is an atrocity and a tremendous cruelty. The use of harpoons is equally cruel. In addition, the use of automatic weapons in an area near a border region could be interpreted as a provocative act. The United States insists that the Cuban Government desist immediately from these barbaric practices and that the Cuban Government inform the U.S. Government of its plans as soon as possible.

What language! What a note! A terrifying and threatening note! We had to reply. We had to respond to what their note was saying.

We had to investigate to find out what happened. Cuban authorities have conducted a thorough investigation of

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the unusual, incredible, and insulting charges in the note. We did not want to reject it out of hand because we were absolutely convinced that it was not and could not be true. The investigations revealed that the U.S. note includes repugnantly slanderous charges. It is an unfair, gross distortion of the minimum measures and procedures that Cuban authorities have been forced to take to fulfill basic duties, not only toward our own country but toward the military base installed against our people's will.

To publicize this note—and they spread the harpoon story throughout the world—was an infamy, a provocation, and indicative of a shameful lack of seriousness. The idea of using harpoons to recover alleged bodies is not only ridiculous, feverish, and a lie; it gives us the right to think that such a fabrication conceals a base, cowardly purposes that goes beyond gross propaganda against Cuba. We would rather believe, however, that the U.S. Government has been the victim of grotesquely false and cynical reports. Even so, we are terribly offended by the credibility given the note. The irresponsible, cavalier way in which this note was handled seems incredible to us.

It has been fully confirmed that from 19 to 27 June, a period of time mentioned by the U.S. note, Cuban citizens who wanted to emigrate to the United States attempted to enter the base several times. Several of them succeeded, and 34 others were arrested by Cuban authorities. Not one of those people were killed or injured during their arrest. No one was injured, yet the U.S. concocted the harpoon theory. Maybe they got confused with some equipment, a sort of stick used by fishermen to help people out of the water. This is the only thing that could have been there. The idea of harpoons is an absurd thing, a crazy idea.

We continued to say that if the United States sincerely and honestly wished to avoid incidents related to illegal immigration through Guantanamo Naval Base on Cuban territory, the United States could easily coordinate the proper measures with Cuban authorities with no risk to anyone. For example, it would be sufficient for U.S. authorities to establish, according to their own laws, that this is not the legal and appropriate way to travel to the United States. When an individual arrives at the base, instead of arresting him, he is put aboard a plane bound for the States, thus encouraging entry into the Guantanamo base, a dangerous place where there are armed forces.

We demanded that they tell the truth. We caught them lying and they never mentioned the matter again. But they had already spread the harpoon story throughout the world. In the end we said this: We think the U.S. note is insolent and threatening. It should be noted that this language is inadmissible and that every threat and attempt at intimidation will crash against our people's dignity and determination. Our border patrols have experienced many problems in their dedicated efforts to prevent illegal departures.

Were these the only notes? No, those were not the only notes. There are several more. For example, on 10 July 1993... [pauses] On 1 November 1993, we sent note Number 1,035, requesting information on the grand jury's decision not to press charges against those responsible for the detour of an Air Caribbean plane on 29 December 1992. The note expresses concern that the lack of action against the perpetrators of those violations might encourage similar hijackings.

On 3 November 1993, we send note Number 1,052. Therein the Foreign Ministry manifests its concern over the lack of cooperation shown by U.S. immigration authorities in not telling their Cuban counterparts that there were Cuban citizens, forced to enter the United States when their ships were hijacked, who wanted to return to Cuba. We could not even get them to return the people who had been kidnapped. [Castro knocks on the table] The note demands that U.S. authorities report those cases to our Interests Office expeditiously and that our citizens be allowed to get in touch with the Interests Office.

The note of 12 November 1993 was presented simultaneously in Havana and Washington. It is note Number 1,121 and concerns the unacceptable nature of U.S. policy on immigration matters in general and illegal immigration in particular. This note expresses the Cuban Government's strong displeasure with the negligent attitude and lack of action by U.S. authorities on illegal immigration from Cuba. It textually states that the attitude assumed by the United States in admitting and allowing Cubans, who arrive via illegal routes, to enter its territory—even if in many cases they were people with criminal records and proven criminal conduct who would never have been admitted through legal and regular channels—is a direct incentive for illegal immigration. It also says: Cuba cannot continue to guard the U.S. border—you see, we have been stating this—and exert intense efforts and incur expenses to do so. Cuba cannot continue to bear the risk of incidents which, despite the many measures we have implemented, can result in loss of life, as has occurred of late, especially when such incidents, as well as the illegal departures, are perfidiously and cynically used to generate propaganda against our country. In conclusion, the note points out that as a constructive gesture the Cuban Government will not make this problem public, preferring to use diplomatic channels.

On 16 February 1994, the director of our North America office, gave Sullivan, the head of the Interests Office, note No. 184 of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, in which we protest the broadcast of propaganda, on Guantanamo Naval Base Television Eight, that validates illegal departures and air piracy.

The 29 June 1994 note, Number 720, protests the impunity afforded to Cuban citizen Basilio Garcia who hijacked the An-24, the Havana-Nassau flight.

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On 5 August 1994 we presented note Number 943, a strong protest over the continued [rephrases] for everything, up through these most recent notes.

That is why I say we have not stated the problem just once; we have stated it 10, 20 times. We have presented the problem. We have warned about it. We have [words indistinct] but how can a problem be resolved when the following three situations exist? A difficult economic situation. An intensified blockade. A blockade increased by the Torricelli law and that has been implemented vigorously. That is why Clinton said no other government had done as much, no other country had done as much to terminate the Cuban government. [Castro drops his hand on the table] Well, they have truly made enormous efforts to this end.

And what have we gotten from all this? The 37,000, our efforts, in addition to all the notes we have sent them. How can we resolve any problem this way? The damage has been done. The incentives and summoning, by using the radio stations, people to travel have come together. Add to this the legal and honorable reception given anyone who gets there by any means. At the time, they did mention those who might sink in the attempt.

They encouraged and created the procedure by using the Gulf stream. They created organizations such as the so-called Rescue Group or Rescue Brothers—I am not sure what the name is—and used airplanes, boats, and so forth to receive them as soon as possible. Is this not a powerful incentive to illegal emigration? These are the three basic factors. An agreement which they disregard in such an incredible way that they only grant visas to 5 percent of the people they were supposed to legally receive, while thousands—I repeat—thousands arrived illegally.

How can Clinton say now that we are encouraging people to leave? We are not encouraging, stimulating, or giving money to anyone to leave the country. Nothing could be easier to prove. I do not believe there could be a clearer or more extensive file on the things we have said, proposed, or discussed from that date to now.

What have the continued illegal departures meant? What good was an immigration agreement that was not observed? For every legal departure there were four or five illegal departures. What effect could that migration agreement have? This is what has been going on for years [coughs] for 10 years. [coughs] Now, of course, all three factors that I pointed out come together.

I do not have much more to go before I finish, then you can ask questions. Many topics have been discussed. I will list the specific internal instructions that were issued to the Border Guard Forces. On 12 August, all these barbaric things had already taken place despite all the warnings. They were unwilling to listen to our call to discuss and find serious and responsible solutions, to which they replied that they would maintain their policy toward those who entered that country clandestinely. What sense does all of this make? What moral right do they now have to accuse us?

For some time now we had been taking steps. For a long time we had boats follow other boats. If a boat was seen out at sea, even if it was stolen, we instructed that they not try and intercept them. These were the instructions issued to the Border Guard Forces. In fact, they had these instructions when the boat accident occurred. As I told you, this was a problem that originated with the workers, who attempted to keep the boat from being stolen. We had issued precise instructions: Avoid the use of weapons; do not intercept boats at sea. They were doing their best and the best proof is in the numbers. I have the paper here. In 1994 alone, they prevented the departure of 10,965 people. What thanks did the country receive for all this? Constant calls, constant encouragement for illegal departures, encouragement to steal boats, to commit crimes. Why then all the great effort? All we could do was continue to accept this situation.

So we simply issued instructions to make the policy more flexible, the Border Guards' activities more flexible. And so there won't be anything secret here, these are the instructions. There are 10 points, and here they are without adding or subtracting—not even a comma.

1. To make as flexible as possible the activity of the Border Guards with regard to illegal departures from the country. We should not continue to be the most ardent defenders of the U.S. coasts, which allows them to blame us slanderously for any incident while they themselves continuously encourage violations of their own immigration laws.

2. To not fire one single shot unless it is in self-defense if our forces are attacked or if it arises from the need to defend economic or social centers.

3. To track with radar any movement of strange vessels that come close to our shores, to observe their possible purposes to discover if they have any offensive intentions toward Cuba, but not to send forces in pursuit unless there are indications of purposes of this kind. An attempt to pick up relatives or friends should not be considered an offensive action against our country.

4. If our patrol boats accidentally come across any strange vessel, to ask what their purpose is. If they say they are coming to pick up relatives, to treat them pleasantly and urge them to return empty. This is in the event they run across one of these vessels. To treat them pleasantly and urge them to return empty, since this is something on which discussion and resolution is pending with the United States, and no port has been prepared for this purpose.

If they need fuel, to supply it in exchange for cash payment in hard currency.

If the foreign vessel is returning—if they run across one that had already been here and is returning from our coasts with relatives and friends, to not to try and

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intercept it. This is the principle applied to all those encountered at sea, and to not take any hostile action against them. If the vessel is coming from Cuba, that is, from our coasts, with personnel who are trying to emigrate—be they private or state—to not to try and intercept it either, avoiding any type of incident. These are principles that we have been applying at sea for a long time, to not to try and intercept anyone, be they public or private, while at sea.

7. [number as heard] This is the most important point. If it is a raft or a small vessel that is unsafe for the trip, to urge them not to continue the trip, to help them return if they so desire, and in any event, not to arrest them, and to allow them to continue their trip if this is their will after advice has been given. No force is to be used. To give them water and food if they are in a critical situation.

You can imagine this—a patrol boat trying to keep a vessel there by force. I repeat: No force is to be used. To give them water and food if they are in a critical situation. That is to say, we have issued precise instructions on the cases of launches or small vessels that are unsafe for the trip.

8. The activities in the struggle against drug trafficking must continue with the same vigor with which they have been carried out up to now.

9. Any activities, concerted agreements, and attempts to try to leave the country by one's own means, and the conspiracies that are being plotted to achieve this end, should not be actively persecuted. There should be no attempt to persecute any group or people who are making any such plans, unless of course they are military personnel or individuals who through their desertion or treason would harm the country considerably. I refer to people in the planning stages, not individuals already at sea. I am talking about people who are making plans.

For its part, counterintelligence should try to learn as much as it can about plans to depart illegally and should keep the corresponding offices informed of them. It is especially important to keep vessels and aircraft that belong to the people from being stolen or hijacked, but this effort must be done on land—on land. Weapons must be used only when it is inevitable, and every effort must be made to avoid unnecessary deaths. The effort must be primarily organizational and preventive: measures to find out about and to prevent. From that point on we tell the Border Guards: focus on protecting the vessels that belong to the people.

10. This is the last point. All necessary organizational measures must be adopted to act rapidly and efficiently in the event the enemy attempts to use the new circumstances to infiltrate counterrevolutionary elements for the purpose of carrying out sabotage, attacks, and terrorist actions inside the country. Naturally, these dangers have always existed. More so with the migration policy established in the past few years: a policy of allowing people in and out. The current situation demands special effort in this regard, so they have to be alert, they have to be vigilant.

We are not opening up a Mariel; they are just expecting that a Mariel will be opened up.

In reality, these instructions explain that if a vessel is intercepted they should try to persuade, to advise the occupants that they should go back empty, that no port has been set up for their arrival, no port has been set up for them to come here. We have not urged them to do this.

We have simply told the Border Guards what policy should be followed if any of these vessels came this way, toward our coasts—many of them come sailing along the coast. In many cases they come to a place that is close to the sea, to a port. These are the instructions that were given on 12 August to our Border Guards.

This has been our policy and our attitude, and under no circumstances can it allow for the lies, falsehoods, and superficialities that are being said about the policy that we have followed.

The measures announced by the United States have not had the desired effect; they are not discouraging illegal departures. To the contrary, they are encouraging them. This is a reality. The numbers show this too. On 18 August, 745 of them arrived in the United States. Sorry, this was on 19 August. On 18 August, the day before Clinton spoke, 575 people arrived in the United States. These reports are theirs. One cannot know where a raft might depart at any given time, but they can cite exact figures because they pick them up.

On 19 August, the day Clinton spoke, 745 arrived. That very day. The following day, when the communique was issued and there was talk about the measures, that is to say, on 20 August, 1,189 arrived. On 21 August, 1,293. On 22 August, 2,548. On 23 August, 3,253. They did not pay him any mind! Measures were taken hastily, measures that were the opposite of what we had suggested to find a solution to the problem, because the exodus was already under way en masse.

To talk of a blockade and all of that also promotes a mass exodus, for the same reasons that we already have explained. What has happened is that following the U.S. measures, the mass exodus has increased, it has multiplied.

This shows the mentality that was created in many people who believe that their stay in Guantanamo will only be temporary and that the North Americans will have to be responsible for them. They believe that the United States has a commitment to them and that after so many years of telling them to leave, of urging them to emigrate, it is inconceivable that this policy could be changed. They believe that the community has enough

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influence for all of this. For a number of reasons, they do not believe and will not pay any attention to the U.S. Government's warnings.

That is the reality. Anyone would think those warnings would have the opposite effect and would result in a reduction, but they are leaving anyway. Those who arrived on Sunday, Monday, Tuesday—they all knew about the measures, all kinds of measures that had been adopted. They were not deterred; they were not afraid; they were not worried about the U.S. threat, and this phenomenon has occurred. Obviously, we know how many of them think. It is a mirage. In fact, many of the relatives....[pauses] Some were concerned, but they were told that the distance to travel is not far because the Coast Guard is there.

Our border guards strictly carried out their instructions. See if they did not. In recent days, our border guards—in compliance with Point 7—managed to dissuade almost 1,500 persons who were boarding crafts considered dangerous. They managed to dissuade them, help them, rescue them, and help them return to land. The average is 200 people.

The border guards have adopted all possible measures within our 12-mile range to provide assistance in case an accident occurs with any craft. All the measures have been adopted. We consider this a moral duty. The figure is interesting—approximately 1,500 persons in recent days. See how many people comply. This is entirely different from the action of encouraging people to travel by sea. They are actively working there, seriously trying to help. I believe they must continue to carry out their work. They must try to persuade people—both on the land and at sea—not to travel; and those who do travel by their own means should not use dangerous crafts.

But that is not all they are doing. Those are not the only things they are doing; that is, helping, rescuing, and persuading people. I am talking about people who were dissuaded when they were already in the water—approximately 1,500 persons. I think they should continue their efforts in compliance with the instructions issued. I think it is appropriate that they continue to follow the instructions—no matter how secret they may be—which were issued to border guards and Interior Ministry troops.

In summary, this is what I wanted to explain to you, to make it known to our public and to the international public. Now you have the sacred privilege of asking your questions. Go ahead, Susana.

[Lee] Commander, as you have said so well: in any event, the exodus continues; it has not been halted. They are talking—U.S. officials—have been talking about discussing the immigration policy; they have been talking about speeding up, about simplifying immigration procedures. That is, they continue concentrating on immigration problems. Meanwhile, they introduce another factor that serves to encourage. On one hand, they tell them not to take to the sea while on the other, they tell them they are capable of receiving more people. The Coast Guard is capable of receiving, of handling a larger exodus. They have been falling into these contradictions...

[Castro, interrupting] They have been contradicting themselves. They have ignored an immigration agreement, affecting many people—all those who arrived illegally. This is a contradiction created by this problem. Encouraging departures, the mentality that these people had created, those who attempted to immigrate in this fashion. All this encouragement, all these factors have caused the problem. Lately the problem has been growing. The instructions were already given to the Coast Guard who are relatively reasonable. A mass exodus was taking place. I reported this with all the data which we have analyzed here. Therefore, in this case, I believe that the Coast Guard's presence in that area is inevitable, and we cannot criticize it. We should not criticize it, since they already created this phenomena, since they created the insolence, defiance—and, let's say, the misbehavior. [chuckles] As this phenomena has affected many people, it is better for them to be as close as possible so they can try to help them. This could, however, drive people who think they will be safer—which is one of the things that happens—by knowing that a patrol boat passes nearby and that our boats are 11 miles away. Let us hope that all available boats are out there, not only those of the U.S. Government, but also private vessels inside that area that want to help. But the fact that this can become an encouragement must not deter us from doing something to lessen the effects of a phenomenon that was created a long time ago and cannot be resolved in 24 hours. The phenomenon is there, and we must make this our moral duty. It is true—a contradiction exists here that comes from the other causes that existed prior to this phenomenon, that grew out of the stimulus, from the compulsion to immigrate because of economic difficulties.

[Lee] The question, Commander, was about the use of the base, the naval base—how they have had to make one decision and then make another. Now they are talking about increasing the installation's capacity...

[Castro, interrupting] It seems absurd to me. All these things seem to be a violation and are illegal. They have enough room, enough territory in the United States itself so someone can violate their laws. They do not need to go to another country to use their territory to establish concentration camps. This is an illegal measure. They have enough resources and can make room.

This is true. I think that when they say they have enough room to receive immigrants it is logical. The phenomenon is working and a response must be given to those people who were undeniably led to believe and educated to do this. Many Cubans have been taught to violate U.S. law for a long time, and they have always been received with full honors. What was built over 36 years cannot

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come down in three days. That is the reality. No one knows the potential of all this which they themselves created.

They did not have to use Guantanamo Naval Base. I think this is a mistake because it creates complications. There are even rumors that it is easy to enter the base, but that is not true. Some people began to move as soon as they heard that they would be held in Guantanamo. Many of these people consider themselves to be under U.S. responsibility and that it is the U.S. authorities' duty to resolve their problem. This gives rise to certain forms of mobilization. But we have warned that there are close and strict measures there. We cannot take responsibility for any boat or small ship. In the area that is under our responsibility, however, we will not only enforce the measures taken but we have reinforced them to dispel those rumors, this idea of moving to Guantanamo base. So the situation, as far as we are concerned, is this: We have no concentration camp there. There is no problem. The situation there is completely normal.

[Hector Rodriguez] Luis Baez.

[Baez] Commander, how much are U.S. taxpayers paying for the maneuvers of all those naval forces in the area and to feed those tens of thousands of people in Guantanamo?

[Castro] Well, a lot of money. Everything is more expensive for them, although I cannot make an estimate. The most worrisome aspect of all this is the political consequences. Money they have in abundance. I do not think that is the fundamental aspect of the issue. It would be better to spend it on something else. It would have been better to have avoided all this. It would have been better to pay a little attention to our many warnings. Now this situation has been created that requires spending money. They spend money on everything to further their hegemony throughout the world. They have lots of military bases and embark on adventures of all types. I do not think money is what they are most concerned about.

[Hector Rodriguez] Rosalia Arnaez.

[Arnaez] Commander, you have specifically referred to the escalation of these stimuli. A sort of stampede has begun of certain social groups who are not deterred by the U.S. stations' blood-chilling stories of what happens to boat people and those who shipwreck in the Straits, as well as the images of Cubans who are on the naval base in a sort of concentration camp. What do you think could stop this situation, which is so dangerous for both Cuba and the United States?

[Castro] We will seek serious, true solutions. I want to resolve the problem. It will be necessary to study all the practical measures to correct it. It will be necessary to determine the causes and find serious solutions for all the factors that led to this situation. Honestly, I do not think there is any other solution. Will it be possible to achieve it? I do not know. I am not sure. But I am sure of one thing: No solution can be found if this aspect is not corrected; if there is not a true policy change; if certain concepts, ideas, purposes, and strategies are not abandoned.

This is a strategy against us, and it can be demonstrated by figures. Figures demonstrate two things. There is a strategy. First, let people arrive legally. Second, among those who arrive legally, grant privileges to a certain sector which the United States appreciates much more because it was made up of counterrevolutionaries. Third [as heard] and most importantly, the economic factor, the economic embargo is the essential, fundamental, overpowering factor in these mass emigrations, these mass illegal departures.

These problems are here and are already a reality. And now they need to be resolved; we have to see how they are resolved. I believe they need to be discussed. In order that these problems can be resolved by both them and us, these discussions have to take place on solid ground, because not even we can solve this problem unless it is on solid ground. It would be a waste of time. In order to seek solutions on solid ground it becomes necessary that both sides be willing. It cannot be this long story we are telling that spans 10 years at least, creating propaganda that encourages illegal departures. Many of these people you mention are now surprised, because after 10 years of hearing the same thing, they are now hearing the opposite. They have no power of persuasion over anybody. People are not persuaded, especially in matters of people's safety. The numbers are there to be seen. If they could have been persuaded we would have done so through the Border Guard patrol.

The problem, however, that has been created by all these things I have told you about, has no easy solution, either for them or for us. We cannot be asked to use weapons and violence to resolve this. All along we have tried to avoid this, like when there has been unrest in the streets. We have always let the masses resolve the problems. We have always tried to avoid the use of weapons. Why? Only to have them say after that we used harpoons or whatever. We have practically banned the use of weapons. Imagine a group defending a bus or a merchant vessel and a takeover takes place and the people decide it will not be taken over. These are circumstances where the use of weapons is justified. I hope this does not happen.

This is why it is ashore where we must prevent and resolve problems. Our main effort right now is aimed at protecting this equipment to prevent it from being stolen. As far as we know, there have not been any attempts to try and do any of these things, which happened every day in the past. To steal the boat to Regla, steal a tugboat, or try and take over a tanker—a ship of that size—these kinds of problems have not occurred in these last few days. But we cannot be asked to use weapons. Hey, it's a monster! Tie a rope around its neck! We are not willing to use violence. This phenomenon has already been created.

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Both countries need to seriously study and discuss how this can be resolved. We, for our part, are willing. We maintain a position and have said so several times before. We do not maintain an irrational or inflexible position, or anything like that.

Some people believe we wanted to annoy Clinton. The last thing we wanted to do was to have these types of problems with the Clinton administration. Who will benefit? People who have traditionally opposed the Revolution, people who have been very aggressive toward the Revolution. This position is hurting us because we have done absolutely nothing to harm Clinton or the Republicans.

But those who look back at history can see this was not invented. Those who know all the information I have given you this evening will understand that this was a situation that had no other option; that we had no alternative but to do what we did. We issued instructions to become more flexible. I think we have done the least; we have really done the least in this problem because there are many other possible options. But we have limited ourselves. No port or facilities have been prepared especially for the people to use.

We had no choice but to do what we did. We had to do it. What was happening was unacceptable; we were guarding the U.S. borders. We prevented 37,000 illegal departures, as opposed to 13,000 people warmly welcomed in the United States. What could we do? No one can blame us; no one has the moral authority to blame us. There are no morals, arguments, or nothing to blame us. Therefore, Cuba's position is irrefutable; it is very clear, so clear that I already read to you the instructions the Border Guards received that day. All authorities proposed a policy to U.S. authorities on those who were arriving illegally in the United States. There were no ulterior motives. Others believe we did it to force them to negotiate with us, but we had no other intentions. Now we are facing a situation for which we cannot be blamed. We must solve it. We are willing to solve it based on real, solid, and fair foundations. They should not ask us to resort to force and violence to which we have always refused.

No country is persecuting those who are trying to emigrate anywhere. Mexico is not persecuting the millions of men who have tried to emigrate or the hundreds of thousands who are trying to enter the United States illegally. Mexico is not persecuting them. Santo Domingo is not persecuting the Dominicans who are trying to cross the La Mona Channel to reach Puerto Rico and emigrate to the United States. Colombia is not persecuting those Colombians who want to go to Venezuela; some 1 or 2 million Colombians live in Venezuela. No country is persecuting those who are trying to emigrate. This is a world where there are many people who want to emigrate mainly for economic reasons.

Why are they demanding that we implement another policy? They want us to be the ones who will prevent another 37,000 people from leaving. However, they keep welcoming another 13,000 people, welcoming all of those who get there illegally. They cannot ask us to even use the force to stop these departures. We cannot continue to resist this policy. This is what has happened. We have been very patient, and we have repeatedly said [words indistinct] with these materials. They cannot demand this from us. I repeat: no country is persecuting those who are trying to emigrate.

[Arleen Rodriguez] Commander, I hope that this program is being watched in other parts of the world and that our truth is being heard, because as we read international newspapers, we have the feeling there is a silent complicity or an exaltation of the most reactionary views against our reality. I am saying this because the world is currently talking about Cuba as though Cuba were only those Cubans abroad. The world is not talking about the millions of Cubans who are living a normal life and fighting to support the country under these circumstances. We are even making things and decisions and implementing a policy to change the country under these circumstances, setting aside all threats. However, there are indications the U.S. Government is supporting the position of the Cuban-American Foundation, because the latest decisions made have to do with the Foundation's policies against the Cuban people. There is even talk about the possibility of implementing a naval blockade. Not very few people feel our country is in great danger if these types of measures are taken.

[Castro] The mere announcement of this measure [words indistinct] encourages the departures. It creates a fear; it can create a fear. That would be sheer insanity because, based on our experience and the consequences that have resulted from certain measures, a naval blockade will increase the exodus of people. A naval blockade will also increase the number of people who want to leave the country because of the difficult conditions. In addition to being an act of war which no country has the right to wage and which the United States has no right to implement on Cuba, a naval blockade will create what we call a catastrophe.

Because after people have learned to use the currents in the Gulf and know they have a possibility of moving in certain areas... [pauses] Just imagine, this is an island of 11 million people, where I am sure the majority, the immense majority, will resist anything, but anything, including a naval blockade and much more than that. There are many people who, caught in such a situation, would do all they could, they would see no alternative but to try to leave the country. Can you imagine the island surrounded by ships? And the people suffering much more from the terrible consequences of a naval blockade? Would this resolve the problem? No, it would not. It would increase the problem.

If the naval blockade does not work out, what is left? The invasion of Cuba? That situation would be the same insanity but raised to the second or third power. There is

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no doubt that this would be an unprecedented insanity even in this unipolar world, because most people, the best people, would undoubtedly fight and resist. It could be a 100-year war, as (?Luisito Vargas) wrote in his GRANMA article. What would this war mean? A genocide. In the eyes of the world. It would be a genocide in the eyes of 400 million Latin Americans. This is not so easy. It is very difficult. But, of course, taking the wrong path or an erratic one could lead to such insanities. We have seen more than one insanity in this world. We know what would happen in this country with each one of those options. They are insane. That is why I believe there are enough intelligent people in the United States to understand such realities.

They have launched a tremendous propaganda campaign against us. They have always had a thousand times more massive media sources to broadcast their campaigns, quarrels, and lies about Cuba than we have. The lies of different sorts. We have read some of them. However, there are also several radio stations that report our situation. There are U.S. television stations that broadcast this program; several broadcast it in its entirety. They give as much information as they can. It is not the same, of course. It is not the same, but we too have our ways of broadcasting information. For one reason or another, a large part of the world understands the problem. We nave to get our truth to all the international organizations, to the public through all available means, to the solidarity groups. All the embassies, the Foreign Ministry, the parliament, the government has to work so we can explain our situation. The explanation will have to be shorter, of course, but basically, the causes of this problem have to be described. Every one knows there is a blockade. This cannot be denied.

Everyone knows the most powerful and richest country in the world is exercising a strict blockade against our country, trying to strangle it, trying to defeat it through hunger and disease. Everyone knows this, but many people will also have to think about it. We must help them to think about it. We must supply the elements so they can form their own opinion. Obviously, all this is bad for Cuba, but it is also very bad for the United States. It is an adventure which, in my opinion, no judicious person would embark upon, especially when there is a possibility of solving the issue in a reasonable, dignified manner.

We do not want to harm anyone. We have no special antagonism or ill will toward this administration, as I said before. We have no desire to meddle in the United States' internal politics or to get involved in its problems. We have no reason to adopt biased positions in favor of someone or to meddle in anything. We would be happy if the problems could be solved. We should try to solve the problems, but based on realistic and honest positions. I believe a wise and sound assessment of the problem should be made. We have to do it, and I believe the U.S. leaders, the U.S. Government, should do the same.

[Hector Rodriguez] Susana Lee.

[Lee] Commander, regardless of what Arleen says, the articles and commentaries in major U.S. newspapers have recently increased and are making an appeal to the U.S. Administration to act wisely, stating that these hasty policies are having the opposite effect. Nevertheless, the foundation you spoke about—I think Arleen also spoke about it—is making an appeal to grant concessions. It is urging the Cuban-American community to grant concessions, to accept the measures, to grant concessions at this point. How do you evaluate this position, which is spreading within U.S. political and media circles?

[Castro] Who said this? Who has said this? I have not seen that.

[Lee] Mas Canosa.

[Castro] Concessions?

[Lee] Yes. He said the exile community had to make certain concessions, meaning to approve these measures....

[Castro] Ah! Make certain concessions.

[Lee] Approve the measures.

[Castro] It represents a tremendous sacrifice for them because it deals with critical issues.

[Lee] Including the trips.

[Castro] He must feel very bitter about this type of thing. This man and this Foundation—I was told today—are sponsoring the naval blockade, the invasion of Cuba. I believe there was a debate with other politicians, and I think it was very difficult. I think it was quite difficult. It must be difficult to defend that position. Someone said another Vietnam—or something worse than Vietnam—could happen. I am not surprised by the things they say. I wonder what the families think. Perhaps they have not been able to help even though they usually help. We know a large number of people depended on this. We are talking about families here and there. Therefore, measures have been adopted.

The measures are really characterized....[pauses] Since the measures are erratic, I believe they are politically damaging for the U.S. Government. They are here, anyway, because they have been attacking people who have no special vocation against U.S. imperialism. They have been attacking people, including revolutionaries, because many revolutionaries have relatives abroad. However, based on the general principle that they are not activists, active members of the revolution, they have even felt identified with U.S. policy in a certain way. The measures have also been affecting, harming them.

I will not claim that all the people who travel are not revolutionaries. Many revolutionaries have traveled, along with the tens of thousands who travel there. In fact,

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I said the other day that there are many people with great qualities and courage in the United States. The myths tend to disappear. The idea that this community was uniform, and antipatriotic. Many of them have lived there, and we must not forget what Marti said: They have seen the things that happen there. The injustice that takes place. The other day I spoke of the terrors that they were trying to use the people who came for the dialogue, who advocate a suspension of the blockade, but they are obviously acting based on that viewpoint—that the revolution must be destroyed, that the country must be blockaded, that the country must be invaded.

Nothing matters to them because their goal is to kill. They feel a fanatic hatred for everything that is progressive or revolutionary. What can you expect? They would like the Marines, the U.S. soldiers, to come and destroy the revolution so the country can be turned over to them. They are not the ones....[pauses] The ones who would have to die would be many people, many Cubans, but also many North Americans, many soldiers, many Marines. This is unavoidable because many cannot compare....[pauses] We do not want to brag. We do not want to appear arrogant, complacent, or proud, but we know what we have and we know our people. We know they are capable of struggling and resisting. We have tactics. Cuba has a concept of struggle that does not in any way resemble the places where U.S. troops have carried out their adventures. They do not resemble them in any way.

I do not want to appear boastful or anything, but many of us are quite aware of what we are and what we have, and about our capability to resist, struggle, and fight. Well, I do not want.... [pauses] I am not....[pauses] I do not want to talk in belligerent terms. If such a folly ever occurs, we are mentally and morally prepared. We want to be serene and calm, and we want to struggle for what is advisable for everyone. In this case, realistic and just solutions would be advisable both for us and for the North Americans. Obviously they are incomparably stronger, powerful, and bigger than we are; but the only reason the U.S. Administration has to do this is force, while our reasons are principles, morals, unity, honor, and truth above all.

We know what our people are capable of based on our truth, our reasons, and our dignity. We have reason for this. We have had reasons for this for a long time. We have suffered injustices for a long time. It is insolent and offensive for a person to say that the blockade is an option. It is also arrogant to say it mainly strived to destroy a revolution.

And what is our sin? Resisting. Not allowing ourselves to be destroyed. Being firm. Not doing what others have done; not surrendering or capitulating. That is our sin. That is the sin for which they want to punish us. They can try to do it, but it is going to be very costly, very difficult, and very unlikely that they can achieve this.

[Hector Rodriguez] Any other question?

[Reporter] He gave an ample explanation.

[Castro] That is true. You understand, of course. I could not cut this short because this coverage is not only for you and our people but for foreign consumption. I could not divide it into several parts. All of these things are linked together: the events of the past few days with all the other things that you have heard about, with all these diplomatic notes, all the measures taken, all the statistics, with what occurred with the immigration agreement, the illegal departures, the efforts we made, and the things that have occurred. I felt that if I limited myself to a brief exposition then all of this would be left to the mercy of you asking enough questions to provide all of this material. And there are still many things left, mind you. In any event, please accept my apologies for making this a little bit longer.

[Reporter] I believe that it is the U.S. Government which has to answer a lot of questions now.

[Castro] Well, you can see how they respond. They say the circumstances are not the same and that what they are doing is the right thing, that they can talk to everyone except us, and that these are the measures that have to be applied, that more and more pressure has to be applied. That is the philosophy, and above all to yield to the pressures of these minority, mafiosi, and fascistoid groups. No one would ever have believed it, that there would be mafiosos of this type there in the White House discussing extremely important measures of an international nature. I believe that the U.S. cadres and leaders themselves must have realized that this is a mistake, that they have fallen into a trap; they do not realize what they have fallen into.

[Hector Rodriguez] Commander, you were not the only one to warn them because the most influential U.S. newspapers—THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE WASHINGTON POST, and even conservative newspapers like THE WASHINGTON TIMES—and some of the brightest analysts warned Clinton and recommended that he take another position. However, he chose to strengthen the blockade and decree all of the measures that were recently announced. Could there be an electoral interest behind all of this, as some people claim?

[Castro] Some information has been mentioned; there has been talk about conversations on migration. A State Department official, an under secretary proposed this. We have given this much thought. Our position is known. Simple talks on migration will not resolve the problems if one does not reach the root of the problems and hold serious discussions. We are willing to discuss all topics, and that is our position. If they wish, we can resolve it. The causes are this, and this, and this. If they want to talk we can advance and discuss migration problems with them. Because I think that all of these arguments presented here about all that has occurred, all of this information has to be analyzed. That is why we have not rejected the idea of migration talks. Several people have shown interest in this. Several prominent

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people in the political sphere, from Latin America as well as from the United States, have already shown an interest in this. I do not want to be indiscreet, but the possibility of talks on migration topics is advancing. [Words indistinct] migration topics are lengthy and prolonged. Many times they drag on and on, and I believe the problems need somewhat rapid solutions.

That is exactly what I was explaining. What should we do if there is a new migration agreement, for example? What should we do about illegal departures? It has been proven that there can be no agreement. This topic alone could be the subject of lengthy discussions.

This is our position, although we do not think this by itself will resolve the problem. There would always be those who do not want to get out, who would not be admitted for one reason or another, who would want to seek other ways. An immigration agreement could be worked on but would require time. But we are convinced this would not resolve the problem. We cannot accept solutions that are not true solutions. This is reality. Nevertheless, our position is not one of opposition to the possibility of talking about any one subject.

[Reporter] Yes, it was yesterday when it was said by an under secretary of state for political affairs.

[Castro] Yes, well if you let me go, I must attend another interview with [words indistinct]

[Hector Rodriguez] I had asked a question about whether Clinton's advisers or Clinton himself had anything to do with the November electoral phenomenon.

[Castro] We must take into consideration that there are many people. I understood there are many people with a broader and more modern mind. There is no doubt that there are inexperienced people, however, and that this blessed ghost of the Cuban revolution, this obsession with the Cuban revolution, is a pathological thing and leads people to make mistakes. This very same thing constitutes a problem. There are many thinking people. I am sure that among the higher spheres of the United States there are many people who think along more rational lines. But there is a lack of experience. Sometimes there is emotion and then, unfortunately, internal policy also interferes.

Then we have the elections, the November elections for deputies and senators. In 1996 for president again. [sentence as heard] I cannot understand why, but Clinton truly does not need a mafia to win the elections. The mafia fought him fiercely, gave the Bush people plenty of money, and did everything possible to defeat Clinton. The mafia has done Clinton no favors.

However unjustified and obsessive, U.S. foreign policy cannot be decided as a function of this type of problem. This is not the nature of true statesmen. What they have done cannot be described as statesmanship.

The most amazing thing is the presence of the mafia and their leader in the White House and discussing important and serious foreign policy matters. I think this is what harms Clinton. If Clinton adopts reasonable and just measures, he will be recognized, not only in the United States but by the international public. This has been demonstrated by several countries' positions in the United Nations.

[Hector Rodriguez] If there is nothing more, you have held a broad discussion. We all expected a lot from your participation, commander. Again, thanks for your visit.

[Castro] I am a habitual visitor. You people now have more who cooperate with you than before the crisis. But do not congratulate yourselves on that.

[Rodriguez] No, no. It is always an honor for us to have you here with us. Thanks to everyone, and Commander. This is the end of our broadcast for today. Good night.

Robaina Discusses Relations With Ecuador's Paredes

PA2308182894 Havana PRENSA LATINA in Spanish 1703 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Quito, 23 Aug (PL)—Ecuadoran Foreign Minister Diego Paredes reiterated here today the need to lift the economic, commercial, and financial blockade imposed by the United States on Cuba and to seek formulas to help the island overcome its economic crisis.

In an interview for PRENSA LATINA, Paredes stressed that Ecuador has always been in favor of lifting the economic siege.

In our recent visit to Havana we noticed the shortage of economic resources, food, medicines, and other products, which have seriously affected the population, he added.

We believe that at this time when relations between Cuba and the United States are tense, it is necessary to seek a solution to the confrontation and promote a climate of peace in the region, the Ecuadoran foreign minister said.

Paredes described his Cuban counterpart Roberto Robaina's recent visit to Quito as very positive for the development of bilateral cooperation.

He said that those contacts contributed to strengthening the relations between the two countries by signing several cooperation agreements in the areas of energy, agriculture, commerce, and tourism, among others.

He stressed that in the next few months, both countries will work at reactivating a cultural agreement that will include seminars, exchange of experts, and other points.

Paredes confirmed that the Ecuadoran-Cuban Mixed Commission will meet during the first quarter of next year in Quito or Havana.

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Meets With Chilean Businessmen

FL2408194194 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1700 GMT 24 Aug 94

[From the "National Radio News"]

[Text] At this moment, Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina is meeting with a group of Chilean businessmen at the main offices of the Banco de Concepcion here in Santiago de Chile. There is interest on both sides in increasing trade between Cuba and Chile, as well as in maritime transportation and mutual investment guarantees.

Prior to this meeting with the Chilean businessmen, Robaina visited the headquarters of the Economic Commission for Latin America where he greeted its Secretary General Gert Rosenthal and later participated in a conference with delegates and officials of the regional organization on our country's reality.

This afternoon, Robaina will meet with Alvaro Garcia, minister of the economy, development, and reconstruction, and with leaders of the various political parties of Chile.

Foreign Minister Robaina, who arrived in Chile on Monday on an official visit, will depart tomorrow for Bolivia.

Robaina: 'We Are Willing To Sit Down and Talk' With U.S.

PY2408182994 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1736 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Santiago, 24 Aug (EFE)—Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina said today in this city that Cuba is willing to sit down and talk with the United States, but on equal conditions. He stressed that if the blockade were lifted, the Havana Government would be willing to drop obstacles for entering and leaving the country.

During a meeting with the media at the seat of the Economic Commission for Latin America, Robaina said: "We are willing to sit down and talk if both chairs are for listening or both for presiding."

The foreign minister arrived in Santiago on 22 August for a 4-day official visit that is part of a Latin American tour. He added that if one country presides and the other listens "there is no chance of any type of negotiation."

Robaina explained that Cuba will not beg for this dialogue and will not accept preconditions. He said that without preconditions "any type of communication can be established."

The foreign minister called on all Latin Americans to invest in his country. He highlighted the investments that Chile has made in the island.

He indicated that relations between his country and Latin America are very good, and maintained that the Cuban people today feel "much more loved" by their brothers of the region.

Robaina: Cuba 'Not Begging' To Negotiate

FL2408224694 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 1932 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina said in Chile on 24 August that Cuba does not rule out dialogue with the United States to solve the rafters' crisis. However, there must be no preconditions to that dialogue. Robaina told a news conference at the Economic Commission for Latin America building that Cuba is willing to sit at a negotiating table if both seats are at the same level, adding that Cuba is not begging to talk with the United States. Robaina warned that President Clinton's decision could create more tension between the two countries, since the U.S. military base at Guantanamo is a sensitive issue for the Cuban people.

Robaina arrived in Chile on 22 August and will travel to Bolivia on 25 August as part of his Latin American tour, which will also take him to Brazil, Panama, and Costa Rica.

UN Envoy's Remarks

FL2408193994 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1700 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Fernando Remirez de Estenoz, Cuban ambassador to the United Nations, stated that Cuba is willing to negotiate with the United States all problems between the two nations: specifically, the U.S. economic blockade, which causes Cuban emigration toward the United States. During the news conference held at UN headquarters, Remirez de Estonoz responded to a question asked by a reporter:

[Begin de Estonoz recording] The cause of the exodus is precisely the blockade. Those who are currently leaving Cuba are doing so basically for economic reasons. Therefore, it is very clear that anything that worsens the economy will increase emigration, which is not exclusive to Cuba. The United States has evidently manipulated the Cuban emigration problem. According to a report by the United States itself, more than 3,200 illegal immigrants try to enter that country every day. In other words, Cuba's situation adds to the emigration problem that the entire world is experiencing, in that people of underdeveloped countries or the Third World try to emigrate toward developed countries. We can even see this in the emigration of so many Latin American and Caribbean brothers who migrate to the United States.

Let me try to be as precise as I can: First, Cuba did not stimulate, nor is it stimulating at this moment, emigration from our country. In other words, it is not our policy to encourage such an emigration. But since the causes that are currently stimulating migration were not created

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by us, Cuba is willing to sit down and negotiate on what is motivating this emigration, which means that we would negotiate on the issue, the real cause: the blockade imposed by the United States against Cuba. [end recording]

Further on UN Envoy's Remarks

PA2408210194 Havana PRENSA LATINA in Spanish 1923 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] United Nations, 24 Aug (PL)—Cuba is not begging for anything, but it is ready to negotiate with the United States to resolve problems of mutual interest, Fernando Remirez de Estenoz, permanent envoy to the United Nations, declared today.

In a news conference at UN headquarters regarding the current situation between Cuba and the United States resulting from illegal emigration, Remirez de Estenoz, also first vice minister of foreign relations, said dialogue must be direct because although there are no diplomatic relations, there are indeed ties between the two countries.

He added that negotiations must be based on mutual respect and must encompass the problem as a whole; that is, the issue of emigration and its causes. He continued, saying that those who leave the country do so primarily for economic reasons that are the result of the tight U.S. blockade against Cuba for over 30 years.

Remirez de Estenoz remarked that the thousands of hours of transmissions from radio stations calling for the exodus and rebellion against the Cuban Government, as well as the illegal presence of Guantanamo Naval Base against the people's will, must be included in the talks.

Remirez said that in the case of the Haitian emigrants, as well as of the Cuban emigrants now, his government opposed the creation of a concentration camp at Guantanamo Naval Base because of its illegal and dangerous nature and its unforeseeable consequences. He added that the U.S. Administration has stiffened the blockade in response to Cuba's efforts to open its economy to modernize it and make it more productive. Washington's pressures and extortions against European and Latin American companies wishing to do business on the island are also well known.

The United States, he said, has implemented an embargo against its subsidiary companies in other countries, thus it is violating the laws of those states.

The causes behind the current exodus, he commented, are mainly economic and for that reason every U.S. measure that worsens the Cuban economy will increase emigration.

Remirez noted, however, that this is not just happening in Cuba. It is just that the topic has been distorted here, since, according to Washington's own statistics, over 3,000 people try to enter U.S. territory every day, owing to the worldwide phenomenon of emigration from underdeveloped to developed countries that is so typical in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Cuba has not and is not encouraging immigration because it is not our policy, he said, but since this situation has been created by external causes, in other words, the blockade, Cuba is willing to negotiate everything related to it.

In response to a question, he said that last year 146,000 citizens requested permits to travel abroad and over 90 percent of them were granted that right and given passports, primarily to visit the United States.

He said that the U.S. Government granted fewer than 2,000 visas in 1993.

We consider it a crime that the United States denies official visas to people so they can travel by secure means but welcomes those same people with open arms when they arrive in the U.S. illegally, risking their lives and the lives of innocent people, he stressed.

Jamming Station 'Worked Efficiently' Against U.S. Broadcasts

FL2508000294 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 2302 GMT 24 Aug 94

[From the "Exclusive" program]

[Text] On the morning of 24 August, the United States fulfilled its threat to increase its broadcasting of aggression against Cuba by expanding the schedule of enemy television broadcasts. As usual, the jamming station set up by our technicians and workers to protect national sovereignty worked efficiently throughout the entire period. With this action, the United States escalates their aggression one more decibel in an effort to take over one of the channels historically used by Cuban television to broadcast national programming.

International telecommunication authorities have urged the United States to suspend these broadcasts, but the U.S. Government has spurned those demands.

The equipment set up to eliminate the enemy signal has once again come to the forefront to respond to the new escalation in this field.

GRANMA Commentaries: U.S. Not Seeking Solutions

PA2408160794 Havana PRENSA LATINA in Spanish 0909 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Havana, 24 Aug (PL)—The daily GRANMA charged today that the U.S. Administration, far from seeking reasonable solutions to the crisis created by illegal departures from Cuban coasts, decided to get into a quagmire and incite a situation of unforeseen consequences.

In a lengthy commentary signed by journalist Lino Oramas, the official mouthpiece of the Communist Party

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of Cuba stated that the decisions President William Clinton announced last Saturday aggravate the true cause of the Cuban-U.S. differences by intensifying the blockade and anti-Cuban propaganda.

"Just 24 hours after showing once again he was beating around the bush by seeking to confine the problem to a mere migration issue, the U.S. Administration chose to remain shackled to the idea of destroying the revolution and to remain the hostage of the Cuban-born ultraright," the author wrote.

The White House announced on that occasion that it was reducing charter flights between Miami and Havana, banning cash transfers from Cubans living in the United States to their relatives in Cuba, stepping up radio broadcasts, and reiterating before international organizations charges about possible human rights violations in Cuba.

Those measures—Oramas stated—point to an implicit rejection of Havana's demand to begin a in-depth discussion of the real problems that have an impact on this crisis and constitute a boon for the Florida governor and the most reactionary members of the Cuban community in that state.

The author of the article added that in view of the continued illegal departures from Cuban coasts, the aides of the U.S. president dared even to raise the specter of a naval blockade.

"Miami's radio stations until just a few hours ago were tirelessly encouraging those exits, even to the point of inciting crime, and now they want to portray themselves as prudent lifesavers, playing into the hands of the strategy of those who are governing in Washington," the journalist stated.

The commentary stressed that rather than represent a simple correction of the previous U.S. policy, the recent measures are a far cry from a true commitment to solve the problem and, at the same time, cool down the already heated climate in the Caribbean, where a military operation has been deployed around Haiti with the endorsement of the UN Security Council.

Oramas makes note in another part of his article of the growing rejection by U.S. news media and personalities of the embargo Washington has been maintaining against Havana for over three decades and the island's willingness to find honorable and final solutions to the dispute.

Furthermore, he added, the U.S. Administration is ignoring the appeal by most of the international community in that respect and "comes out with new interventionist actions that harm Cuban sovereignty."

The U.S. refusal to accept its sole and absolute responsibility for this migration flow, the use of the Guantanamo military base as a concentration camp, and the stated purpose of employing Marines to arrest Cubans on the high seas fan this [words indistinct], Oramas wrote.

GRANMA carried another commentary by journalist Luis Baez Delgado, who said that what will end the emigration will not be a policy of belligerence, the naval blockade, conflict, and stepped up radio broadcasts. What will end it, instead, is the key cause: the embargo.

Under the heading: "What Will Happen?," the article stated that the blockade and emigration are inextricably linked phenomena and that the existence of one hinges on the existence of the other.

After noting Cuba is no Haiti or Grenada, Baez Delgado said that the life of a single U.S. citizen is not in danger in Cuba, and if a million people reportedly want to emigrate "there are 10 million willing to defend this land."

The author of this article noted that although Washington reversed its stance in less than 24 hours, the Cuban actions have been the same for the past 35 years and recalled that Havana's stance to settle the dispute has not changed one bit.

On this matter, he mentioned the points Cuba has proposed: "the lifting of the economic embargo; the return of the illegally occupied territory in Guantanamo; the end of subversive activities, including radio broadcasts; the end of the violations of our air and maritime space; and the end of pirate attacks and meddling in our internal affairs."

The authors of those commentaries stressed that those are the issues to be resolved if one wants a final solution to this longstanding problem. Referring to the world crisis of 1962, he added: "There are no nuclear missiles nor do Third World countries exist."

Baez Delgado concluded his article by stating that "the die has been cast, and the one thing we are completely certain of is that the most absolute steadfastness is the only path that leads to victory."

GRANMA: 'War' Among Guantanamo Refugees 'Could Explode'

FL2408145194 Havana Radio Progreso Network in Spanish 1100 GMT 24 Aug 94

[From the "First Thing" program]

[Text] On 24 August the newspaper GRANMA reports that the war among the poor could explode at the Guantanamo Naval Base. The Haitian refugees that are held at the base fear that the arrival of the Cuban rafters will worsen their situation. Colonel Douglas Kennedy informed that on 23 August 722 Haitians left their huts and improvised a protest march because they believed that the orange juice that was to be distributed at their concentration camp was being given to the Cuban immigrants. The U.S. spokesman stated that the rumor was

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totally false. The protest took place during Secretary of Defense William Perry's visit. Perry stated that some Haitians believed that the Cubans were receiving better rations and were being allowed to play baseball. Perry informed the Haitians that the treatment was going to be equal for both Cubans and Haitians.

At the Guantanamo Naval Base there are now approximately 15,000 Haitian refugees and in the next few hours 10,000 Cubans will arrive there as well, says a report from ANSA in Washington.

U.S. Reactions To Influx of Cubans Reported

FL2408142594 Havana Radio Progreso Network in Spanish 1100 GMT 24 Aug 94

[From the "First Thing" program]

[Text] On 23 August, in Washington, the White House reported that U.S. President Clinton discussed the Cuban immigrant problem with his national security and foreign affairs advisers for an hour.

The increase of Cuban rafters headed toward the coasts of Florida is putting pressure on Washington and they are trying to find a solution through countries that will admit the illegal immigrants concentrated at the Guantanamo Naval Base.

On 23 August, in the afternoon, the U.S. Coast Guard had already picked up 1,757 Cubans, which added to the 2,548 intercepted on 22 August. The same sources inform that as of 19 August a total of 6,787 Cubans had been picked up. At this rate the immigrants will soon surpass the capacity of the Guantanamo Naval Base. By week's end the total number could reach 10,000 Cubans, in addition to the 14,000 Haitians already at the base.

According to the U.S. State Department, 1,187 immigrants have arrived at Guantanamo Naval Base and another 4,696 immigrants are currently aboard U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels.

U.S. Secretary of State William Perry has not hesitated to threaten that the immigrants could be returned to Cuba. He stated that the return to Cuba is certainly an alternative. In the last few hours, the White House has confirmed that Cuban immigrants would not be allowed to enter the United States. The White House spokeswomen stated that U.S. authorities are worried by the level of immigration and that the Cubans are wrong in thinking that after being at the Guantanamo Naval Base they will be allowed to enter the United States.

The request made by the United States to third countries to receive Cuban immigrants does not seem to be obtaining good results. Costa Rica's Foreign Relations Minister Fernando Naranjo stated that his country is not willing to receive illegal Cuban immigrants, as requested by the U.S. Government. At a press conference, Naranjo stated that Costa Rica favors analyzing the return of Cuba to the Organization of American States.

On 23 August, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that for economic reasons the Government of Nicaragua is not able to accept Cuban nor Haitian refugees.

The Foreign Affairs Ministry of Suriname stated that it had taken note of the petition received from the United States. The petition requested that the Government of Suriname admit Cuban rafters. Diplomatic observers in Suriname's capital do not expect a positive reply to the United States' petition.

On 23 August, Ileana Varela, a reporter from the Hispanic television station Channel 23 in Miami, reported that the illegal Cuban immigrants at the Guantanamo Naval Base are behind bars at this U.S. military facility. On 22 August, Varela visited the imposed military base, where the Clinton administration has already concentrated over 1,000 men and women that reached the United States the week before. Varela reported that the first group of rafters were assigned huts and the second group were assigned U.S. Army tents. A base officer informed Varela that Cubans were going to be treated in the same manner as Haitians. Varela pointed out that many of the Cubans held at the military base were complaining about the intense heat and that she believed that soon there might be difficulties with the supply of water. Varela added that there was a tense atmosphere at the concentration camp and the fact that there were antiriot forces present proves that measures had been taken to face any eventuality. Varela confirmed that on 23 August U.S. military transport planes continue to transport illegal Cuban immigrants to the Guantanamo Naval Base, where they will be held for an indefinite time.

Radio Cites U.S. Groups on Immigration Issue

PA2408144994 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish 1300 GMT 24 Aug 94

[From the "Morning Information Review" newscast]

[Text] The White House is directly responsible for the current wave of illegal immigrants who are trying to enter the United States, leaders of a coalition of Cuban emigres' organizations residing in that country said in Miami.

Andres Gomez, spokesman for the coalition, said that the United States is also to be blamed because it has maintained during the last 35 years radio and television stations that air propaganda and encourage Cubans to leave their country and reach U.S. territory without using legal procedures.

The group—which is made up of the Alliance of Workers, Cuban-American Association, Afro-Cuban Cultural Recovery Association, and the Antonio Maceo Brigade—recalled that Washington has also not complied with the migratory agreements it has with Cuba.

The daily NUEVO HERALD pointed out that the U.S. Government is reportedly willing to sit down at the

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negotiating table with Cuba and discuss the issue during the periodic meetings both governments have been holding for more than a decade, according to statements made by Peter Tarnoff, assistant undersecretary of state for political affairs. The Cuban Government, however, has reiterated that the matter goes beyond the issue of migration techniques and that the main causes that led to the crisis should be negotiated.

U.S. President William Clinton has met with his national security and foreign affairs advisers to analyze the situation created by the increase of illegal Cuban immigrants, White House Spokesperson Dee Dee Meyers has reported, but she refused to comment on the alternatives that were analyzed.

Defense Secretary William Perry, Justice Minister [title as heard] Janet Reno, and Assistant Secretary of State [title as heard] Strobe Talbott were present at the meeting.

According to the communique distributed by Meyers, Washington decided to send a government delegation to Florida to meet with Governor Lawton Chiles. The spokesperson said that the policy with regard to illegal Cuban immigrants as announced last Friday by President Clinton remains unchanged.

Russia Supports Cuba-U.S. Talks

PA2408192094 Havana PRENSA LATINA in Spanish 1658 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Moscow, 24 Aug (PL)—Yuriy Korchagin, deputy chief of the Latin America Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, said today that Cuba has shown signs of willingness to talk with the United States and settle their bilateral differences.

The ranking Russian diplomat cited recent statements by Cuban authorities in favor of negotiating with White House representatives to eliminate tension from their relations.

In statements to PRENSA LATINA, Korchagin confirmed that from his country's viewpoint, open political dialogue is an adequate means of overcoming Washington-Havana differences.

The diplomat said that an intensification of differences will not resolve the current crisis and will only bring new elements of tension to the region.

Korchagin said he hopes for a solution to the conflict, adding that the measures announced by the Cuban Foreign Ministry regarding immigration could be interpreted as a constructive sign from Havana. He also said he is confident that the United States will respond.

Raul Castro 18 Aug Granma Plenum Address

FL2308233494 Havana Tele Rebelde Network in Spanish 0030 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Address by Army General Raul Castro to Communist Party of Cuba, Union of Young Communists, and mass organizations cadres meeting in Bayamo, Granma Province, on 18 August—recorded]

[Text] On 26 April 1992—two years, four months, and 18 days ago—during the analysis of Granma Province's progress report, made after an inspection visit by the Politburo, in this same room, and in my capacity as second secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba [PCC], the same capacity in which I am here today, I said, and I quote: The first thing we heard—I was referring to the first day; that must have been 22 or 23 April—was a summary of the government's report. I believe it was by Comrade Quintana. We had already studied, underlined, and checked figures before arriving in Bayamo. We had requested that the report be sent to us before our arrival so that we could avoid spending many hours listening to reports and getting dizzy from figures and statistics. I have spent over 30 years, I said back then, listening to those reports, and all that data that in the majority of cases we do not fulfill. I went on to say, on that day: The government's report, or the report that was made on the government's behalf, had the same defects as all reports. It was apologetic, filled with complacency, and contained very little self-criticism. Some deficiencies were mentioned indirectly. I had to speak before the provincial president had a chance to finish speaking, and I asked if there were no problems here and if was everything all right. I added that we were tired of hearing apologetic reports that during normal times should have been eliminated. Now, and in the situation that we find ourselves, that spirit, that method, and that attitude should simply be eliminated, and that it was not going to be an easy task.

Before I continue, I should point out that I began speaking of the provincial government's report in 1992. I said: Do not take upon yourselves alone these opinions or criticisms I want to share. Think about them and use them in future meetings related to these issues. I am speaking [pause] and this is the reason this meeting is being filmed and recorded. That was the 26th of April of 1992. I brought those videos, recordings, and transcripts with me here to Bayamo.

On 18 July 1994—last month—16 days before Granma Province was to present its progress report to the National Assembly of the People's Government [ANPP], we held a regional meeting in Holguin for the eastern provinces. That meeting lasted over 12 hours. Some of the people who are here today were at that meeting; the rest have been able to see on the videos that were shown this morning, the main issues that were broached. This therefore saves me from having to extend myself unnecessarily and take up more of your time.

On 20 July, a similar meeting was held in Villa Clara; and on 29 and 30 July, the regional meeting for the western provinces was held. The commander in chief was present during the last day of this meeting. At these meetings, the style of discussion encouraged, the type of analysis conducted, and the truly critical, revolutionary

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spirit that should prevail today in tackling any problem were highly reported by national media. I did not say anything new. All the basic concepts that I broached in those meetings have already been profusely explained by the commander in chief during all these years of the Revolution. However, on 3 August, during the morning session of the National Assembly of the People's Government, Comrade Rafael Dominguez, on behalf of the provincial assembly, read the synopsis, Granma Province's progress report, a synopsis which as we have seen, was superficial, apologetic, and did not tackle the core of the problems the province faces. I would like to state that we have confidence in Comrades Dominguez and Pina, in their qualities and in their proven revolutionary conviction. But trust among revolutionaries, comrades, is no exemption, but should signify constructive criticism, clear language, sharing criteria, and telling the truth while looking someone in the eye. Here we do not question any one person in particular. I take this opportunity to reiterate that Comrades Pina and Dominguez are revolutionaries. The problems here belong to all of us, beginning with us and ending with all of you who are sitting out there. Comrades Pina and Dominguez, members of our Central Committee, are capable of being useful to the Revolution which has shaped and educated them, on any post assigned to them by the party and state.

As many of you are aware, Comrade Pina met with the commander in chief, in his office, on the evening of 13 August. Pina explained the situation, said that he was not resigning, but due to that situation, he thought he would be more useful to the PCC and the government if he were released from his duties as first secretary of the People's Government Provincial Assembly of Granma.

Later, after their meeting, the commander in chief called me and briefly explained the conversation with Pina, Pina's explanation, the predominant state of mind in Granma, the minutes of the 8th [month not specified] meeting of the provincial bureau, and his willingness to go wherever he is sent. Pina's proposal was accepted, and Fidel said that Comrade Pina showed an honorable, honest, and unselfish attitude.

Comrades, my address at the ANPP session was meant for the entire nation, not only for Granma. It was a result of the three PCC meetings that had been held throughout the country, and comprises the method the Politburo, and especially the commander in chief, believes we should follow.

Now then, I reconfirm each and every word, without exception, that I stated in my address, beginning with the first paragraph where I stated: This morning's session of our National Assembly, with the exception of a few addresses, first of which was the last one by Comrade Fidel, and just a few others that took place earlier, have left a bitter taste in my mind.

That was so: I had that bitter taste in my mind that has not yet disappeared because the report that this province presented was apologetic, and descriptive—I consider that to be the key word; it was a descriptive synthesis rather than an analytical synthesis of the problems and the manner in which to resolve them. This is, of course, not only the responsibility of Pina and Dominguez but of many of the cadres here today and others who are not here. At no time in my address did I say that the report contained lies. I do not refer to liars as comrades, nor do I talk with them in the manner and way I reserve for revolutionaries.

However: What is happening? What happens is that at times, when we do not say the whole truth, when we speak half truths, candy coated, when that truth is lacking, the truth of the problems which the people endure daily, then the people get the impression that we are telling lies, although that might not have been our intention. It is a problem of conception, not intention. It is a problem of misunderstanding the crux of it, of mind set, not actions. This is what we have to work on.

In the meeting in Holguin that we mentioned, and the other ones, we strongly stressed the colossal labor which the acute situation of the special period requires from the party: to unite the forces, mobilize the masses, inspire them, eliminate bureaucrats' red tape, identify subjective weaknesses in order to eliminate them without delay, and objective problems in order to find alternative solutions with the conviction that: Yes, we can!

Once again, emphasis was placed on not resting on accomplishments, but tackling problems; with a self-critical spirit, fighting against problems. We dismissed self-complacency, we demanded truthful and objective analysis. We were exhorted to eliminate lies, that after being repeated so many times, we finally believed them to be true, deceiving ourselves. When we speak of this lie, we are not referring to vulgar lies, but to another type of lie: the political vice of maximizing results and excusing mistakes; giving more importance to the difficulties of an objective nature than they really have, at the same time minimizing those difficulties of a subjective nature, the ones that depend on us, that depend on our own lack of ability and mistakes and errors.

When, during my address at the ANPP, I called for demolishing the lies, I was not thinking about Granma or about this or that comrade from this province. I was thinking about something much more important and transcendental. I was referring to eliminating this corroding vice throughout the country and exploding it ourselves, right now, so that our enemy cannot take advantage of it as an important element, among others, to assist their plans to eliminate the Revolution.

My words were not a personal decision, nor did I express only a personal opinion. Both were shared by Comrade Fidel, first secretary of the PCC, and a substantial number of Politburo members with whom I spoke during the first recess and who had access to the address that was to be read.

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As I explained in my address of 3 August at the ANPP, I quote: True to my way of being, I must express myself here with all sincerity, and to do so, I will use some notes I wrote to the PCC the last two nights, after deep meditation about the three regional meetings, end of quote.

These notes were written with the idea that they would soon be published as an article, signed by me, to be followed as well by three or four more articles referring to similar issues broached at these meetings. I was carrying these notes in my portfolio because I hoped Fidel would review them—which he did—before publication. Other members of the Politburo had already read them.

The humanism that has always characterized the Revolution in the treatment of the cadres, as in everything it does, stems from the integral analysis of each comrade's attitude and functions, with the understanding that revolutionaries, like any human beings, have a right to make mistakes, and therefore also have a right to an opportunity to make things right. In the Revolution's ranks there has always been room for honorable men willing to labor and die for it.

Humanism is not, as is sometimes erroneously thought, the refusal to call a spade a spade, sucking up, to use the vulgar term, to throw in the towel on one who has made a mistake, in not allowing them to be moved upward or to the side, as has happened with some cadres throughout Cuba. They believe themselves to have tenure for life. Yet, we continue to see them reappear here and there like flesh and blood ghosts, with the flesh and blood of a bureaucrat, of course.

In the treatment of the cadres, as with everything else, we have to be as Fidel has told us on many occasions: Nither tolerant nor implacable. This is the measuring stick of our behavior. Cadres must be taught, guided. We must encourage them in the spirit of initiative and boldness. We must help them correct things when they make mistakes. This, together with labor cohesion, systematism, controls, close ties with the masses, and the heightened combativeness required by these times, makes it possible to get results. What the people need today are results, the stick by which to measure the cadres. Results are what revolutionaries have to report to themselves and the people everyday.

Comrades, we are in the middle of a very long-term strategic operation today. We fight on several interactive and interconnected fronts: We are immersed in the struggle against the blockade, imperialist aggression, counterrevolutionary propaganda, and subversive and vandalistic acts stimulated by imperialism. Our enemy wants to achieve more, through a well-studied and organized plan. We are developing, together with sugar production, the struggle to feed the people. As the commander in chief has said, these are the principle strategic, economic, political, ideological, and military tasks that all Cuban revolutionaries have. We are waging a battle to strengthen the cohesion of the forces and combativeness in every sector, as required by the times. We are waging a battle to mend national finances, to encourage labor, to revalue the peso, and to encourage the people to produce because, comrades, we must produce, and this is another great struggle.

We are in the middle of a struggle, perhaps one of the most difficult, to change cadre mentality. Let us eliminate old-fashioned methods, inertia, the need for systematism, apologia, complacency, false praises, and everything else that has nothing whatsoever to do with the principles that should govern a true revolutionary's conduct.

Victory in this great operation will depend on our prowess to simultaneously wage this battle, on our capacity to fight on every front at the same time without getting jaded, and on our trust and loyalty in the topmost military and political guide of the Cuban nation. This will be the definite—I repeat—the definite preservation of the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cuba.

Let no one be fooled. This is a period of definition, combat, and integrity. We have to set our sights high. Those who are today discouraged, who have lost the faith, who do not see beyond present difficulties or the heroic struggle we are waging, are overlooking the future of our fatherland. Even worse, they cannot even imagine the consequences of ousting a Revolution such as ours.

We have to tackle problems straight on, with commitment, valor, and morals as high as the Turquino Peak. I am convinced that this is how the people of Granma are going to react and work. This heroic, noble, and selfless people who have abundantly proven, throughout history, that they are not a hands-down people, but a combative and fighting people, and that there are no difficulties or problems that the people of Granma cannot overcome.

To you, the cadres, I say: Summon your people, take to the streets, become one with the people, the people of Granma trust in their party, their Revolution, their commander in chief, and will respond as they have always done, with its typical patriotism.

Here in this very province, our grandfathers preferred to torch the city of Bayamo, rather than let it fall to the enemy; here in this same province we had the sadness of Alegria de Pio, but because we were able to resist, fight, and maintain the fighting spirit evoked by duty and Fidel, we also had Cinco Palmas, a show of unyielding trust in victory. We are sure that all of you will continue the same path, as you have done from La Demajagua until today. People of Granma, to arms! Viva Free Cuba! [Crowd shouts: "Viva!"] [applause]

UJC First Secretary Appointed CDR National Coordinator

PA2508013494 Havana PRENSA LATINA in Spanish 0046 GMT 25 Aug 94

[Text] Havana, 24 Aug (PL)—A special plenum of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR)

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today approved the appointment of Juan Contino—first secretary of the Union of Young Communists (UJC) until today—as national coordinator of that popular organization.

Contino replaces Division General Sixto Batista Santana, who has health problems, it was stated by Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, member of the Communist Party of Cuba's Politburo, when submitting the proposal to the plenum.

Batista Santana headed the CDR, the most important and numerous popular organization in the country, for four years and will now perform other duties within the Revolutionary Armed Forces.

The "NTV" newscast made the announcement and also reported the UJC National Committee had appointed Maria Victoria Velasquez, deputy secretary of that political organization until today, to the post of first secretary.

Inter-Caribbean Affairs

Cuba Asks Caricom Not To Accept Refugees

FL2408131894 Kingston RJR Network in English 1200 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] The Cuban Government has asked that Caribbean Community [Caricom] countries not accept refugees from that island. Last Friday the U.S. Government announced a change in policy on accepting Cubans illegally migrating to the United States. The U.S. said it would instead [word indistinct] at its naval base in Guantanamo Bay as a prelude to providing safe havens for them in the region. Speaking in Barbados recently, the Cuban ambassador for the (?eastern) Caribbean Lazaro Cabezas noted that if any regional state wants to set up immigration arrangements, Cuba would be willing to discuss the matter, but urged them not to accept refugees as they were illegal [word indistinct].

Meanwhile U.S. officials and independent analysts say while the attention of the U.S. media has shifted to Cuba in the past week, plans for a U.S.-led multilateral invasion of Haiti are moving ahead. One U.S. official, who declined to be identified, said, however, that no final decision has been made. The official further states that Argentina and four Caribbean countries have committed themselves to playing a noncombat role in an intervention sufficient to satisfy UN Security Council Resolution 940 approved on July 31st this year.

Haiti

Deputies Debate Jonassaint Government Prime Minister

FL2408172894 Port-au-Prince Signal FM Radio in French 1030 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Excerpts] Who will be Jonassaint's prime minister? This question debated in the parliament will not have an immediate answer. The discussions continued at the Chamber of Deputies on Tuesday, 23 August. They have already begun citing names. At the top of the list is the name of Petit-Goave Deputy Deus Jean-Francois. Daly Valet, you will agree with me that the Jonassaint government's idea of appointing a prime minister has been under consideration for a long time.

[Begin recording, in Creole] [Valet] Since the formation of the Jonassaint government, many Alliance for Parliamentary Cohesion [ACP] deputies insisted on the necessity of having a prime minister, but at that time the question gave rise to so many discussions and conflicts among the decisionmakers that they preferred to ignore the question of prime minister. So, Emile Jonassaint became the only civilian head of the 11 May authority. But today, the question of the prime minister is back on the table. Discussions and bargaining have been going on in some political circles for some days in order to see if they can appoint a prime minister to rule with Emile Jonassaint. Many names have been cited, but most of them are parliamentarians. The most cited name is that of Deus Jean- Francois, colleague of Hubert de Ronceray of the Mobilization for National Development [MDN]. Jean-Francois confirmed before the microphone of Signal FM that the question of making him Jonassaint's prime minister has been raised, but that this idea does not come from him but from friends of his and other parliamentary colleagues.

[Jean-Francois] I have also heard this news as only a token of sympathy from some friends and colleagues. I thank them for this attention. Now, will I accept this post if it is offered to me? I think it is a political post of high responsibilities. You cannot say you will accept it as long as you have not yet listened to the people who proposed you, understood why, and seen what interests and what advantages it will bring to the country. [passage omitted] If it really shows that something that would be in the interests of the nation, then and only then we could decide.

[Valet] But is Deus Jean-Francois ready to cooperate with a government that says it is of an extraordinary nature? Is Deus Jean-Francois ready to be part of a government that does not rest on legality and legitimacy as denounced by many sectors? The MDN deputy answered these two questions by saying that legality is necessary but that the national interest is the top priority. [passage omitted]

We should tell you the names of other parliamentarians are being cited for the post of prime minister. But we have refrained from citing their names until we contact the concerned persons. The idea that a parliamentarian could become the prime minister of Emile Jonassaint is much supported in the ACP. By the way, according to [ACP Deputy] Walto Augustin, the issue of a prime minister is a constitutional requirement.

[Augustin] [passage omitted] The Constitution clearly says as much. The Constitution stipulates that the president of the republic must appoint a prime minister who

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is the head of the government. As we are living in an extraordinary context, this means the Constitution does not provide for the situation we are experiencing now and that the current government acknowledges that this is an extraordinary situation. This is maybe what prompted the government to form a cabinet without a prime minister. [passage omitted] Today, I agree with whatever should be done to straighten out the country. If—to get out of our current situation—it is necessary that a parliamentarian become prime minister, I am ready.

[Valet] Would you not have problems with somebody like Deus Jean-Francois, for example, as prime minister as is rumored?

[Augustin] He is our colleague. In my opinion, he is a very disciplined man here and everybody acknowledges that. He is a man of principle. But, we would like to hear him first so we can know whether he sees that as something good for him or not.

[Valet] The information we have collected does not yet allow us to say whether the military authorities agree or not with the question of Deus Jean-Francois as prime minister of the 11 May government. But what remains clear is that as an MDN deputy, Deputy Jean-Francois' position is virtually the same as that of the army leaders since the beginning of the crisis. By the way, during General Cedras' tour in Petit-Goave last week, he was hand in hand with Petit-Goave Deputy Deus Jean-Francois. Daly Valet for Signal FM. [end recording]

Sansaricq Senate Discusses 'Normalizing' Electoral Council

FL2408222894 Port-au-Prince Signal FM Radio in French 1030 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] The Senate has met in informal, private session to discuss normalizing the Permanent Electoral Council [CEP]. Alliance for Parliamentary Cohesion senators reportedly want to convene the National Assembly to discuss the three CEP members representing the legislature and possibly to designate three new members. The CEP has nine members, including three in an exceptional situation. The CEP, known as the exceptional electoral council, held partial legislative elections on 18 January 1993, which have been contested up to now. The Bernard Sansaricq Senate wants to make the CEP operational. CEP President Balthazar Saimphar met several political leaders in early August to prepare for November's legislative elections.

Flights Chartered by Journalists Prohibited

FL2408212994 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1800 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] The provisional government of Emile Jonassaint no longer authorizes charter flights by foreign journalists between Miami and Port-au-Prince, according to well-informed sources. A plane arriving from Miami with four German journalists aboard, which was due to leave today with nine other foreign journalists, was denied authorization to land in Port-au-Prince. According to the same source, the authorities allegedly decided to prohibit those flights, based on the fact that Haitians are no longer permitted to travel abroad.

It should be recalled that the international community had indeed decided, under pressure from the U.S. Government, to interrupt its commercial flights to the Haitian capital within the framework of sanctions against the Haitian military.

Further on Prohibition

PA2408195094 Paris AFP in Spanish 1834 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Port-au-Prince, 24 Aug (AFP)—The provisional government of Haiti (not internationally recognized) will no longer authorize flights chartered by foreign reporters between Miami, Florida, and Port-au-Prince. Well-informed sources in the Haitian capital made the announcement on Wednesday.

A plane arriving from Miami with four German reporters on board was unable to land at Port-au-Prince. There were nine reporters on the ground today waiting to board the plane.

The same source said that the Haitian authorities reportedly decided to prohibit the flights, arguing that Haitians are no longer allowed to leave the country.

The international community, following a U.S. initiative, interrupted its commercial flights to the Haitian capital. The move was part of the sanctions imposed upon the military regime.

Last Thursday, a charter plane from Miami was allowed to land at Port-au-Prince with nine reporters on board, after having been turned back the previous week.

Many foreign reporters, who are afraid the Port-au-Prince measure might be permanent, began their paperwork in the hopes of being allowed to travel by land through the Dominican Republic.

Aristide: Haitian Refugees 'Treated Inhumanely'

FL2408162294 Port-au-Prince Signal FM Radio in French 1030 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Haitian President-in-exile Jean-Bertrand Aristide has labeled the Haitians fleeing the country by sea as second-class refugees in comparison to their Cuban counterparts. The spokesman for the president-in-exile, Mr. Jean-Claude Martineau, relayed a statement by Aristide which says the Haitian refugees are treated inhumanely in comparison with the Cubans. After 35 months, it is clear that the restoration of democracy remains the only solution to the problems of the Haitian refugees, the exiled Haitian president said.

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Jonassaint Minister Discusses Fuel Situation, Refugees

FL2408165294 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1600 GMT 21 Aug 94

[Interview with Charles David, foreign minister in the Jonassaint de facto government, by reporter Rothschild Francois, Jr., in Port-au-Prince on 21 August—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Francois] Mr. Minister, what is the situation regarding the humanitarian fuel? Is the fuel sent for humanitarian reasons effectively sealed up by the Port-au-Prince authorities? Why and what do you intend to do?

[David] Listen! Here again, there were many rumors, many stories. Some technical details had to be fixed. They are mostly solved. I can say that right now, this problem is about to be solved, I can even say it is practically solved. We have found some mechanisms which allow—within the government political path—the separation of humanitarian (?aid) from politics. We want everything to proceed normally, correctly, within the scope of the laws of the republic. It is nothing to make a fuss about, and over the course of two weeks some rumors were spread. As I told you, the humanitarian fuel will remain humanitarian, that is all. I think that I already told you that this was not news.

[Francois] Do you think that the humanitarian fuel will be released by next week, after the establishment of this mechanism that you just mentioned?

[David] Certainly, certainly, certainly. As far as I am concerned, that is no longer a current issue.

[Francois] It is also said that the government allegedly requisitioned a certain amount of fuel for the running of the public hospitals and the Health Ministry, especially, is that true?

[David] Listen! In the framework.... [pauses] I am not in charge of distribution of fuel quotas. I am simply saying that, just as in the past, since the fuel is humanitarian, since the fuel falls within the scope of humanitarian management, all the humanitarian institutions by definition will have to receive their part. That is all. This is nothing new. I think that is something that has always been done. [passage omitted]

[Francois] What about the Haitians who are asking for political asylum in the United States? Has the American Embassy already requested from the Haitian Government the authorization for the landing of some charter flights in Port-au-Prince? What is going on in that regard?

[David] Listen! This case is still being examined. So I can not expand on it. I can simply say that some requests were made and we are studying them. That is all.

Inflation Replaces Invasion as Primary Worry

FL2508004294 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1045 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Report by Kesner Farel; from "The Economic Page"]

[Begin Farel recording] Inflation is an obsessive fear for Haitian economic experts. Local consumers complain daily about the enormous decline in their purchasing power. Producers no longer know what to do since it is now so difficult to renew their stock. The local press talks about it, while the authorities, at bay, try to solve the crisis through communiques that until now, have left the market completely indifferent. Inflation has become the main source of worry for Haitians, replacing the invasion, which had been the major concern during July, following adoption of UN Resolution 940.

In a comparative analysis by Haiti's oldest daily newspaper, LE NOUVELLISTE, extreme economic increases were observed for certain products, following the adoption of the resolution. The newspaper noted that products for the housewife's basket, chosen by LE NOUVELLISTE as essential, do not stop being essential just because of their scarcity at supply centers. Apart from the box of evaporated milk, which increased 66 percent, going from 150 gourdes before the resolution to 250 gourdes last week, the increases observed for other products were all over 100 percent. Sacks of white and brown sugar have increased, respectively, 131.4 percent and 150 percent, reaching levels of 625 and 500 gourdes, against 270 and 300 gourdes before. Soap, rum, and propane gas increased more than 200 percent, reflecting increases of 208, 206, and 213 percent respectively.

The 25-pound propane gas tank went from 40 to 125 gourdes. The sack of flour increased 300 percent, from 125 to 400 gourdes. Cheese won the grand prize, increasing 400 percent, a pound reaching 150 gourdes, against 30 gourdes previously. However, it is important to recall that the latest prices collected by LE NOUVELLISTE last week could change this week, when one recognizes the speed with which the situation progresses nowadays. The acceleration of prices noticed lately is, according to the Haitian Press Agency, the result of three main factors: lack of stock by producers; the creation of money during the past three years, assessed at 1.2 billion gourdes; and the most recent economic sanctions adopted by the United States and Canada.

It should be noted that the economic authorities of the current government reacted this week to the phenomenon of dollarization, noticed lately, with the use of the U.S. dollar as an important means of exchange in local transactions, by highlighting in a communique addressed to national economic agents, that the currency in the free and independent territory of Haiti remains the gourde, even if it has considerably lost its value compared with the dollar. One should, however, remember the old Gresham's law: Bad money always drives away good money. It should be noted that only the market, not political decisionmakers, can determine good or bad money.

Furthermore, the leader of the banking system, the Bank of the Republic of Haiti, asked the commercial banks in a note not to go beyond the limit of fixed credit, even

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threatening to penalize them if they do not respect the decision of the leading bank. This measure is aimed at limiting the creation of money in the system, with a view to reducing the constant pressures on the exchange market from an increase of gourdes in recent weeks. The Central Bank should also adopt a similar measure for the public sector in financing the budget deficit.

Finally, on the exchange market, the U.S. dollar, increasingly scarce, continues to reach alarming levels, sometimes crossing the psychological bar of 25 gourdes, which represented a 400-percent increase in Port-au-Prince yesterday, 23 August. This was the economic bulletin for Radio Metropole, Kesner Farel reporting. [end recording]

Neo-Duvalierist RDR Favors Negotiations

FL2408213594 Port-au-Prince Signal FM Radio in French 1030 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Excerpt] For or against negotiations? The assembly of Democrats for the Republic [RDR] supports negotiations. Attorney Gabriel Augustin, president of this neo-Duvalierist group, says he is favorable to any negotiations that can resolve the crisis.

The UN secretary general reaffirmed this week his intention to send a negotiating mission to Haiti to hold discussions with the military. Attorney Augustin favors a negotiation mission, but without the participation of international mediator Dante Caputo. [passage omitted]

Social Christian Party Leader Urges Compromise

FL2408224494 Port-au-Prince Signal FM Radio in French 1030 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Excerpt] Professor Gregoire Eugene—attorney, leader of the Haitian Social Christian Party, and author of the book "Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse"—says he hopes for a quick solution to the Haitian crisis. Eugene told Signal FM on 23 August that he supports compromise, something which he asks the authorities to consider. The provisional government believes elections will resolve the crisis; the international community [words indistinct]; mediation remains necessary. A goodwill mission is due in Port-au-Prince soon to negotiate with the military authorities involved in the coup that compelled Jean-Bertrand Aristide, elected president on 16 December 1990, to go into exile. Eugene says that the people should not have to wallow in so much misery. Appearing on the "Haiti Today" program on 23 August, Eugene called for a deed in favor of the deprived population. [passage omitted]

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Commerce Secretary Foresees Growth in Exports

PA2508014194 Mexico City EL FINANCIERO in Spanish 22 Aug 94 p 42

[Article by Lourdes Gonzalez Perez]

[Text] Commerce and Industrial Development Secretary Jaime Serra Puche has said that peace and tranquillity after the elections will guarantee an additional surge in the economy. Likewise, he ruled out any problems with shortages in the country. To the contrary, he assured, "technically speaking, we have a full supply" of staples. He later advised that Mexico will make progress only through dialogue and harmony.

Meanwhile, Serra Puche emphasized the evolution of Mexico's foreign trade. He referred in particular to exports to the U.S. market, which he reiterated grew 20 percent during the first six months of the year, which is twice as fast as the whole world's sales to the neighboring northern country.

Interviewed on Sunday's elections day, the commerce and industrial development secretary referred to the political process, which he defined as "very special for Mexico."

The official said that is very good that within a clean and honest atmosphere all Mexicans decided on 21 August "on how they want to be ruled, on the future they want for their country."

Asked about the possibility that once the political process ends and final results are announced there be a strong surge in the economy, Jaime Serra Puche mentioned the beginning of an important economic surge in the second six months of the year.

Nonetheless, he explained that trust has always been a very important factor in growth, and the fact that we have elections in which everyone participates and peacefully voices his opinion through a vote will increase confidence in Mexico and in the economy. This will represent an additional surge.

The secretary of commerce and industrial development then called on all Mexicans to comply, once the elections are over, "with our obligations and responsibilities, because Mexico will progress only through dialogue, harmony, and peace."

In view of rumors circulating recently about the possibility of shortages in the country in the event of violence after the elections, the Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development conducted "research" and determined that "we have not detected any shortages problems." To the contrary, the official insisted, in recent weeks we have observed a 98.8 percent rate of supplies, that is, practically total supply from a technical point of view.

To this effect, he reiterated his call on the people in general to remain calm and comply with their rights and obligations.

To conclude, he pointed out that Mexican exports continue growing in a very important manner, particularly sales to the U.S. market, which registered a 20-percent increase during the first six months of the year, against a 10-percent increase of the whole world's exports to the United States.

Exporters To Present Trade Program to Zedillo

PA2508014394 Mexico City LA JORNADA in Spanish 23 Aug 94 p 18

[Article by Lucia Domville]

[Text] In September the Mexican exporting sector will present to Ernesto Zedillo, presidential candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, a foreign trade program for the 1994-2000 period that focuses on the promotion of small and medium-sized companies, marketing strategies, total quality systems, and programs to support certain sectors.

The goal is to broaden the national export base to 25,000 businessmen and maintain a 20 percent growth rate in exports in the coming years.

Representatives of the private sector made this announcement and outlined the most salient proposals of the program:

—Indirect assistance to businessmen to encourage production without resorting to subsidies.
—National Banking Commission (CNB) modifications to the financial legislation help exporters obtain direct loans abroad without having to channel them through the country's main [de primer piso] banks.
—Fiscal incentives [preferencias] for exporters, including the elimination of the 2 percent tax on assets and credit facilities to pay the income tax (ISR) and the value-added tax (VAT).
—Effective marketing mechanisms to promote small and medium-sized companies without resorting to the marketing mechanisms used by large companies.
—Modernization and technicalization of businesses to increase total quality.
—Computer programs to modify the business administration system.

Private sector sources who requested anonymity said that this foreign trade project for the next six years will be treated separately from the economic proposals to encourage industrial development that the private sector presented months ago to the presidential candidates.

Trade expansion and the negotiation of trade agreements with other countries, especially the United States and Canada, require special attention and treatment from the Mexican exporting sector, they added.

The Free Trade Agreement has been favorable because non-manufactured exports grew more than 25 percent in the first semester of 1994.

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But the sources admitted that exports are still concentrated around 25 generic products and 252 companies, although a register at the Commerce and Industrial Development Secretariat (SECOFI) lists 5,000 exporters.

The foreign trade program seeks to incorporate more companies and products into foreign market transactions. In order to accomplish this, the country needs to promote trade opportunities and ensure that Mexican businessmen enjoy the same conditions that its competitors have.

Foreign trade representatives said that they finalized a document after months of studying the various industrial sectors and will forward it to President Ernesto Zedillo [title as published] in September.

The proposal consists of four main titles—modernization, quality control systems, marketing, and indirect assistance—and also innumerable subtitles on the problems facing exporters and ways to solve them.

Among the measures to increase sales abroad that the program lists are fiscal measures, including credit facilities to pay the ISR and VAT, elimination of the 2 percent tax on assets, asset depreciation, and more tax deduction opportunities.

They also think that it is necessary to have direct access to foreign credit without having to channel it through the main [de primer piso] Mexican banks, and thus, the CNB must modify the financial legislation on this matter.

Another point refers to indirect assistance that is frequently used by our trade partners and does not involve subsidies. Studies done in various countries showed that their governments dismantled direct assistance programs and replaced them with better credit facilities—in both term and interest—low cost of government services, and fiscal benefits.

They will also try to ensure that cost of services, such as telephone and electricity, and fuel prices are similar to those abroad.

As for transportation, they demand a reduction in fares; this implies extending highway concessions. They also want higher efficiency and the development of railway, maritime, and highway transportation systems.

Greater deregulation, simplification of procedures, and personnel training are other aspects of the foreign trade program.

The sources concluded that to increase program effectiveness the authorities must tighten relations with the private sector (which will be governed by a single organization in the future) to ensure that the government will make decisions and the private sector will play a major role in carrying them out.

Police Arrest Several for Drug Trafficking

PA2508010194 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0257 GMT 20 Aug 94

[Text] Mexico City, 17 Aug (EFE)—Mexican drug agents have dealt a strong blow to drug trafficking bands with the arrest of two kingpins whose bands operated in northern Mexico, the Attorney General's Office reported today, Friday.

One of the kingpins arrested is Arturo Martinez Herrera, head of the "Los Texas" band, involved in the murder of a federal police commander.

An Attorney General's Office spokesperson reported that the "Los Texas" band had started its clandestine activities 14 years ago. It operated in the Tamaulipas State, mainly in the Nuevo Laredo border city, first as traffickers of immigrants and later as drug traffickers.

In other action by the Federal Police, Fernando Hernandez Quinonez, alleged chief of the "Los Flechas" band, was arrested. He is known by the alias "Flecha Mayor" and is charged with clandestinely receiving planes filled with cocaine coming from Central America.

The spokesperson observed that allegedly "Flecha Mayor" and his band worked during five years with drug trafficker Gilberto Ontiveros Lucero, alias "El Grenas," who is imprisoned in the high-security Almolova de Juarez jail in the State of Mexico, in the center of the country.

Recently, the police arrested Moises Juarez Ledezma, the second most important man in the Sonora Cartel, which is headed by "capo" Amado Carrillo Fuentes.

Juarez Ledezma, known by the alias "El Moy" and "El Dienton," was arrested in the Sonora border state the past 16 of this year [no month as received] but was released "due to lack of evidence to take him to trial."

The federal drug agents clashed with the "Los Villalobos" band and arrested seven of its members, who are charged with drug trafficking, homicide, and assault, reported the Attorney General's office today, Wednesday.

In a communique, the government office reported that the "Los Villalobos" band had operated for more than a decade and has terrified entire towns in the northeastern states of Durango and Sinaloa.

According to information from the Attorney General's Office, Mexico is the main producer of marijuana, as it produces approximately 8,000 tons a year, which is mostly sent to the neighbor country to the north. Furthermore, Mexico is an obligatory stop for hundreds of tons of cocaine and heroin coming from South America.

The main drug trafficking groups, organized in approximately 19 cartels, have divided the main drug routes among themselves and fight for the market and control of the drugs.

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Steady, If Incomplete, Democratization Seen

94CA0162A Mexico City NEXOS in Spanish No. 200, Aug 94 pp 48-49

[Commentary by Carlos Monsivais, essayist and social critic: "The Death Throes of Presidentialism"]

[Text] Culturally and politically speaking, the transition to democracy in Mexico is already an obvious fact. One need only consider all the people who are signing up as observers, the mobilization of public opinion, the critical responses to the platforms of the three parties, and the disinformation being put out by TV stations and so many publications. If the government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari has set in motion in 1994 the electoral reform that has been so eagerly anticipated since at least 1982, it is not because of its devotion to democracy, of which it has given such meager evidence, but rather because of the combined pressure of urgent modernization, the international demand for honest elections, Chiapas, and Mexican society. To counter my argument it could be asserted that much remains to be done, that society is still deeply depoliticized, that the only campaign event with nationwide consequences was the televised debate on 12 May, etc. I emphasize, however: Mexican society today is already undergoing a profound democratization that is, however, uneven and, in many sectors, incipient.

In 1988, fraud (overwhelming, outrageous, no longer provable today) was seen in the great majority of cases as a certainty without consequences: everything was in the government's favor; the Chamber of Deputies was supremely servile; machinery for civic defense did not exist, and the electoral tribunals were under the Executive Branch. Legitimacy dissolved as an issue and a problem, and Salinas de Gortari devoted the first five years of his government to winning the 1988 election as he bolstered the confidence of the First World, made macroeconomic changes, and went on Solidarity tours. (He is now devoting his last year to losing that famous election.) And 6 July 1988 further marked the character of his government with its vindictive persecution of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas and the PRD [Party of the Democratic Revolution]. Apart from this, as it was emphasized for quite some time, take care of the economy first and the rest will follow.

During its heyday, politics was the government's "unfinished business," which in practice led to authoritarian stubbornness and electoral brazenness: old-style fraud and fraud corrected capriciously and clumsily: Guanajuato, San Luis Potosi, Michoacan, Yucatan, Chiapas...This was compounded by the quashing of the timid efforts at autonomy inside PRI and by the (inexplicable) belief that Pronasol [National Solidarity Program] was sufficient to offset the privileged monopolies and financial splendor of the One Hundred Families. The regime placed a "messianic" emphasis on its promises of economic success, and the Free Trade Agreement seemed to justify everything.

The six-year term as such, in contrast, has proven to be a major democratic learning experience. In a fundamentally modern society, presidentialism, which Colosio criticized and Zedillo fails to mention, is an embarrassing relic and a self-deception: a country run by a single person is unthinkable in our day and age. Salinas amended the Constitution of the Republic as he pleased and as often as he liked; he installed and removed governors; in practice he endorsed the many agreements granting impunity; he failed in the area of public security; he "experimented" with education; he spurred the fanatic wealth-accumulation of a handful of people; he did not concern himself with administrative reform, and he promoted himself with great generosity. Nevertheless, his power was limited by various, converging phenomena: the bureaucratic enclaves (which as usual took action on their own), the supreme ineffectiveness of PRI members and of his closest political circle, the insolence of the financially powerful, the constant intervention of the U.S. Government, the disasters in the Judiciary, the demands and reproaches of the clergy, and the growing importance of public opinion. Not paradoxically, the government that has most centralized decision-making has been the one under which civil society has most become a source of real power in the wake of a half century of cumulative ineptitude and arrogance.

Democratic sentiments and ideas have been growing stronger thanks to the experience of 1968, the historic contributions of the National Action Party and public universities, the experience of 1988, the resistance of the Party of the Democratic Revolution, the attitude of many public officials who are convinced that it is impossible to continue along the path of authoritarianism, the persistent efforts of several publications, the expansion of a new civic culture, the internationalization of the country, and the gradual consolidation of the regions. Perhaps the gains have not been that extraordinary in and of themselves, but if we compare today with 1988, a breakthrough has been made because the country has seen and become fed up with demagoguery, paternalism, plundering, and devastation in the name of development. This is one of the conclusions: if presidentialism continues, there is not much point to having a society.

The meaning of the existing democracy is to be found in civil society. I do think that the term civil society has become almost sacred, has been idealized without taking into account its true character, its weaknesses, its contradictions, and its varying and often conflicting degrees of maturity. Nevertheless, it does exist and in its reliable manifestations (which are more numerous than one might think) it is beyond the reach of manipulation by the government and left- or right-wing extremists. Though at times its understanding of democracy is naive or elementary, what is decisive is its basic intelligence and genuine desire for change. This is why the transition to democracy is irreversible: because it started from below some time ago.

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Krauze Urges Genuine Democratization

94CA0158A Mexico City PROCESO in Spanish No 927, 8 Aug 94 pp 44, 46

[Commentary by Enrique Krauze, essayist, historian, and deputy editor of the Mexico City monthly VUELTA: "The Inviability of the Party of the State"]

[Text] Mexico, which deserves credit for undertaking the first social revolution in the 20th century, is now suffering the disgrace of having this century's last party of the State. PRI came into the world winning the 1929 election with bullets, not ballots. During Lazaro Cardenas's six-year term PRI developed the corporatist structure that characterizes it to this day. Its structure is similar in ways to that of the major fascist and communist parties of the State. It is true that they were all based on a statist ideology that encompassed not only fanatics but also many men of intelligence and good faith. It is also true that unlike all of the petrified revolutions of the 20th century (perhaps because it predated them or because it was purely nationalist), our revolution kept alive many of the civil liberties contained in the classical-liberal code of 1857 and, therefore, refrained from engaging in the comprehensive terror that the century's dictatorial regimes (both fascist and communist) visited on their citizens. It is true, lastly, that the stability and growth that the "Mexican political system" gave the nation until the 1960's represented a positive bottom line. In 1968, however, the system showed that it was mortal in both senses of the word: mortal because it was destined to die and mortal because every day it killed the political and moral creativity of the Mexican people and, ultimately (as in Tlatelolco), it killed the people themselves.

Starting in 1968, every presidential term has ended in disaster. Individuals have failed, but the greatest failure has been the system of absolute power that corrupts absolutely and of which PRI is a key piece. Year after year the facts have become increasingly clear: PRI has no right to use the nation's funds; PRI has no right to function as an agency for government employment; PRI has no right to abridge the freedom of voters (through either gentle or coercive measures); PRI has no right to appropriate the nation's colors and symbols; PRI has no right to the privileged treatment it receives from the mass media; PRI has no right to exert cacique control over communities, ejidos, [Indian] pueblos, unions, and urban colonias [communities]; PRI has no right to take advantage of the poverty and ignorance of vast segments of the population so as to persuade them that PRI and Mexico are one and the same thing; PRI has no right to serve as the electoral branch of a political system that pretends to observe the constitution when it actually violates its essence by vitiating the Mexican people's devotion to the republicanism, democracy, and federalism that this constitution embodies.

At the close of the 20th century, now that the entire world has shifted to democracy, Mexico must make a historic leap. Public life must be seized from PRI's hands. As a party of the State, PRI must not only change; it must disappear. It must become something that it has never been: just another party, a true party.

Assuming that we do not encounter electoral fraud (if we do, there is always the recourse of civil disobedience), whoever wins the upcoming election and becomes president must pledge to abide by the letter and spirit of the political constitution; cease being an absolute monarch who uses a bogus party as a corporatist weapon to rule over a falsely representative, democratic, and federal republic, and become simply the president of a democracy.

Castaneda Cites Vote Reporting Dilemmas

94CA0160A Mexico City PROCESO in Spanish No 927, 8 Aug 94 pp 42-44

[Commentary by Jorge G. Castaneda, National Autonomous University of Mexico political scientist: "The Bartlett Syndrome"]

[Text] With the election on 21 August just two weeks off, speculation and doubts about the process of reporting the results have been intensifying. The specter of 1988 is haunting the corridors of the IFE [Federal Electoral Institute] and visiting citizen counselors Arturo Nunez and Jorge Carpizo in their nightmares. Technical solutions to political problems are avidly being sought, solutions that are rejected as quickly as they are suggested. While the IFE, the media, and the parties make up their minds, perhaps it would be advisable to lay out the problem and then comment briefly on some of the possible solutions that have been proposed so far.

The dilemma lies in the so-called (Manuel) Bartlett syndrome. The natural flow of election results in Mexico has two characteristics: it is slow and it has a geographic bias that since 1988 has been political as well. The returns are slow to come in, and when a reasonable volume of data is finally available, it comes from electoral districts in the capital and its periphery. Even in 1991, with a simplified system of reporting results, by three in the morning the interior secretary and the chairman of the General Council of the IFE, Fernando Gutierrez Barrios, had reports from just 3,000 voting booths out of a total of 88,000. Worse still, the returns that do arrive are from the capital and surrounding areas and hence favor the opposition. The PRI has not had a majority in the Federal District for some time, and it bears recalling that in 1988 Carlos Salinas de Gortari came in third in the capital of the republic.

In view of the electoral institutions' and authorities' dreadful and persistent lack of credibility among citizens, the obvious explanation (to wit, that the preliminary results do not necessarily reflect the final result) is not believable. Suppose that in 1988 the interior secretary had announced that at 2200 in the evening results

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from some 2,000 voting booths showed that Cuauhtemoc Cardenas was winning; we Mexicans would never have believed that if Carlos Salinas was ahead in the country as a whole the next day, it was because the returns from Mexico City had been offset by those from the countryside, the north, the south, etc. But if the reporting of results to the public were to be delayed, as officials waited in good faith for returns from elsewhere to correct the initial bias or else for the purpose of deliberately doctoring the numbers, then they would be, and were, more discredited. Hence the dilemma: if preliminary results are reported as they come in, unstoppable opposition momentum is created; if data are not provided and the system crashes, there is an even worse loss of credibility.

Something very similar could happen at this election. Although the data reporting procedures have been simplified and streamlined once again, the natural stream will remain slow and skewed. By 2100 or 2200 in the evening the General Council of the IFE will have reports from barely more than 10,000 voting booths, most of which will be located in major urban areas, mainly in the Federal District, where the opposition is once more in the lead. Again, if the returns are made public as they come in, irreversible momentum could be created for the opposition; if the results that are already in are not announced, officials run the risk of creating a wave of suspicion and distrust that may not be reversible either. This fiendish dilemma is the reason for the proliferation of official and private efforts to estimate, predict, or survey the results of the election before the returns from all or even most of the voting booths are known.

These techniques are well known in other countries and have been used already in several state and municipal elections in Mexico. In general (there are some minor differences), there are two methods: the quick count and the exit poll. They are very different. The second is probably not altogether appropriate for Mexico when used to predict an ultimate outcome, instead of to inquire into the motivations of voters and to break them down by age, sex, etc. In principle, it works only in countries that are relatively small (with a single time zone) and homogeneous from an electoral standpoint (where the entire country casts votes in more or less the same way: France, for example).

It involves polling a sample of voters after they vote at a sample of polling places. The assumption is that the distribution of the vote on election day is completely random and, thus, that the information obtained from the first 100 voters will be identical to that from the last 100, or from all of them. Hence, by around noon we can know the result of the election even before the deadline for voting is up, even if the result is not announced so as not to influence late voters. I doubt that it is possible in Mexico today to get a representative number of voters to tell a complete stranger waiting for them outside the polling place about their decision. There will no doubt be some attempts at exit polls on 21 August, but I fear that they will not reveal anything of major interest.

The other tool, the quick count, does not really depend on polling. Rather, it is a way of speeding up the reporting of results (parallel to the official system of vote tallying) and estimating the overall result based on the final returns (not a poll) from a representative number of voting booths. The assumption is that if the sample is well chosen, the result that will emerge from these polling places will mirror the overall election result, with an insignificant margin of error. The assumption also is that information can be obtained from the selected polling places two or three hours after they close and that soon thereafter the computer program can be run and an overall final result obtained.

It is this system that several organizations of civil society (Coparmex [Employers Confederation of the Mexican Republic], CIRT, Civic Alliance, etc.) and several companies (Televisa, Telemundo, and Grupo Acir have been mentioned) have decided to use or subcontract out so that they can have early results available on the night of 21 August. The number of voting booths that have been selected varies, from more or less 650 in the case of the Radio and TV Chamber to more than 2,500 in the case of Civic Alliance, and the margin of error varies too: from 1 percent in some to between 1 and 5 percent in the case of Civic Alliance. The electoral authority itself, the General Council of the IFE, seems to have decided to commission three quick counts from private firms, including A.C. Nielsen (the one that does marketing studies and calculates TV ratings). The idea is that the numbers emerging from these three quick counts will enable the authorities to correct the bias in the flow of results and thus to report general voting trends, instead of mere preliminary figures.

In my opinion, the quick counts by civil society and private firms should be kept separate from the ones commissioned by the IFE. In the case of the former, there are three somewhat major problems that could seriously complicate matters. The first is that the final result of the presidential election at the selected polling places will indeed be available at a given hour. As we know, the polling places close at 1800, unless potential voters are waiting in line outside. In this case, the polling place will not close until everyone has voted. This could delay the start of the tally. We should also remember that the order of the tally is the least conducive to a quick count. The polling places count the ballots for deputy first, then the ones for senator, and the presidential ones last (Article 224 of the Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures, COFIPE). It may not be that easy to obtain final tally sheets as early as some people hope.

Second, the reporting of returns from all over the country to Mexico City may also become messy. If 2,500 polling places have been chosen, then 2,500 calls have to be made. If regional collection centers are set up, then the concentration of calls diminishes, but the chances for error or breakdowns in the reporting of results increase, for instance two or three calls per polling place instead of

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one. The multiple calls also increase the odds that the data will be altered, especially if we recall that several figures have to be reported: the total number of registered voters, the total number of voters, the votes for three or four candidates, ballots annulled, etc. Inevitably, not all of the data will get to the indicated place at the expected time.

Third problem: how representative is the sample. If there were a homogeneous statistical universe, this would merely be a technical issue. The difficulty in Mexico is the potential gap between two different types of polling places: monitored and unmonitored. If it were confirmed that the opposition will be able to monitor at most two-thirds of the voting booths, it would mean that the odds on the will of the people being distorted will differ greatly between two distinct statistical universes, both of significant size. By definition, the sample consists of monitored polling places, but there could be distortions in up to 10 percent of them. How can the sample reflect this? And if it cannot, how do we calculate the maximum allowable deviation between the result of the sample and the final result? If the margin of error is 5 percent, for instance, and the deviation turns out to be 5 percent, to what do we attribute the difference: error or fraud?

Precisely because of all these obstacles, I think that the idea of the electoral authority taking responsibility for one or several quick counts is extremely dangerous. It is one thing for Coparmex or the Civic Alliance to make a mistake or fall behind: The consequences would be severe but not devastating. However, the reason why as a principle no electoral authority anywhere estimates results is the danger of making a mistake: That would be really disastrous. It would be preferable for the IFE to tally the votes and to leave the task of predicting or, as the case may be, guessing results to civil society. No one denies that there are real risks. The Bartlett syndrome is a real malady. But the implications of a mistake in a premature estimate of the final result are so enormous, in fact almost unimaginable, that it would seem preferable to run the risk of moving with the flow, no matter how skewed and slow it may be, rather than to wager on a statistical exercise that is feasible and desirable but that is also fraught with danger. This is just one of the decisions that are in the hands of the citizen counselors, in whom many Mexicans have placed their trust and hopes.

Democratic Advance Criteria Cited

94CA0161A Mexico City NEXOS in Spanish No. 200, Aug 94 pp 46-48

[Commentary by Arnaldo Cordova, member of the National Autonomous University of Mexico's Center for Social Research: "Election Scenarios"]

[Text] To Carlos Fernandez del Real, in memoriam. No one knows what is going to happen until it happens, athletes commonly say. I think that this is just where we stand with respect to the federal elections this coming 21 August. Anything imaginable could happen. We could have clean elections for the first time ever. There could be covert fraud, and even though it could not be proven, many people (enough to cause a ruckus) would take it for granted, thus triggering a post-election conflict that could seem like a genuine civil war. Fraud or no fraud, PRI could win, but no one would believe that it really did, which could usher in a period of virtual ungovernability. An opposition candidate could win, and PRI, seconded by its hangers-on, would make a fuss and prevent the peaceful transmission of power. The ruling party could honor President Salinas' word and transfer power peacefully. The PAN [National Action Party] candidate could win, foreshadowing a more peaceful, less troubled transition. The PRD [Party of the Democratic Revolution] could win, and the strong opposition to him, which we can all see, among broad segments of society could lead to an outcome like the one that befell the Allende regime in Chile in September 1973. All this and a great deal more.

To judge by how the campaign has been going, there is undoubtedly reason to believe that this will be the most hotly contested, closest, and most uncertain election ever. All of this is true. It does not necessarily mean, however, that any of the candidates may win, as has been so often asserted. Unfortunately, the time does not seem to have come when we can say, without fear of error, that anyone can win. The polls conducted so far, which have been very erratic and far from objective, tell us only that the ruling-party candidate will be in a very tough battle with his opponents. If we believed them, we would have to conclude that Zedillo will come nowhere close to winning as many votes as ruling-party candidates did just 12 years ago. What happened in 1991, the year of PRI's famous "comeback," was an abuse of power that the party is now paying for in spades (even PRI members were astonished at their stunning victory and had to yield in many cases, which put them in an embarrassing situation that neither they nor the government expected). That cannot happen again. If Zedillo wins with more than 50 percent of the vote, there will be bedlam. More than likely he will win with less than half. That might be best for Mexico too, because if the PRI candidate wins with, say, 44 percent of the vote, versus 35 or 36 percent for his closest rival, he will be forced to share power in a way that the country has never seen. This could well be our biggest accomplishment during this stage of political reform. In the best-case scenario there may even be a coalition government, which Zedillo has imprudently ruled out. In the worst-case scenario, the government would have to accept a bigger role for opposition forces in running the nation and, perhaps, a rebirth of sovereignty for Congress, which for so long has been devalued and discredited. It would indeed be fateful if the government and its party failed to take into account or ignored the pluralism that obviously characterizes Mexican society today. Under current conditions,

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a vote for the ruling party of more than 50 or even as high as 60 percent would be an insult to the intelligence of all Mexicans.

If we said that this election will be extremely close, we are obviously referring to the fact that the opposition forces have finally won over major constituencies that the former "super-party" or "practically single party" can no longer hope to command. The political opposition is a fact, and the August elections will have to confirm it. Otherwise, these elections will have no credibility. This is the point. The argument is not that there will be democracy in the country only if PRI loses. Rather, the elections must mirror, without any distortions whatsoever, the political pluralism that has developed in Mexico on its own over the past 17 years. There is no alternative but to acknowledge that the opposition has a place in Mexico's political system, to the detriment of the party that until now has controlled every popularly elected post. PRI has to lose something so that the opposition, in turn, can gain it. Why does the ruling party refuse to acknowledge something so obvious? Its policy since 1977 has been to make room for the opposition, but while always pursuing the goal of not giving up anything that it has had. This makes no sense. It has been able to do so till now by increasing the number of seats in the popularly elected bodies in order to make room for the opposition. The time has come, however, when it can no longer continue to do this. The opposition can be accorded its place only by reducing PRI's sphere of control. There is no other way. The principle that would summarize our democratization is not, of course: "There will be democracy only if PRI loses," but rather, "there will be democracy only if the political forces that reflect our diversity and pluralism are given a place in the current spheres of power." The two are not the same, and it does not take much brains to understand this. To deny it is to deny the very possibility of genuine democracy in our country.

The regime's attitude has always been the same, and I strongly fear that it will remain so in this ill-fated 1994. There are two sides to this attitude. On the one hand, it trusts that the ruling party's traditional constituencies will come through with their votes when the time comes. As a result, many government tools have been made available to ruling-party candidates, thus violating the law and taking advantage of the machinery of power to maintain it. This has occurred and continues to occur. And this is not just according to articles in publications like LA JORNADA or PROCESO. In many others I have found charges by citizens to whom Solidarity or Pronasol [National Solidarity Program] has appropriated funds on the condition that their beneficiaries vote for ruling-party candidates. The ban on Solidarity or Pronasol advertising during the final weeks of the campaign is of no use. In my own region I have spoken with many peasant and community leaders who have been told that receipt of funds from these programs is contingent on a vote for PRI. Many local newspapers have reported that several governors have warned mayors in their municipalities to "work harder for (ruling-party) candidates." If the opposition does likewise in the municipalities that it governs, that is terrible. But this in no way excuses the party that controls the overwhelming majority of the country's municipalities. The long-standing vices of Mexican politics are very far from having been eradicated. In addition, monitoring of radio and TV newscasts by the IFE [Federal Electoral Institute] and various nongovernmental organizations has proven how the mass media show barefaced favoritism towards ruling-party candidates. Almost half of total newscast time is devoted to them, and in some respects, such as lead-in news stories, they account for up to 70 percent. There is greater fairness in the printed media, but in most cases coverage of Zedillo far outstrips the others. Some newspapers, like most of the provincial ones, devote themselves entirely to furthering the PRI candidate's campaign. The conclusion is simple: these are the most hotly contested elections in our history, but they still do not offer a level playing field in the battle for power. The opposition still has to fight not only a party, the one in power, but also the government, which remains the exclusive preserve of a group that still refuses, at any cost, to leave power.

Under these conditions, the opposition is always at a disadvantage. I monitored TV programs on my own for one week. What I observed was not only that newscasts consistently devote half of their time to the ruling-party candidate, but also that, by my count (which is by no means accurate, to be sure) between 50 and 70 paid PRI spots are broadcast on almost every station from the beginning to the end of their broadcast day, compared to none for the opposition parties (except their own programs). Money? Of course. That is the problem. The PRI leadership, which says that it will account for all of its outlays, should start explaining right now how it can afford its TV and radio campaign, which is so lavish that I am certain no opposition party could match it. Legally speaking, all parties are on a fairly level playing field, and we have electoral bodies that are more impartial than ever before. An audit financed by PAN and the one conducted at the behest of the IFE tell us that the voter registry is reliable to an incredible 98 percent. This means that it is the best in the world. Let us hope that they are not mistaken! Personally, though, I want to give them the benefit of the doubt. The General Council of the IFE is truly independent, and the district bodies and the election boards (which are now being formed) are more autonomous than ever. This is, to say the least, a historic breakthrough. The penalties for electoral crimes, which are now described in greater detail than ever before, will no doubt deter more than one thug from breaking the law. The presence of election observers, who by now are more proficient and have many years of experience, will be a powerful force for preventing irregularities. The Chiapas uprising, which is responsible for many of the very rapid and sweeping political and

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electoral gains that we have made during the first half of the year, will be another factor promoting clean, credible elections. The hope all over the world is that there will be clean elections on 21 August. Not only will they be the most competitive in our history; they will also be the most watched. Hundreds of foreign observers are already signing up to express their views about our elections. Mexico will apparently have to enter the First World via politics, in particular via the upcoming federal elections, even if Salinas and his colleagues do not like it, wagering as they are on their own showy economic programs.

The problem is: Under what conditions is the opposition competing against a regime that does not seem to have altogether abandoned its old methods of preserving State power? What concerns me above all is electoral thuggery, because I see no way that the government can control it, even if it wanted to. The thugs are running around loose and up to their old tricks. The government is not stopping them, either because it cannot or does not want to. It amounts to the same thing. The opposition, including the PRD, is completely powerless to stop their assaults and has already been a victim on countless occasions. I think that these will indeed be the cleanest elections in our history. Many more legal and political mechanisms than in the past will guarantee this. But I am extremely skeptical in this regard, nonetheless. In spite of the enormous gains that we have made in recent times in the legal and political arenas, I do not think that the government is prepared to play fair. The opposition remains at a disadvantage in all respects. The administration of the electoral process is marked by neither equality nor equity. Zedillo holds all the winning cards, and I do not like that a bit. Aside from the fact that he has never openly embraced Colosio's democratizing pronouncements, no one can quite understand what he is proposing for a wide range of areas in public administration, and every time he offers a proposal, he prompts justifiable irritation from one group or another. The opposition has failed to take advantage of Zedillo's indecisiveness or vagueness. Both PAN and the PRD keep on making their usual pitches, without bothering to analyze the proposals of their main rival. It is painfully obvious that the opposition groups still have a long way to go before they become true political parties (I think, though, that PRI has still further to go). They are competing at a disadvantage today not only because of the shortcomings from which our electoral system still suffers, but also because of their own. I do not see how either of these parties can win the election, although I hope one does. My reading is that we will have to wait quite some time yet before we achieve a truly modern political system. What happens on 21 August could put us on that path or distance us from it. Anything could happen.

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Costa Rica

Naranjo: Limited Number of Cubans Could Be Accepted

PA2508015794 Paris AFP in Spanish 0116 GMT 25 Aug 94

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Costa Rican Foreign Minister Fernando Naranjo has said that his country could accept a limited number of Cubans who qualify as political refugees.

Naranjo warned, however, that the number "cannot be large" because the country is not in a position to pay the expenses of a large-scale immigration.

El Salvador

Government Denies Considering Accepting Cubans

PA2408190594 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 1754 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] San Salvador, 24 Aug (NOTIMEX)—The Salvadoran Government denied today that it is considering the possibility of receiving Cuban and Haitian refugees in the country, as the United States has announced.

"The position of El Salvador has not changed in that respect. Everyone knows that we are experiencing difficult times. We have the aftermath of an armed conflict and plans for the demobilization of former combatants," Foreign Minister Oscar Santamaria stated today.

"The conditions continue to be the same as when they asked us to give refuge to the Haitians. We have problems of land extension and overpopulation, among other things," the official said in an interview with NOTIMEX.

Last Tuesday Washington said the Central American countries were considerig the possibility of receiving Haitian and Cuban refugees in their territories.

"Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Panama are studying the possibility of accepting the creation of refugee centers in their territories," Dee Dee Myers, spokesperson for the White House, had said on that day.

The U.S. official said that "initially, the talks held between the United States and Central America only contemplated refuge for the Haitians, but in light of the recent incidents in Cuba, they have been extended to include the Cubans."

The Salvadoran foreign minister said his country's government "will not change its position in that respect."

He said the exodus of Cubans to the United States is the result of a "lack of a democractic opening" on the island and the "lack of opportunity for the Cuban people to express themselves freely."

"These are the factors that have influenced the situation that exists in Cuba. I do not think it is the U.S. policy that is causing ever-increasing emigrations, Santamaria stated.

He did say that El Salvador believes the domestic affairs of each country "must be resolved according to the mechanisms, formulas, and characteristics that exist in each country."

He recognized that in Cuba there is "a very serious situation, which has gone beyond the borders of Cuban territory."

El Salvador and Cuba have not had diplomatic relations since 1959 when Fidel Castro reached power, despite the fact that Cuban athletic coaches train local teams in diverse sports.

Guatemala

Government Not To Accept Cuban Refugees

PA2408224294 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 2152 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Guatemala City, 24 Aug (ACAN-EFE)—Deputy Foreign Minister Bernardo Arevalo announced today that the Guatemalan Government will not accept Cuban refugees because it must solve very critical internal problems, including the relocation of people displaced by the war.

The diplomat said the official position on the Cuban refugees is just like that adopted concerning the Haitian refugees in June, when the government decided not to receive any group from the Caribbean island.

Nevertheless, Arevalo explained that the government has yet to receive an official petition from the United States, but he reasserted that Guatemala will accept no refugees because it must solve its own problems.

Honduras

Possibility of Receiving Cubans 'Not Ruled Out'

PA2408161594 Tegucigalpa Voz de Honduras Network in Spanish 1145 GMT 24 Aug 94

[From the "The Morning Paper" newscast]

[Excerpts] Honduran President Carlos Roberto Reina has not ruled out the possibility of welcoming Cuban refugees to Honduras and rejected any efforts by the Liberal Party deputies to create conditions so that the National Congress will accept the new package of economic measures. [passage omitted]

President Reina said he does not know if Cuban refugees trying to reach the United States might change their course at any given moment and arrive in Honduras.

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[Begin recording] [Reina] Up to this moment, I do not have any request from President Clinton's government to receive Cuban refugees, but we would have to consider it seriously if such a petition is made. [end recording]

Source: Government To Admit 'Selective' Group of Cubans

PA2508004494 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 2343 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Tegucigalpa, 24 Aug (ACAN)—The Honduran Government will reportedly accept a "selective" flow of Cuban refugees, a source from the General Directorate of Population and Immigration Policy in that Central American country stated today.

Immigration Director Angelina Ulloa told ACAN-EFE that personnel are currently preparing for an eventual arrival of refugees from Cuba or Haiti after the United States proposed that Honduras receive approximately 5,000 Haitians.

She admitted, however, that the government has received no official request from the U.S. Government to receive Cubans who are leaving the island aboard rafts or inner tubes.

If Honduras decides to receive the Cuban refugees, it would be a select group of "technicians and professionals rather than sick people or criminals," the Honduran official warned.

The first four Cuban rafters arrived on Honduras' Caribbean coast on 18 August aboard a Honduran fishing boat that found them adrift in international waters.

The Cubans, all adult males, sought shelter on the island of Guanaja, located in the insular Islas de la Bahia Department on the Caribbean Ocean, Angelina Ulloa said.

The official reported that the four men left Cuba on 6 August from the region of Baracoa and were granted a "temporary visa" upon arrival.

It was reported that at least 13 Cubans who fled their country have arrived in the country within the last seven months, and most of them departed for the United States after receiving a visa from the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa.

Immigration authorities said a considerable number of Cubans who requested political asylum in recent years now live in the country.

Ulloa added that officially, and following agreements between the Governments of Honduras and Cuba, approximately 20 Cuban technicians—experts in sports, medicine, and agriculture—currently render their services in Honduran territory.

Cuban aid has increased in recent months even though Honduras broke diplomatic relations with Fidel Castro's government in the early sixties.

Panama

Perez Balladares: Cuban Refugees To Be Handled Same Way as Haitians

PA2508010594 Panama City Circuito RPC Television in Spanish 2300 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] A few minutes ago President-elect Ernesto Perez Balladares spoke to journalists about the Cuban citizens' situation and how his government will handle the issue. He also discussed other subjects of national interest.

[Begin recording] [Perez Balladares] This matter is being handled directly by Foreign Minister Gabriel Lewis Galindo. We have said—and I reiterate the position, which is my future government's position—that after 1 September we will handle the Cubans in the same way we were willing to handle the Haitian refugees. Allow me to reiterate the conditions: 1. A specific number of refugees, a number yet to be determined, would be housed in enclosures managed by and financed by the United States; 2. These enclosures would be located within the perimeter of the defense areas; 3. The refugees would stay for a specific period of time—six months at the most.

[Unidentified reporter] Why will the Cuban refugee issue be handled the same way as the Haitian issue? Cuba is not being threatened with an imminent invasion.

[Perez Balladares] You mean is there a threat of an imminent invasion of Cuba? Not at all.

[Reporter] If there is no threat of an invasion of Cuba, why is the Cuban refugee issue being handled the same way as the Haitian refugee issue?

[Perez Balladares] Because the issue at hand is not whether there will be an invasion but how to help these people so they do not die at sea. This is an eminently humanitarian issue. [end recording]

No Formal Request Made to Panama To Take Cuban Refugees

PA2508012794 Panama City Circuito RPC Television in Spanish 2300 GMT 24 Aug 94

[From the "RPC Television News" Newscast]

[Text] The plight of the Cuban rafters has captured the world's attention, and the Republic of Panama has not ruled out the possibility of hosting these people desperately leaving the island. The Cuban emigrants, known as rafters, are victims of the political standstill between Washington and Havana. The U.S. Government is currently negotiating with 12 Central American and Caribbean countries the installation of safe havens for Cuban

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rafters. Foreign Minister-designate Gabriel Lewis Galindo said that the possibility of receiving and hosting Cuban rafters in Panama has not been ruled out.

[Begin Lewis Gallindo recording] To be honest, this possibility is still in its first draft. We have received no formal requests, because no formal requests can be made prior to 1 September. [end recording]

Lewis pointed out that should a decision be made to receive the Cuban rafters in Panama, they would be allowed to stay for six months. He also pointed out that should they be housed in military bases belonging to the Southern Command, headquartered in Panama, this situation would not violate the Panama Canal Treaties.

[Begin Lewis recording] I would do what my team of lawyers advises me to do. All of those who negotiated the treaties are in my team of lawyers. That is why I have enough professional support to tell you that this situation does not violate any treaty. I believe that we are again entangling ourselves in truly irrelevant issues. Panama has always distinguished itself by lending its hand to people in dire need. We refuse to mar a humanitarian issue with fruitless discussions among ourselves. (end recording]

Meanwhile, the current foreign minister, Jose Raul Mulino, believes the situation is exactly the opposite.

[Begin Mulino recording] In my opinion, only a very loose and rather unconstitutional interpretation of the treaties would allow the military bases or the defense sites along the Panama Canal, as stipulated by the Panama Canal Treaties, to be used in this type of situation. [end recording]

The incoming administration will have to make a decision on the Cuban rafters; that is, it will have to decide if they will be accepted in Panama as refugees.

President-Elect Pledges To Punish Corrupt Officials

PA2508011794 Panama City LA PRENSA in Spanish 22 Aug 94 p 1A

[Report by Manuel Alvarez Cedeno]

[Text] President-elect Ernesto Perez Balladares has said he will punish and imprison any official of his government who "lays his hands on" state funds. He also regretted that President Guillermo Endara and Legislative Assembly President Arturo Vallarino "are publicly fighting over a slot machines contract."

Perez Balladares met yesterday with the National Executive Committee (CEN) of the PRD [Democratic Revolutionary Party] and the party delegates of the 8-9 electoral district at a Parque Lefevre restaurant, where they studied the president-elect's work agenda. He will take office on 1 September. They also discussed political issues.

During his speech, the president-elect said he will not tolerate corruption during his term, adding: "Just as we have opened the doors to broad participation, rest assured that I will also know how to punish and imprison whoever lays his hands on state funds, regardless of rank."

He also urged the PRD rank and file to "become the eyes and ears of our people to ensure the honesty of each and every one of my government's officials."

Perez Balladares, who is also the PRD secretary general, spoke about the dispute between President Endara and Vallarino over the slot machines bidding process, pointing out: "The Republic deserves better things than seeing the shameful spectacle staged by the president (Endara) and the Legislative Assembly president (Vallarino) bickering in the media over a slot machine contract."

Vallarino accused Endara of being a "criminal" after Endara expropriated the Bizarro Corporation slot machines. Vallarino also threatened to try Endara this week in the Legislative Assembly, later explaining that he will try him in September.

Perez Balladares emphasized that he has no doubts whatsoever that "we will be successful," because "what characterizes our party's rank and file is their determination to advance in an honest country, where we all will have equal opportunities; we will make this expectation a reality during our government."

The upcoming president "self-nominated" himself to the post of his party's secretary general, which will be decided during the October 1995 PRD congress. The PRD is getting ready to elect the delegates to the congress that will be held to elect new PRD leaders.

President-elect Perez Balladares pointed out that the congress is sovereign and will have the duty of electing the party's leadership, underscoring: "We would be foolish and stupid if we fail to institute an excellent and honest government and a stronger and militant PRD organization."

Legislative Assembly Approves Ban on Constitutional Army

PA2508012894 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0127 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Panama City, 23 Aug (ACAN-EFE)—Today [23 August] the Panamanian Legislative Assembly approved in its third and last debate the removal of the Army from the national Constitution, with only the support of the "pro-civilian" [civilista] parties that fought the previous military regime.

The measure will not take effect until ratified by President Guillermo Endara, one of its supporters, and the new assembly scheduled to be sworn in on 1 September, which will have a different balance of power in which the pro-civilians are a minority.

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The constitutional change approved today states that Panama will not have an Army. But every citizen is obliged to bear arms to defend the country's independence in the event of a foreign attack.

Further on Act Eliminating Army

PA2408200394 Panama City Telemetro Television Network in Spanish 1730 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Report by Jose Ivan Ramos from the "Telemetro Reports" newscast—passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] In a move many have considered historic, the Legislative Assembly last night approved the elimination of the Army from the Constitution.

[Unidentified legislator, broadcast in progress] "...has been approved, Mr. President."

The approval of this constitutional reform was almost unanimous; 49 legislators voted in favor, only one belonging to the Democratic Revolutionary Party [PRD] voted against, and no legislator abstained.

After approving this Legislative Act in the third debate, the Assembly modified the preamble of the Constitution, eliminated the General State Council, and ended militarism in the contry.

After calling the Assembly's decision historic, the first vice president of the Assembly, who presided over the debate, stated the present Assembly fulfilled the democratic aspirations of the Panamanian people.

[Gilmer Gonzalez, Legislative Assembly first vice president] "We are aware of the fact that the Panamanian people really expected this from the present Assembly. We know the people also expect the next Assembly to approve this Legislative Act."

The constitutional change, approved eight days before the inauguration of the new government, states that Panama will not have an Army, but mandates all Panamanians to take up arms to defend the independence and teritorial integrity in case of an attack by a foreign country. These issues made the approved Legislative Act the most controversial one of the four that will be discussed in the special legislative sessions.

[Gonzalez] "Finally, following broad discussions, important agreement has been reached, prompting the approval in the third debate of this Legislative Act."

The final discussion of this Legislative Act took place in the absence of a large number of PRD legislators. For the first vice president of the Assembly, the marked absence of the opposition legislative wing was because they practically agreed with the measure.

However, PRD alternate legislator Horacio Rodriguez, who was the only legislator who voted against this initiative, does not agree with the full content of the approved reforms.

[Rodriguez] "Regrettably, the modifications made to Title 12 eliminate the concept of national defense from the Constitution."

The approved reforms will not come into effect until they are ratified by President Guillermo Endara and the next Assembly, which will take office on 1 September and will be controlled by the PRD. This new Assembly must submit this Legislative Act for discussion in the first five days of ordinary sessions.

In the next few days, the present Assembly is expected to discuss Legislative Acts No. 2 and No. 4, contemplating reforms to various articles of the Constitution and the Electoral Code.

Extradition Request Denied for Former Guatemalan President

PA2408195994 Panama City Telemetro Television Network in Spanish 1730 GMT 24 Aug 94

[From the "Telemetro Reports" newscast]

[Text] The Panamanian Government has denied the extradition request for former Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano Elias. Foreign Minister Jose Raul Mulino made the announcement during a ceremony at the Foreign Relations Ministry.

[Begin Mulino recording, broadcast in progress] ...copy of the resolution whereby the Government of the Republic of Panama denies the extradition request for former President Serrano Elias. After analyzing the case and in keeping with Panama's right as state before which the request was made [estado requerido], we consider there were political charges in the extradition request, which prompted us to term alleged offenses by Serrano as political offenses. [end recording]

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Argentina

Di Tella on Falklands, AMIA Case; Menem Not To Visit UK

PY2408133194 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1100 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Buenos Aires, 24 Aug (NA)—During a meeting with British Interior Minister Michael Howard, who is visiting Buenos Aires, Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella again expressed the Argentine Government's dissatisfaction over the British decision to extend the fishing exclusion zone around the Malvinas Islands.

During their one-hour meeting, the two ministers mainly discussed the Malvinas issue and the disagreement between the two countries with regard to the archipelago's sovereignty.

After yesterday's meeting, Di Tella again described the British decision as "nonsense devised by low-level Foreign Office officials and merely aimed at bothering us."

For his part, Howard said London's decision with regard to extending the exclusion zone is aimed at conserving the squid reserves existing in those waters and does not represent a measure taken in reprisal for including in the new Argentine constitution a provision which confirms Argentina's sovereignty over the islands.

In addition to the Malvinas issue, Howard and Di Tella briefly reviewed other issues, including drug enforcement and the problem of international terrorism. In this regard, the two ministers proposed studies on cooperation methods between the two governments.

Asked about President Carlos Menem's remarks that Argentina would continue to patrol the waters that the British have now included in their exclusion zone, Di Tella said he hopes there will be no incidents.

Nevertheless, the foreign minister emphasized that Argentina "is not willing to give up its rights."

After meeting Howard, the foreign minister expressed hope that the Iranian diplomats mentioned in Judge Juan Jose Galeano's ruling will accept testifying, even though they may testify without giving up their diplomatic immunity.

The foreign minister ruled out—for the time being—the possibility of President Menem visiting the United Kingdom. He again noted that the UK authorities "have to be good boys" and not make decisions like the one they made on this occasion.

Discussing the unilateral expansion of the fishing exclusion zone around the Malvinas Islands, Di Tella emphasized: "We have been very reluctant in promoting the presidential visit because we were expecting attitudes like the one taken on this occasion."

Defense Minister Discusses Security, Falklands

PY2408183994 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1405 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Buenos Aires, 23 Aug (NA)—Defense Minister Oscar Camilion said "the handling of the security apparatus continues to be a problem that we must discuss" within the government. The minister reiterated that the National Border Police and Coast Guard "must continue under his portfolio."

Camilion thus questioned the role of the Community Defense Secretariat headed by retired Brigadier General Andres Antonietti. The defense minister said there is "an open debate on how a new security system should operate."

"The Security Secretariat or the Community Defense Secretariat is not the super-secretariat people talked so much about. Its function is to coordinate. It has the work previously performed by the Interior Ministry Security Secretariat. The organic distribution of functions has not changed at all," the minister said.

Camilion, who this morning installed Jose Torzillo in the post of budget and administration under secretary, said that if we want to review our internal security, "it must be clear that the defense department cannot lose control of our exterior defenses, just as we cannot intrude in interior security."

The daily CRONISTA COMERCIAL asked Camilion if he thought the creation of a Security Ministry was necessary. Camilion answered: "The government will discuss that at the appropriate time," without elaborating further.

The minister said that Argentina "expressed its total disagreement" with the United Kingdom's decision to extend the exclusion zone around the Malvinas Islands, adding that "the Foreign Ministry is closely monitoring the issue in order to adopt all the necessary precautions and protection."

"We still cannot speak about a government answer because we are still analyzing the problem. [no closing quotation mark as received] Guido Di Tella had already anticipated the reaction when the cabinet discussed the possibility of incorporating the clause on sovereignty in the Constitution.

Camilion said that if Carlos Menem is reelected "we should make an important effort to rationalize" the defense department because "the military budget is distorted by the use of too much money for personnel and too little for material and equipment."

Regarding the needed rationalization, the minister said Argentina must continue participating in UN peacekeeping missions "without ruling out the possibility of reducing these operations, particularly due to their high cost. We should participate only in extreme cases," Camilion said.

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Defense Minister on Military Salary Increase

PY2508035394 Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish 16 Aug 94 p 13

[Text] Upon arriving in Cordoba on the evening of 14 August with President Carlos Menem, Defense Minister Oscar Camilion noted that "nobody disputes" that an adjustment to military salaries is needed, but that "the possibilities of implementing this adjustment must be reviewed, bearing in mind last year's increase in public spending."

Camilion emphasized that this issue "is in the hands of the cabinet," which will continue to examine it over the next few weeks. It still has not been reported, however, when a final decision will be made on this issue.

Other Defense Ministry sources, contacted by CLARIN last week, indicated that "the issue will take a long time," without elaborating any further.

This issue was raised on 25 July at the government's top levels, when Lieutenant General Mario Candido Diaz, the joint chief of staff, explained to President Menem a program drawn up to implement a voluntary military service.

The program specifically points out that it is deemed "necessary" to increase the salaries of the Armed Forces' permanent cadres—officers and NCO's—to allow them to dedicate themselves "full time" to training soldiers, giving up other jobs to which they had to resort to make up for their paltry salaries.

The military leadership presented to Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo a "realistic" proposal involving an aggregate salary increase of 800 million pesos per year.

Lt. Gen. Diaz and the joint staff commanders told Cavallo (the president had already left the cabinet meeting in which the voluntary military service issue had been discussed) that "new elements" supporting their petition had appeared.

The military leaders specifically mentioned the salary adjustment for government employees and the implementation of the new military service system.

The cost of the voluntary military system—which was not challenged—totals 247.5 million pesos. Adding the current compulsory military service appropriations, the total cost amounts to 317 million pesos.

Cavallo's initial reaction was: "From where do you want me to get 1.1 billion pesos?" New studies on this issue will be conducted, and Eduardo Bauza, secretary general of the presidency, will act as an "intermediary" between the Economy Ministry and the military leadership.

The program reviewed by the general staffs consists basically of increasing the chiefs of staff salaries to match the president's salary (about 6,000 pesos). This increase would be proportionally implemented for the subordinate military commanders, while the current aggregates would be included into the retirees' salaries and payments in order to achieve a readjustment and improvement in the cadres.

Buenos Aires Province Governor on Reelection

PY2408153794 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1925 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Buenos Aires, 23 Aug (NA)—On 23 August, Buenos Aires Province Governor Eduardo Duhalde categorically ruled out the possibility of becoming President Carlos Menem's running mate and asserted that Santa Fe Governor Carlos Reutemann would be the wisest choice as vice presidential candidate.

Duhalde also pointed out that if he is able to run for the governorship a second time, the current vice governor, Rafael Roma, will "surely" be his running mate.

Duhalde categorically rejected the possibility of being Menem's running mate when stating that if he is successful in the plebiscite, that will settle the issue of his reelection and he will "obligatorily" run for office.

"If the people of Buenos Aires Province were to vote in favor of the governor's reelection, it would be schizophrenic on my part to reject" such a possibility in order to stand for vice president.

He asserted that if he cannot run for the Buenos Aires Province governorship a second time, the possibility of sharing the Justicialist Party slate with Menem is "totally out of the question" because "if the people decide that I cannot be a candidate in my province, I will do the president a great disservice by being his running mate."

Duhalde stated that Santa Fe Governor Carlos Reutemann has the necessary conditions to be on the Justicialist Party ticket with Menem in the 1995 elections.

Although he said that "there are several" leaders who can aspire to the vice presidency, including Tucuman Province Governor Ramon Ortega, Formosa Governor Vicente Joga, La Pampa Governor Ruben Marin, and Entre Rios Governor Mario Moine, he stated that Reutemann is "undoubtedly" "a good candidate" to pair up with Menem.

He made it clear that "after all, it is the president who will resolve that." Still, he did not rule out that Italo Luder, former acting president and presidential candidate in 1983, may be Menem's running mate. Duhalde termed Luder "a most prestigious leader."

He further stated that "government officials or governors have so far been mentioned as possible candidates, but it is not a wild idea to think about people who do not hold a public post at present but who have built up a reputation for themselves, like Luder."

Duhalde made these remarks after a ceremony held in the Buenos Aires Province borough of Lanus, where he

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awarded 38 property deeds of homes located in the neighborhood of Los Ceibos.

With regard to the manner by which his run for the governorship of Buenos Aires province can be made valid, Duhalde said that "he preferred the people to give their opinion" when he defended the alternative of a plebiscite to decide the reelection question, although he indicated that he was willing "to obey the mandate of the provincial Constituent Assembly."

It is his belief that "the people must give their opinion" regarding his eventual candidacy, and he said that "if they say no, then I will take time off to rest for a short time with my children."

"The people, whether or not they vote for Duhalde, believe that it is not fair that the governor of Buenos Aires province cannot be reelected, and yet many governors and the president have that possibility," he said.

He indicated that if he runs again for governor, he will "surely" do so with the current deputy governor, Rafael Roma.

Duhalde also stated that if he cannot run for governor for another term, the formula will be defined "through internal elections" in the Justicialist Party of Buenos Aires Province.

He believes that the internal elections can be held "in December or March" to decide on the candidates, and he did not reject the fact that the multiple-ticket law system will be implemented.

"This possibility has not yet been debated with the party," he said, and he indicated that the definition of what mechanism will be used will be made "after the Constituent Assembly ends its sessions."

Duhalde is reticent regarding the implementation of open internal elections in the Justicialist Party of Buenos Aires Province because "it harms the chances of the smaller groups that cannot afford the costs of acceding to the general electoral lists."

Bolivia

Defense Minister Denies Unrest With Armed Forces

PY2408220594 La Paz HOY in Spanish 12 Aug 94 p 3

[Text] Defense Minister Raul Tovar yesterday admitted there are "personal disagreements" among military commanders but denied any unrest within the Armed Forces. He thus sought to refute rumors of an outbreak of unrest within the institution.

Tovar asserted: "As far as I know there is no unrest within the Armed Forces, only personal disagreements."

Another version states, however, that the confirmation of the Armed Forces high command and the impunity of irregularities in the three forces—the Army, Air Force, and Navy—have fueled conflicts among the commanders.

FIDES news agency reports that the commanders of the Army, the Bolivian Air Force (FAB), and the Navy have been "officially and unofficially charged with irregularities which were not investigated at the time they occurred."

FIDES adds that Armed Forces commander in chief Fernando Sanjines has been summoned by the military prosecutor in the TAB-2 case [involving the unauthorized sale of Bolivian Air Transport spare parts]. Some officers believe the commander in chief will be replaced by the joint chief of staff.

FIDES adds: "Last June, a high-ranking officer of the office of the commander in chief reported the existence of 'fake entries' in the Bolivian Navy, and 'economic-administrative irregularities' in the Army general command. The Supreme Military Court prosecutor also asked the FAB general commander for further information on the forging of TAM [Military Air Transportation] air tickets."

According to reliable military sources, the confirmation of the members of the high military command in their post on 6 August, in addition to charges of irregularities by military commanders, has caused unrest.

Minister Tovar said people must remember that they were confirmed in their posts by President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, and it is up to him whether or not to change that decision.

He said the decision to ratify the high command came from the president "and the ministry has nothing to do with this issue."

Sanchez Terms Gas Contract With Brazil 'Just'

PY2408153594 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0008 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] La Paz, 22 Aug (EFE)—Bolivian President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada stated today that the addendum to the contract for the sale of gas to Brazil, signed last week, represents a "just" and "suitable" project for the economies of the two countries.

The Bolivian Government has thus referred to the criticisms by the Brazilian press which questioned Sanchez de Lozada's proposals to review the project to sell Bolivian natural gas to the Brazilian industrial market.

"The addendum allows the implementation of the project," Sanchez de Lozada said. He added: "We needed some changes to make the project feasible and economically and financially viable."

The Bolivian president, who last week met with his Brazilian counterpart Itamar Franco in Brasilia, said that the changes in the contract "are for the good of all."

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"It does not benefit one to the detriment of the other," he said, and added that it is a project "of the two countries, suitable for the two economies."

He added that they achieved a project that "will not be unjust (because) unjust contracts do not last." He concluded by saying that "when a president returns with a decoration, there must be doubts, but when he returns with criticisms, it means that he has done his job well."

Bolivia and Brazil had signed a contract for the sale of gas. This contract will be fully in effect by the beginning of 1997, according to the timetable, following the construction of more than 3,000 km of a gas pipeline and an investment of some $2 billion in what is considered the most ambitious project in the Latin American region.

Brazil

Vox Populi Poll Shows 40 Percent Prefer Cardoso

PY2408184894

[Editorial Report] Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese on 20 August publishes, on page 8, four unattributed articles on the results of a Vox Populi poll on voter preference for presidential candidates, which shows that Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party is 13 points ahead of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the Workers Party.

The first 250-word article states that the Vox Populi poll, carried out "a little less than 40 days before the election, shows that Cardoso's chances of winning in the first voting round have increased considerably." In the simulated poll in which the candidate's name is mentioned, Cardoso has 40 percent of the voters support, while Lula has 27 percent, Leonel Brizola 5 percent, Orestes Quercia 4 percent, Eneas Carneiro 3 percent, and Esperidiao Amin 1 percent. In the spontaneous poll in which the candidate's name is not mentioned, the difference between Cardoso and Lula fell to 8 points, with 28 percent of the voters supporting Cardoso and 19 percent preferring Lula.

A second 150-word item states that Vox Populi asked the voters whom they considered the most honest candidate, the one with best knowledge of the people's problems, the most capable to solve them, and the one with more new ideas. Thirty-four percent said that Cardoso is the most honest, while 27 percent thought the same of Lula; 48 percent think Cardoso has newer ideas against 27 percent for Lula. Thirty-nine percent think Lula knows the people's problems best, against 34 percent for Cardoso; however, 46 percent think that Cardoso is more capable of solving the problems than Lula, who obtained 29 percent.

A third 150-word item says that the Vox Populi poll also demonstrated that the Real Plan has made the people more optimistic. When asked what the situation of the country will be by the end of the year, 60 percent of those polled said that it will improve, while 8 percent said it will be worse and 22 percent think the situation will remain the same.

A fourth 100-word item states that, according to the Vox Populi poll, half of the Brazilian population believes that the economic situation improved with the implementation of the real. Fifty-seven percent of those polled think that the economy improved with the new currency, 7 percent think that it became worse, and 27 percent think that there have been no changes.

Ω Nuclear, Space, S&T Notes

94P21106A

[Editorial Report] ABACC TEAM INSPECTS NAVY NUCLEAR CENTER—Technicians from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) conducted inspections of the Navy Ministry's nuclear facilities in Ipero, Sao Paulo State, during the first week in August. According to ABACC Secretary Jorge Coll, no irregularities or diversion of nuclear materials were observed. The ABACC maintains a regular schedule of inspections of the nuclear installations of Brazil and Argentina, in accordance with an agreement signed with the two countries and with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in March 1994. Some of the inspections are conducted solely by technicians from ABACC. (Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL 5-7 Aug 94)

MAYOR SPECULATES ON NUCLEAR CENTER'S DEACTIVATION—The Navy Ministry has given the mayor's office in Ipero, 130 km from Sao Paulo, until the end of July to vacate the buildings the ministry had originally provided for use in establishing services in the areas of public security and social assistance. The eviction will affect the buildings housing the Social Solidarity Fund Center, the residence of the police chief, and two houses used by the military police. Ipero Mayor Marcos Andrade (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party-PMDB) viewed the Navy Ministry's recall of the buildings as the rupture of a partnership that had existed between the Navy Ministry and the mayor's office since the Aramar Experimental Center (CEA) was inaugurated in 1988. The Aramar facility is the site where the Navy develops its principal projects for the Brazilian nuclear program and nuclear submarine construction. According to Andrade, the Navy Ministry has now stopped hiring workers in the city, and has reclaimed roughly 50 houses that were being used by senior employees of the CEA. Andrade observed that there are indications that the CEA is gradually being deactivated, adding: "We don't know what is going on, but it is certain that changes are taking place in the philosophy of Aramar's administration." Neither Admiral Othon Luis Pinheiro da Silva, president of the Coordinating Center for Special Projects which administers the Aramar nuclear facility, nor Navy Minister Ivan Serpa could be reached for comment. (Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO 19 Jul 94)

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TIMETABLE OF SLV PROJECT DELAYED—Since its beginning, the development of the Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) by the Aeronautics and Space Institute (IAE) has been continuously hampered by obstacles occasioned by international embargoes of technology transfer and lack of funding. The rocket's development is part of the Complete Brazilian Space Mission (MECB), whose objective is to launch satellites that are built domestically by the National Space Research Institute (INPE) from a launch site located in Alcantara, Maranhao State. Despite the difficulties, the IAE anticipates that the rocket will be ready by the end of 1995. According to IAE Director Tiago da Silva Ribeiro, "the timetable for development will depend on the release of funds," adding that the minimum budget projected for the SLV project in 1994 was $9 million. Since the funds can't be released until the government's budget is approved, he continued, the IAE is depending on funding from privatizations of public enterprises. Ribeiro further remarked that although the Science and Technology Ministry designated $40 million for the SLV, the IAE has only received $500,000 this year.

In the last three years, the SLV project has been operating with a budget of less than $10 million. According to Ribeiro, the monies from privatizations will be essential to contracting firms between now and the end of the year to develop the rocket launch tower on the Alcantara base, adding that the proposals will be submitted by 26 August.

BRAZILIAN SPACE AGENCY PLANS FOR 1994—The Brazilian Space Agency (AEB) will be operating at full capacity within three months, according to AEB Director General Ajax Barros de Melo. The AEB'S plans for 1994, he said, are to engage universities and broaden scientific cooperation with other countries, continue launching data collection satellites (SCD), and complete the SLV. An international bid for the launch of the SCD-2 will be published by the end of 1994. The launch is projected to take place in March 1995, and the SCD-2 project is now under development by INPE. The SLV should be completed in 1996. The other satellites planned in the Brazilian space program will depend on the domestic development of some technologies, since there are international restrictions on importation.

Another AEB plan is to enter the international market for launching small satellites of up to 400 kilos from the Alcantara base in Maranhao, a market in which Brazil has only a 0.04 percent share, according to Melo. "The base has great possibilities of generating sufficient income to maintain and complete its infrastructure," he said. At the present time, he pointed out, France has 60 percent of the market for launching geostationary telecommunications satellites; the cost of launching a geostationary satellite ranges from $60 million to $100 million. The AEB director cautioned, however, that the AEB's hopes of entering the international market will depend on the completion of the SLV which has been under development since the 1970's. "If it is ready by 1996," he said, "Brazil will have an opportunity to offer the Alcantara base as a launch site option."

Melo went on to say that even with Brazil's adherence to the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which regulates the transfer of sensitive technologies to developing countries, the picture involving restrictions on imports has not improved. Nor has the signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean facilitated access to those technologies. He then added: "There are economic interests in this process that are larger than a mere concern with the acquisition of military technologies by the Third World," and, for that reason, Brazil will have to develop its own research projects. (Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL 27 Jul 94)

AEB BEGINS OPERATING AMID FINANCIAL WOES—The AEB officially began operating on 14 July amid serious budgetary problems. The agency, which is connected directly to the Presidency of the Republic and will centralize all planning and implementation associated with monitoring and launching satellites and rockets, was created by law in 1994, but was left out of the government's budgetary allotment sent to Congress in early 1994. At a ceremony swearing in the AEB's superior council on 14 July, AEB President Luiz Gylvan Meira Filho remarked that the resubmission of the Union General Budget to Congress during the last six months made possible the creation of a category designating $19 million for the establishment of the AEB and the implementation of its most important project, the MECB. The MECB had previously been administered by the Armed Forces General Staff (EMFA).

Another $20 million, however, continues to be held within the EMFA, and would have to be transferred to the AEB in order for the timetable for completing the MECB's projects to be met. Filho added that transferring those budgetary funds will involve some work administratively, and asked the representatives of the Finance Ministry and Planning Secretariat present to lend their assistance. He also asserted that the AEB has the authority to revise all of the agreements that the government has already signed in the space sector, if the Council deems it appropriate. (Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL 15-17 Jul 94)

INPE SIGNS ACCORD FOR COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES—On 3 August, Science and Technology Minister Jose Israel Vargas and Brazilian Telecommunication Inc. (Telebras) President Adyr Silva signed an accord at INPE headquarters in Sao Jose dos Campos, Sao Paulo State, to build eight communications satellites. The accord was signed during a ceremony commemorating the 33rd anniversary of the founding of INPE. Established on 3 August 1961, INPE has 1,400 employees and maintains offices in Cachoeira Paulista in Sao Paulo State, Fortaleza, Rio Grande do Norte, Cuiaba, Atibaia, and Brasilia. In addition to conducting research and building satellites, INPE offers Post-graduate and doctorate courses in the

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fields of astronomy, space geophysics, meteorology, remote sensing, applied computation, orbital mechanics, and other subjects. Prominent among the projects currently being developed by INPE is the MECB involving construction of four satellites, two for data collection—the first of which was launched in February 1993—and the other two for remote sensing in monitoring earth resources. (Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL 4 Aug 94)

Chile

Foreign Minister Figueroa Interviewed

PY2308023094 Santiago LA TERCERA DE LA HORA in Spanish 14 Aug 94 pp 8-9

[Interview with Foreign Minister Carlos Figueroa by Maria Eugenia Oyarzun; place and date not given]

[Text] [Oyarzun] Why is it that the first bill that the administration is submitting to Congress deals with constitutional political reforms, replacing institutionally appointed senators with elected ones, and the changing of the electoral system?

[Figueroa] The constitutional reforms are part of the medium and long-term goals of the country. We cannot separate socioeconomic development from political development. The administration believes that there are obstacles in the way of the good operation of the political system.

[Oyarzun] What are they?

[Figueroa] They have to do with how Congress operates and its powers. This is a demand raised by the deputies and senators themselves, who want to modernize Congress so that it can be as expeditious as other national activities.

[Oyarzun] What criticism against the administration has been the most painful?

[Figueroa] There is an assessment made by the political class that I disagree with, because the administration is very active at all levels; the economic team is working quite well; it has clear objectives, and the people are reacting quite differently from how you are here in the political corridors.

[Oyarzun] Is it a good symptom that people who earned a lot of money in Chile in various companies are now taking part of this money and investing it in Argentina, Bolivia, or Peru?

[Figueroa] Yes, of course it is a good symptom.

[Oyarzun] Why?

[Figueroa] Because it shows business capacity. Businessmen have the obligation of finding better ways to use resources—both human resources and capital. Businessmen have the obligation of looking into all means to better develop their activities and maximize their capital, and their professional and technical resources.

[Oyarzun] Are there no possibilities for reinvestment in Chile?

[Figueroa] If there were any, they would be investing here. What happens is that there are better opportunities next door, but in the end, it is good for Chile.

[Oyarzun] This depends on whether they return their profits to Chile, or leave them abroad....

[Figueroa] Yes, of course, but these are Chilean companies that have branches abroad and associate themselves with foreign businessmen to develop projects. This means that Chilean companies are becoming multinational companies, and this is the appropriate thing to do in the whole world, and in line with what is occurring with the world economy.

[Oyarzun] Are there any disagreements between the current cabinet members and those of President Aylwin's cabinet?

[Figueroa] This is what many people would like to see. The thing is that for at least the past 50 years we have not experienced a government transition between two administrations of the same political party. We were compelled to design one, and we probably made some mistakes in the process, but that is all. President Frei has reasserted many times his loyalty to President Patricio Aylwin's administration. He did so both during the campaign and while exercising his post. The cabinet members enjoy excellent relations with those who were in government during President Aylwin's administration. What more do people want?

[Oyarzun] Is this a transition government, or one of continuity?

[Figueroa] I would say that this is a government of continuity, but at a different time and under different circumstances.

[Oyarzun] Is the transition over?

[Figueroa] There is continuity at all levels—at the political, economic, and social levels—but the scenario has changed because the country has other requirements, and people believe that we have overcome certain stages. People believe—and President Frei has accepted this quite well—that Chile has today the great opportunity of taking a very important step in achieving its development. This requires thinking in terms of the future, and not encouraging a dispute between an under secretary and the Senate. Those who are used to moving in such an atmosphere have yet to realize that we are living in a society that is growing and developing at spectacular speed. In Santiago we have yet to become more open-minded. We have yet to learn how to think in big terms for the country.

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[Oyarzun] People said that Chile had its great chance during former President Eduardo Frei Montalva's administration, but that it lost it somehow. Do you believe we run the same risk today?

[Figueroa] Having been under secretary and a cabinet member in the senior President Frei's administration, I would not say that the opportunities Chile is facing today are the same as those we were facing then, because at the time Chile obviously lacked the stability it enjoys today; which, furthermore, is something I believe we should safeguard dearly. Whoever undermines Chile's economic, political, and social stability is committing suicide. I believe the government and the opposition understand this, and this is why there is an effort to achieve agreements, consensus, and ways to overcome differences. Issues such as poverty, education, opportunity for women, the development of production, and diplomacy for development are believed to be indispensable. To bet against them would be breaking a balance the country has achieved. Moreover, Chile has also established stable bases of social and economic ties so that the country might develop. The Frei Montalva administration was a great government; it achieved many changes and goals. For Chileans, Eduardo Frei junior represents much of what was achieved by Eduardo Frei senior. Those of us who participated in the recent presidential campaign clearly witnessed this.

[Oyarzun] Do you agree with President Frei when he said that the opposition has not given him "a single day of political honeymoon?"

[Figueroa] Regarding the opposition, I believe that it is doing its job, and this is what they are paid to do. Let us cease to complain about what the opposition does! We have no theories on this issue.

It is one thing to be a member of the opposition and submit proposals on issues one believes in. But in view of the existing high degree of consensus, the opposition is aware that it is committing suicide if it bets against the country's political and economic stability.

[Oyarzun] Is there a social consensus in Chile?

[Figueroa] This is a country in which there is a great social consensus, and this is shown in the people's attitude, which says: "I am not making any more petitions, because I do not want to lose economic or macroeconomic stability because of overly ambitious requests." The same goes for the government regarding public spending.

[Oyarzun] Has the fear of breaking the macroeconomic balance forced the government to not acquiesce to the petitions of the residents of Arica and Aisen?

[Figueroa] Not only that. Would it not have been better for the government not to engage in a conflict with teachers, municipal health workers, or coal miners? Would it not have been much better not to have had any black banners flying over Arica? The government faced these conflicts in line with the great government objectives that were prioritized by the president in his 21 May message, in which he stated that macroeconomic stability is an essential condition for achieving national development. The executive branch will be inflexible in this, and it is willing to make all the necessary efforts so as not to lose what has been achieved. We are not willing to run any risks. Like Aylwin's administration, we have started by implementing an adjustment program, because there has been excessive spending.

Let me be perfectly clear: This administration will do everything in its power to safeguard economic stability, because this is capital that Chile has gained with tremendous effort. We have to open up more space for private enterprise and exert strict control on spending, in accordance with what the country can pay.

[Oyarzun] The president and his team have been in power for 150 days.... Will you make an assessment of his team in these first five months?

[Figueroa] I am appalled with the provincialism of Chileans, because we bother about petty things and do not see beyond our noses. This is an administration that had appointed its entire government team before it took office. Do you believe there is a president anywhere in the world who can make an assessment of the first six months in office if he has not yet been unable to appoint his entire staff? We have no appreciation for what Chileans do! In the end we have yet to get used to living in a stable society!

[Oyarzun] Do you believe that Development Under Secretary Jorge Rodriguez Grossi did the right thing in criticizing the National Renewal (RN) senators, or can you justify the suit?

[Figueroa] Why should anyone sue because of a political commentary? We hear them every day. Please, what about the commentaries made about cabinet members during the Codelco [Copper Corporation] case? We should not have such bad memories! Under secretaries are not persons without political opinions. They exercise a political job.

[Oyarzun] Do you find these statements "inappropriate," as the interior minister described them?

[Figueroa] I am not aware of the circumstances, and I would not even like to discuss the subject.

[Oyarzun] Even the Santiago mayor said he expected President Frei to make an evaluation....

[Figueroa] The president said he would make an assessment after the first six months....

[Oyarzun] In order to change some cabinet members?

[Figueroa] It could be an assessment of good results. The assessment does not necessarily have to be a negative one.

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[Oyarzun] Did you find in the Foreign Ministry the degree of cooperation you expected?

[Figueroa] Extraordinary! We made the right decision in favoring the diplomatic career and allowing Foreign Ministry personnel to assume all high-ranking posts. Strictly speaking, the only outsider in the entire Foreign Ministry staff is the foreign minister. He is not a complete outsider, either, because he was Chilean ambassador to Argentina. Twenty-three minister counselors were promoted to the rank of ambassador, and people are working very well. We have overcome a complex challenge, because with the end of the "Cold War" and the bipolar world, the international agenda has grown. Today we are working on five conventions of the sea: the Convention of Maritime Floors; the Convention of the Sea; the Convention of the High Seas; the Convention of the Antarctic Environment; and the Convention on Whales. We are also working on the Space Commission; the Disarmament Commission; the Commission for the Proscription of Chemical and Nuclear Weapons; the Commission of Security and Confidence Measures [Comission de Seguridad y Confianza]; on the drug trafficking issue; and on commercial issues, GATT, etc. The agenda has grown, because before the controversy was centered in the two big powers, and now each country upholds independent positions. In view of this the Chilean proposal on the Convention of Whales was approved with the support of France, Mexico, and the United States—something that would have been unthinkable in the old scenario.

[Oyarzun] How do you view the world at the end of the bipolar system and the start of the unipolar or multipolar system?

[Figueroa] There is only but one power capable of assuming leadership at the political, military, and economic levels. It is the United States. I believe that the United States has not yet grasped this possibility, or has not yet decided whether to assume this role. Consequently, there is disorder. There was order in the bipolar world because there were two guardians who neutralized each other, and there was a certainty that nothing similar to what today is occurring in central Europe would ever happen. The world was virtually divided in half. Whereas today there are ethnic and religious conflicts. We view the Haitian problem very unemotionally, but for the United States it is an issue that means hundreds of thousands of persons arriving on its coasts. You see how Fidel Castro has reacted, by telling the Americans he will send them Cubans.... This is a very delicate issue. Moreover, old conflicts which seemed exhausted have flared up, such as xenophobia, fundamentalism, nationalism; if in addition you have drug trafficking, which scorns no country, and terrorism, which hits everywhere, you have a confusing and not very hopeful situation.

In view of the 50th anniversary of the UN Charter, the world should unite and ponder over the fact that if 50 years ago we were able to structure a world order on the basis of what existed then, and invented a mechanism of balance of powers and international actions to safeguard order, international security, and peace, we now have to deal with social problems and how they can undermine international stability. We face such intense dramas, with international reverberations, because conflicts are internationalized. The United States intervenes in Somalia, and the French in Rwanda. This produces a discussion on intervention. The doctrine of nonintervention is being replaced by preventive diplomacy, a theory currently in vogue in the UN Security Council. The United States maintains that the Haitian issue is a threat to peace, but if Haitians continue to arrive on its coasts it will have to invade Haiti, and because it does not want to do it alone, it raises the issue before the Security Council. These are not domestic issues. They affect the entire world. There is a globalization.

[Oyarzun] Is the United States attempting to act as an international policeman?

[Figueroa] No, I would say that the United States is no longer willing to play that role, and I think that it will transfer it increasingly to the UN Security Council. This is why the United Nations should consider modifying its role and making changes in the Security Council, the composition of which corresponds to the reality being lived in 1944, after the end of World War II, when Japan and Germany were out and the winning countries had a right to veto. Nowadays we can no longer leave out Germany and Japan as world powers; we cannot ignore that the Europe of today is different from that of 1945. Europe is the most important economic, political, social, human, and cultural conglomerate in the world, and it cannot be left out of the world scene.

[Oyarzun] Isn't Chile a bit behind in its contacts with Europe?

[Figueroa] Not through our own choice. We want to prioritize our relation with Europe, and I understand that it has been first concentrating on consolidating its economic and political unity, which causes a political erosion. Europe is now beginning to look toward Latin America—it has already given signals—and it regards with concern the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], and the Asian-Pacific treaty that is beginning to materialize after APEC [Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation]. I think that the European Union and the countries mentioned should recover the role they had in the past: They were countries that in the past cooperated economically with Latin America; they helped form our political systems; they transferred to us their political systems, their working culture; and they worked for the development of our countries.

[Oyarzun] Some governments have been more pro-Europe, others more pro-United States, and others have been more pro-Latin America. In what direction is the Frei administration looking?

[Figueroa] I think that the president has been very clear, and he is the one who establishes the foreign policy. He

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said that the priority is clearly Latin America, because it is the continent to which we belong, and the one with which we have the greatest historical, cultural, geographical, traditional, and economic ties.

[Oyarzun] Is it true that Finance Minister Aninat is in charge of the negotiations with the United States and North America, and that you are in charge of Mercosur [Common Market of the South]?

[Figueroa] No, the situation is different. International economic relations correspond by law to the Foreign Ministry, which does not exclude that the president—and in this case, with the approval of the foreign minister—should have assigned the finance minister to negotiate with NAFTA or reach a bilateral agreement with the United States, with the approval of the rest of the countries involved. All the rest of the negotiations are carried out by the Foreign Ministry unless another complex negotiation comes up. We could then entrust the economy minister to conduct it. We want to distribute the very complex work.

[Oyarzun] Have there been any conflicts between you and the finance minister?

[Figueroa] No, none, and such a question shows the lack of knowledge there is about our work. Few ministers have worked so close together and in harmony as Minister Aninat and I.

[Oyarzun] Are you optimistic regarding the arbitration of Laguna del Desierto?

[Figueroa] I am calm because we have made a great defense, based on historical, geographical, juridical elements, and maps before the arbitrage court, which are a full guarantee for us. I am optimistic because no one who is on a trial thinks he is going to lose; but above everything I am calm because we have done everything possible.

[Oyarzun] Was the meeting of the Higher Council for National Security (Consusena) held only for briefing purposes?

[Figueroa] I report on the state of the arbitration of Laguna del Desierto in the following order: First, the president of the Republic; then the Foreign Policy Advisory Council, which is made up of the chiefs of staff of the Armed Forces, all the former foreign ministers, and a group of international law experts; I informed the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies; the Chamber of Deputies, in a closed session; the Consusena, which is the organization that was created to advise the president of the Republic on border subjects; and the Carabineros. I will later inform the media directors. That is, within the secrecy required by the arbitration, I have outlined a strategy to inform Chilean society, which I consider very important in a subject like this one.

[Oyarzun] And the Italian rogatory letters?

[Figueroa] I am like a mailbox. I receive them and send them to the Supreme Court of Justice. We receive rogatory letters not only from Italy; we receive 40 or 50 rogatory letters per week, and we send abroad about 60 per week. All international judicial relations are done through the Foreign Ministry.

[Oyarzun] What is your opinion about the rogatory letter sent by the Italian judge?

[Figueroa] There is no reason for me to give an opinion about it, and I will not give an opinion about it.

Government To Transfer Land to Indigenous Communities

PY2408225794 Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 15 Aug 94 p C5

[Text] The framework agreement signed by National Resources Minister Adriana DelPiano and Mauricio Huenchulaf, director of the National Corporation for Indigenous Development [Corporacion Nacional de Desarrollo Indigena] (Conadi), will allow studies to be begun as soon as possible on the situation of fiscal properties occupied by indigenous people, in order to transfer them to Conadi when appropriate.

The agreement is important, as it will serve to really implement the new state policy regarding the state properties that are occupied by the different ethnic groups in the country.

Its objective is to resolve very old problems, to do justice, and to facilitate the sustainable development of the indigenous communities.

The National Resources Ministry will transfer fiscal funds to Conadi in the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Regions. Conadi will in turn hand over the funds to the Mapuche, Pehuenche, and Huilliche indigenous communities.

The transfer will begin in the Tenth Region. This will help solve the problems presented by the indigenous communities to the Land Regularization Commission that used to function in Chiloe and Osorno.

In Chiloe, the transfer will include fiscal land in Compu, Chadmo, and Tepuhueico of approximately 10,000 hectares. This will benefit 500 Huilliche families.

In Osorno, seven fiscal properties will be transferred. They are located in San Juan de la Costa, and cover 28,093 hectares for the benefit of 300 Huilliche families. A process will also begin for the regularization of land for about 400 Huilliche families without land titles in San Juan de la Costa (Llesquehue and Bahia Mansa), and in Chiloe (Quellon).

The framework agreement between the National Resources Ministry and Conadi also includes the continuation of the transfer of fiscal land to the Mapuche communities in Panguipulli (Culan), and Arauco

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(Tirua), and to the Pehuenque families in Lonquimay. It is estimated that the transfer of land will cover 10,000 hectares for the benefit of about 500 families.

In the 12th Region, studies will be made on the situation of the Kawashkar community in Puerto Eden, which is an area under the jurisdiction of the future Area for the Development of Indigenous People.

The Areas for the Development of Indigenous People, according to Article 26, "are territories in which the organizations of the state administration will concentrate their action for the benefit of the harmonious development of the indigenous people and their communities."

Pinochet Criticizes Those Who 'Attack His Institution'

PY2508001594 Santiago Television Nacional de Chile Imagen Internacional in Spanish 1800 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Text] Completing 21 years as commander in chief of the Army, General Augusto Pinochet said there are people who attack his institution in an effort to divide it.

Gen. Pinochet no longer lives in the house of the commanders in chief on Presidente Errazuriz Avenue and so the traditional greeting of the Santiago garrison officers took place early this morning at the military school.

Major General Guido Riquelme described him as the modernizer of the Army. Gen. Pinochet received the greetings of the entire corps. No one was missing. Officers came in from everywhere, from Arica to Punta Arenas. The military attaches from Spain and Washington also arrived.

Army Deputy Commander Jorge Lucar reaffirmed the Army's unrestricted loyalty. He said history is already judging Pinochet. He cited recognition from Eastern Europe, Asia, and even from a Russian Army general. Gen. Pinochet expressed his gratitude and recalled past events, warning that the objective is to not reopen wounds. He criticized those who attack the Army.

[Begin Pinochet recording] ...those who intend to damage or to cause divisions within the institution. [end recording]

Ecuador

Ω Poll Reveals Government 'Credibility Crisis'

94P21093A

[Editorial Report] The Ecuadoran Government and most major institutions are suffering from a "credibility crisis," according to the results of an Informe Confidencial poll summarized by Quito HOY on 24 July. An unspecified number of Guayaquil and Quito residents were asked to describe their confidence in the government, Congress, and institutions that exert "substantial influence" on current national issues, such as the armed forces, the Catholic Church, the National Police, the Confederation of Indian Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), and the Chamber of Agriculture. According to Informe Confidencial pollsters, only the Catholic Church still retains a "good image" among the people. The Armed Forces, they observed, although traditionally one of the country's most respected institutions, is suffering a "slow decline" in credibility, and all other institutions elicited negative reactions from the populace. The Government and Congress were described as the "ugly ducklings" inspiring "the highest levels of distrust" among respondents residing in the country's two major cities.

Government, Congress

Informe Confidencial found that 87 percent of Quito residents and 81 percent of Guayaquil residents polled said they had "little" or "no" confidence in government. An "unprecedented" 81 percent of Quito respondents and 74 percent of Guayaquil respondents expressed their distrust in Congress, according to the Informe Confidencial pollsters.

Agriculture, CONAIE

The Chamber of Agriculture and CONAIE, involved in negotiations over the revision of the Agrarian Reform Law, inspired somewhat different levels of confidence among residents of the two cities. Whereas in Quito a small majority of 54 percent said they had "some" or "a lot of" confidence in the Chamber of Agriculture, 52 percent of Guayaquil residents said they did not trust it. Results were similar for the CONAIE, where 47 percent of Quito residents had confidence in it, but 64 percent of Guayaquil residents said they distrusted that organization. According to the polling organization, the different responses of the two cities are due to the "conservative" tendencies of the highlands, dominated by Quito, versus the "open-minded" nature of the coastal areas, headed by the city of Guayaquil. The pollsters also observed that CONAIE's attempt to win over the urban population to its cause has failed partially because of the organization's increasingly "racist" and "extremist" proposals and its "exaggerated demands for autonomy."

Armed Forces, Catholic Church

Sixty percent of Quito residents and 56 percent of Guayaquil residents expressed confidence in the Armed Forces, while 68 percent of Quito residents and 64 percent of Guayaquil residents polled expressed confidence in the Catholic Church. According to the pollsters, the Church maintains its "good image" among the population because of its "mediating role in various conflicts." Because of this mediating role, confidence in the Church, they said, is expected to increase.

National Police

As for the National Police, the poll's authors observed that "a few months ago it had started to regain the

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confidence of the people." That confidence was abruptly shaken, however, by the recent corruption scandal involving the police commander and other high-ranking officers.

Ω Demographic Projections for Year 2000

94p21098a

[Editorial Report] Ecuador is a country demographically "in transition," according to figures compiled by the Population and Responsible Parenthood Studies Center (CEPAR) and discussed at a Guayaquil conference on "communication, population, and development." Highlights of CEPAR's studies and projections are reported in Quito EL COMERCIO on 11 and 18 July with a juxtaposed article announcing the UN International Conference on Population and Development to be held in Cairo in September. CEPAR concludes that Ecuador's development and population growth are "uneven." Although the population growth rate is expected to decline from "moderate" to "low" after the turn of the century, it "will surpass the production of food, resources, jobs, and wealth," as well as make more demands on the health and educational systems. While there will be a decrease in overall mortality rates, especially infant and juvenile, rising life expectancy will put pressure on social security and pension systems. "Accelerated" urbanization will strain the resources of the country's two largest cities, Guayaquil and Quito.

Growth Rate

According to CEPAR, Ecuador had approximately 1 million inhabitants at the turn of the century. By 1950 it had 3.4 million and in 1993 the population reached some 11 million. The growth rate during these years was over 2.5 percent. CEPAR projects that the country's population will be 12.8 million by the year 2000 and 15.936 million by the year 2015. The growth rate will have declined to 2.1 percent by the end of the century and will decrease even further to 1.35 percent by the year 2015. The Gross Reproduction Rate is expected to decrease to 3.2 children per woman which will lead to a reduction in the Crude Birth Rate, from 32 to 28 per 1,000.

Age Distribution

By the year 2000, 35 percent of the population—approximately 4.54 million—will be 15 years or younger and life expectancy will increase from 67 (for males) in 1993 to 69.5 years. The number of retirees over 60 will increase 46 percent, 170,000 more from 1990. CEPAR expects a 27 percent reduction in the adult mortality rate for those 15-39 years, as well as decreased mortality for those over 60.

Urban Growth

It is estimated that 63 percent—7.951 million—of the country's population will live in urban areas by the year 2000, compared with 5.7 million in 1990. Quito's population will have reached 1.5 million and Guayaquil's 2.7 million.

Poverty

The 8.1 million Ecuadoreans living in poverty in 1990 will have risen to 10 million by 2000, a 23 percent increase. Some 88 percent of the poor will live in cities.

Employment

By the year 2000, the number of underemployed Ecuadoreans will have risen to 2.8 million and the number of unemployed to 743,000, a 32 percent increase from 1990. CEPAR expects the Economically Active Population (EAP)—defined as anyone at least 12 years old—to reach 5.054 million, approximately 1 million more than in 1993. According to the study, the EAP is increasing faster than the country's overall growth rate. The young EAP will increase 26 percent and there will be a 31 percent increase in the female EAP. The labor sector will have to absorb 981,000 workers in the cities and 257,000 workers in the rural areas by 2000, so CEPAR estimates that 124,000 jobs must be created annually.

Health

By the year 2000, 2,400 doctors and 4,500 hospital beds will be needed, 20 and 27 percent increases, respectively.

Education

CEPAR expects 250,000 additional students in primary and secondary schools by the year 2000 and adds that a 23 percent increase in enrollment is necessary if 1990 school attendance levels are to be maintained. Furthermore, if current teacher/student ratios are to be maintained (30:1 for primary and 13:1 for secondary), a total of 14,000 teachers must be hired, a 23 percent increase.

Housing, Basic Services

If the current averages of 4.8 persons per dwelling in urban areas and 5 in rural areas are to be maintained, 498,000 dwellings will have to be constructed by 2000, a 23 percent increase. To maintain the current percentages of the population having access to piped potable water (55.1 percent) and private or public sewerage systems, including "latrines," (74.2 percent), these services will need to be extended to an additional 3.1 million people, according to CEPAR.

Peru

Perez de Cuellar Campaign Faulted for Leftists

PY2408233694 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1728 GMT 23 Aug 94

[Article by Victor Robles]

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[Excerpts] Lima, 22 Aug (EFE)—The participation of well-known leftist Peruvians in Javier Perez de Cuellar's electoral campaign is causing doubts and fear that they will become a heavy political burden for the former UN secretary general, according to political analysts.

The first criticism came from the media, in terming the presence of leftists on diplomat Perez de Cuellar's team "excessive."

Perez de Cuellar downplayed this criticism, asserting that he seeks "national harmony" and is willing to work with whoever wants to support him, "no matter what sector they represent."

Among the most outstanding leftists participating in his campaign are attorney Carlos Chipoco, who is now the obvious leader of the movement Unity for Peru [Union Por el Peru, UPP] created to promote the candidacy of the diplomat.

There is also Daniel Estrada, mayor of the southern city of Cusco; Augusto Castro, UPP coordinator in Puno; journalist Julio Schiappa; and other leaders of the dismantled United Left (IU) coalition.

Former Economy Minister Carlos Bolona warned that gathering people of "various political tendencies" in a single movement "may help to win an election, but not to govern."

Other more straightforward critics assert that Perez de Cuellar "has become the candidate of the left."

The lack of confidence in Perez de Cuellar's "leftist circle" is understandable, because none of its members has publicly abandoned his tendency in favor of statism, which is contradictory to the liberal economic model proposed by the diplomat.

Most of them are, rather, linked to the Democratic Left Movement (MDI), which openly criticizes the market economy model established in 1990, which it terms "neoliberal."

Although leftists have never governed the country, their image was tarnished by the failure of former President Alan Garcia's administration, as 89 percent of Peruvians identify him as a leftist, according to surveys. [passage omitted]

In view of this, analysts believe that Perez de Cuellar's decision to seek the support of obvious leftists is a mistake, and feel that he must rectify his campaign if he is truly seeking the presidency.

Board Approves Text of New Electoral Law

PY2408220194 Lima EXPRESO in Spanish 11 Aug 94 p A4

[Text] The National Electoral Board [JNE] has approved the Single Integrated Text (TUI) [Texto Unico Integrado] of the law that will govern the general elections on Sunday, 9 April 1995.

The text has 256 articles. It was approved by a JNE resolution and published yesterday on a special supplement by the official gazette EL PERUANO.

The document ratifies the agreement achieved in Congress, that spouses and blood relatives to the fourth degree, and in-laws to the second degree, of the current president or the previous president are ineligible to run for the presidency or the vice presidency of the Republic, or for a seat in Congress.

The following officials will also be ineligible for those posts: ministers, vice ministers, the president of Foncodes [National Compensation and Social Development Fund], and members of the Armed Forces and the National Police unless they resigned at least six months prior to the elections.

Likewise, the comptroller general of the Republic, regional officials, bank and insurance superintendents, and the Central Bank president are ineligible—again unless they resigned at least six months prior to the elections.

Members of the constitutional court, the National Council for Magistrates, the judicial branch, the attorney general's office, the JNE, and the ombudsman and the tax administration superintendent are also ineligible.

The TUI states that if no candidate for president and vice president of the Republic obtains the absolute majority, a second election will be held within 30 days of the publication of the official results. The second round will be held between the two candidates who have obtained the largest number of votes.

Within five days of the publication of registered candidacies, both for the presidency or for congressional seats, any citizen registered in the electoral records may object to a candidate through proven documents. These objections must be accompanied by evidence of a deposit in the name of the JNE at the National Bank of 200 soles per objected candidate. This money will be returned if the objection is proven.

The organization and holding of elections will be in the hands of provincial election boards which will be based in the respective provincial capitals. When the circumstances require, the JNE will establish an integrated board with two or more provinces.

Concerning the election of congressmen, the TUI states that the national territory will be taken as a single electoral district, and that the common denominator [cifra repartidora] will be used as a mechanism to allocate congressional seats.

Each congressional candidate must submit 100,000 signatures for each list of candidates, including their registration card numbers.

The JNE will order electoral registry officials to verify the authenticity of the signatures and reject a registration if it does not have the required number by the deadline.

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Uruguay

Minister Interviewed on Mercosur Outcome

PY2408192694 Montevideo EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO in Spanish 10 Aug 94 p 10, 11

["Synthesis" of an interview with Economy and Finance Minister Ignacio de Posadas by EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO staff reporters Fernando Gutierrez and Oscar Vilas; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] [EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO] What is your evaluation of the agreement reached among Mercosur [Common Market of the South] countries from the viewpoint of national interest?

[De Posadas] First we must go back to the beginning. One of the fears that caused a lot of agitation was that a small country like Uruguay would join such a large economy as that of Brazil, which is closed and very unstable.

Three years later we are seeing Brazil as we imagined. It has used the Mercosur to open its economy. Brazil has made a very great effort to reduce its tariffs and has made a very great effort to achieve stability.

In addition to the fears that were fanned a lot, there were a series of accusations against our government—charging that it had no policy to develop the productive aspects or to defend national interests, that it is willing to let some productive sectors decline because the government wants to create a country of services, and you know the rest of the story.

If when one reviews the economy over the past few years, one can observe a change that includes consolidation, growth, and higher levels of investment. One thus arrives at the conclusion that Uruguay is better off today than it was at the end of 1989 or the beginning of 1990, that it is much more solid. If one looks at what was negotiated in Buenos Aires, one can see that accusations that the government was not interested in defending the basic aspects of national production were a lie.

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO] Did you believe the pressure, the criticism could affect the progress of the negotiations?

[De Posadas] The greatest pressure was caused by the long-term economic consequences of the negotiations. All the electoral cackling is merely incidental.

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO] Surely the government's success in the negotiations give the National Party a high degree of support in view of the upcoming elections?

[De Posadas] I suppose so, but it is only because matters came out that way. If the negotiations had been carried out six months or two years ago, however, the responsibility would have been the same.

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMIC] You have always said that one must cede in this type of negotiations in order to obtain benefits. In what areas would you say Uruguay had to make concessions?

[De Posadas] It was just a stage of negotiations within a process that evolved over a period of more than two years. Thus, when this stage arrived we already realized that some topics could not be resolved at the technical level because they would need a political decision. Technicians were charged with clearing the table. For some time we knew which topics would remain on the table. We outlined our position and informed the other countries well in advance so as to avoid a forced negotiation, which can be somewhat dramatic. That is how we submitted our position. We told the other countries what Uruguay needed in order to be a partner in a customs union—in other words, what would remain in a "minimum package" of what was on the table. It was not as if we were seeking an advantage; in this case it was what we needed and that is the way we planned it.

We obtained practically everything. If one checks the list that we submitted one can see that there are practically no crosses.

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMIC] Uruguay did not cede anything?

[De Posadas] That is the way it was with this package. It was not that we did not want to negotiate, we simply said: "Without these conditions we cannot became a partner."

I am not saying that during the three years of negotiations Uruguay did not cede anything. I am saying that after three years our position was that without these points we could not become a partner. We did not adopt this position just to swagger, we did so because it was a reality.

The final tariff framework that was approved is not exactly what we wanted; some are better than what we have, others are not. I believe, in general, it is better to have one common tariff than four national tariffs.

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMIC] You have always termed the external tariff as the cost a country must pay to join Mercosur....

[De Posadas] Any tariff is a cost. A common external tariff must be negotiated in order to join a customs union. At the beginning our positions were different, but through negotiations this has changed. There may be cases where the cost is higher, but there are others where the benefits are greater. Only time will confirm this.

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO] Did you at any time feel you were going to fail and that an agreement would not be reached?

[De Posadas] It was very hard, the pressure was very great, and the responsibility was also very great. Everything "was an uphill struggle."

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[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO] You got up during the middle of the meeting and withdrew from the negotiating table because the validity of the PEC [Trade Expansion Protocol, signed with Brazil] and the CAUCE [Argentine-Uruguayan Agreement on Economic Cooperation] were not accepted?

[De Posadas] Yes, that is true.

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO] That was a bit strong, wasn't it?

[De Posadas] Well, there was no other way to play it. It was coherent with what we had always said, that what we sought was a need, not an advantage. [passage omitted]

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO] What is the main advantage of maintaining the agreements?

[De Posadas] The PEC and the CAUCE each have three parts. The first part is the rule for access that maintains its importance and gives us some predictability because there is still the possibility that safeguard clauses will be introduced. The second part is that the rules of origin will be maintained at their current levels of 50 percent and 50 percent. And the third part involves temporary admission. We made it clear that these ancillary requirements are only temporary.

Regarding the rules of origin, agreement was reached that there would be a descending scale where the products included in the rule of 50 percent and 50 percent would drop to 60-40. This will also apply to products included in temporary admissions.

Our task now is to create the scale and the methodology to be used, which will be the same as that applied to the lists of tariff exceptions. We asked the various sectors to reach agreement and make a proposal. [passage omitted]

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO] What chances do you give the achievement the common market, which is the explicit objective of the Treaty of Asuncion?

[De Posadas] It has always been said that the schedule was too short and that we wanted to accomplish in four years what Europe was unable to accomplish in 40. I believe that to have reached a customs union agreement is very important and it must now be consolidated. The other objectives will take longer.

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO] Do you not believe we should at this time begin harmonizing macroeconomic aspects like exchange policies?

[De Posadas] Some of these aspects were agreed on in Buenos Aires. For example it was agreed that the exchange policy cannot continue to be used to stimulate exports.

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO] Does everyone agree on this point?

[De Posadas] That is at least written in the agreements, the difficulties will crop up later.

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO] The agreements establish that Argentina will continue its reimbursements to exporters, does this not harm Uruguay's agricultural producers?

[De Posadas] A period of transition was granted, and it was agreed that the GATT mechanisms would be used. The idea is to implement two situations: One motivates intra-Mercosur exports and the other covers exports to third countries. You know we had problems adapting to this, as did Argentina.

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO] Do you know if Argentina will eliminate the entire statistical tax in 1995?

[De Posadas] It is one of the points that will be on the table during the upcoming negotiations. It has not been defined yet.

[EL OBSERVADOR ECONOMICO] The government has always given importance to a common trade policy and to guarantees against unilateral positions that distort trade, such as the importation of subsidized products. Was this achieved?

[De Posadas] The practical component is necessary in all these things. One begins by "setting the rules of the game," and then the score has to be evened. A regulation regarding subsidies is about to be concluded. There is no disagreement regarding the drafting of the instrument.

'Leftist' Group Calls for 'Revolutionary Justice'

PY2408174594 Montevideo BUSQUEDA in Spanish 18 Aug 94 p 18

[Text] Leftist radical activists have decided to join forces in the Popular Workers Front (FOP) [Frente Obrero Popular], which holds that "revolutionary justice" is "just," and proposes to do away with "imperialism" and "capitalism" and install "socialism with a workers democracy."

The FOP has been created by the Uruguayan Revolutionary Movement (MRO); Socialist Convergence [Convergencia Socialista] (which has Trotskyist roots); anarchists; members of the neighborhood councils of Villa Teresa, Paso Molino, Belevedere, La Teja, and El Cerro; and former militants of the People's Participation Movement (MPP) and of the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU).

The coalition's first meeting was held on 12 August in the Progreso Club, which is located in the heart of La Teja, and according to its organizers, some 150 persons participated. The same sources indicated that the club was not chosen by mere chance: Tabare Vazquez, the presidential candidate of the Broad Front, was once the club's president. It must also be noted that the FOP disagrees completely with the Broad Front's platform.

The FOP has prepared an "emergency program" that contains demands that were watered down or directly

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filed away by the Broad Front: "Salaries and pensions that equal the cost of the family basket," the "nonpayment of the foreign debt," "state control of the banking sector," "state control of trade and all monopolistic groups," and "an agrarian revolution with the expropriation of large landed estates."

Another FOP document states that "we have confidence in the struggle of the workers and the people to obtain our demands and socialism with a workers democracy. In this respect, we will resort to, always jointly with the workers, every type of struggle that will lead us to a rupture with imperialism and to an end to capitalism."

Mario Rossi Garretano, the leader of the MRO, told BUSQUEDA that "when we say 'all types of struggle,' this includes revolutionary violence, the violence of the majority, and the violence of the working class. It is a just violence, because it will lead the majority to assume (its) rights."

Rossi, whose group left the Broad Front when its leadership was about to expel him for his preaching of violence, indicated that if, within the current institutional framework, "the country's majority" understands that an armed uprising is justifiable, "then history will note that we were united with the majority."

He added that the FOP will try to "support conflicts, the takeover of land, and all those who rise to defend a just demand."

Ruben Sassano, adviser to the neighborhood council of La Teja and a FOP leader, said that "we do not reject the idea of the armed struggle if all democratic channels are closed to us, even bourgeois democratic channels."

"The problem is: Either they resolve the economic crisis, or the situation becomes more acute," he maintained. He then said that "the workers are not to blame if the people take up an ax or a stone to defend themselves; the culprits are those who are creating an army of unemployed."

Sassano indicated that the traditional parties are the FOP's "main rivals," but he also criticized the "rightist sector of the Broad Front," which, he indicated, has distorted the coalition's principles.

Moreover, he maintained that this "right" of the Broad Front does not include the MPP, the Unir [expansion unknown], and the Broad Front Unity Movement (CUF). These organizations will be invited to join the FOP.

The coalition will decide in September whether it will present candidates for the national elections in November.

Injuries Reported in Basque Extradition Clash

PY2508032494 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 2304 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Montevideo, 24 Aug (AFP-NA)—At least three policemen and an undetermined number of civilians were injured on 24 August during a clash between security forces and demonstrators who oppose the extradition of three Basque citizens arrested in Uruguay. This was reported by witnesses to the incident.

The clash took place when riot police riding on horseback charged some 4,000 workers who had convened outside the Filtro Hospital in Montevideo, to show their solidarity with three Basques staging a hunger strike so as not to be extradited to Spain.

Deputy Helios Sarthou from the leftist Broad Front coalition, who was at the site of the incidents, commented that "it was like a pitched battle."

The demonstrators responded by hurling stones at police, who sought to clear the area surrounding the hospital and allow an amublance access to the Basques to transport them to the airport, where a Spanish Royal Air Force plane is awaiting the detainees to take them to Madrid.

Some shots were heard during the clash. Interior Minister Angel Gianola then reported that a policeman and two other people sustained injuries.

Physicians from emergency mobile units who were summoned to the area pointed out that they provided assistance to over 20 people who suffered injuries and cuts in the clashes.

Gianola and trade union leaders called upon demonstrators to "keep calm" and to express their opinions "peacefully."

Mikel Ibanez, Jesus Goitia, and Luis Lizarralde—the Basque citizens whose extradition has been requested by Spanish justice in having been charged with belonging to the separatist organization ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty]—have been on hunger strike for 14 days to protest their deportation.

The interior minister said that "the health condition of the Basque citizens is delicate, but the physicians monitoring their health are of the opinion that they can be taken to the airplane."

He announced that the three alleged "ETA members" will be taken to the airport and will then leave for Madrid "as soon as the Spanish plane is ready to take off."

He went on to say that "the Uruguayan Government's decision to comply with the extradition ordered by Uruguayan justice is final, and nothing will make us change our mind."

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Venezuela

Foreign Minister: Country Unwilling To Receive Cubans

PA2508015394 Paris AFP in Spanish 1401 GMT 24 Aug 94

[Text] Caracas, 24 Aug (AFP)—According to statements made public today in Caracas, Venezuelan Foreign Affairs Minister Miguel Angel Burelli has said that Venezuela is unwilling to receive Cuban refugees fleeing their country to go to the United States.

Questioned about whether U.S. President Bill Clinton had asked Venezuela to receive groups of Cubans to lessen the immigration pressures on his country, Burelli told journalists that "this possibility has not been considered, nor will we accept" refugees coming from Cuba.

As for the position taken by the administration of President Rafael Caldera on the political crisis prevailing in Cuba, the foreign minister maintained that Venezuela is on the lookout for any new developments on the island.

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